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 REMOVING THE LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO OFFERING 
LIFETIME ANNUITIES IN PENSION PLANS* 
 
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN† 
 
*** 
Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings—is 
probably the greatest risk facing current and future retirees in the United 
States. At present, for example, a 65-year-old man has a 50 percent chance 
of living to age 82 and a 20 percent chance of living to age 89, and a 65-
year-old woman has a 50 percent chance of living to age 85 and a 20 percent 
chance of living to age 92. The joint life expectancy of a 65-year-old couple 
is even more remarkable: there is a 50 percent chance that at least one 65-
year-old spouse will live to age 88 and a 30 percent chance that at least one 
will live to 92. In short, many individuals and couples will need to plan for 
the possibility of retirements that can last for 30 years or more. There were 
48.6 million retirees in the United States in 2014, but there are expected to 
be 66.4 million retirees in 2025 and 82.1 million in 2040.  
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One of the best ways to protect against longevity risk is by securing 
a stream of lifetime income with a traditional defined benefit pension plan 
or a lifetime annuity. Over the years, however, there has been a decided shift 
away from traditional pensions and towards 401(k) plans and other defined 
contribution plans that typically distribute benefits in the form of lump sum 
distributions rather than as lifetime annuities. When given the choice, people 
rarely choose to receive annuity distributions, nor is it common for people 
to buy annuities in the retail annuity market. All in all, Americans will have 
longer and longer retirements, yet fewer and fewer retirees will have secure, 
lifetime income streams. 
This Article considers how changes in the laws and regulations 
governing pensions and annuities could help promote secure, lifetime 
income streams. More specifically, this Article explores how the laws 
governing annuities could be changed to make voluntary annuitization more 
attractive and how pension laws could be changed to incentivize plan 
sponsors to offer more lifetime income options and to encourage plan 
participants to select those options. 
After a brief introduction, Part II of this Article provides an overview 
of Social Security, pensions, annuities, and other lifetime income 
mechanisms in the United States. Next, Part III focuses on the legal rules 
that govern annuities and pension distributions, and Part IV discusses the 
role for pensions, annuities, and other lifetime income mechanisms in 
providing secure, lifetime income streams. Finally, Part V considers some 
options for statutory and regulatory changes that would promote greater 
annuitization of retirement savings. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement savings—is 
probably the greatest risk facing current and future retirees in the United 
States.1 At present, for example, a 65-year-old man has a 50 percent chance 
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., Youngkyun Park, Retirement Income Adequacy with Immediate and 
Longevity Annuities, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 357, 2011), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-2011_No357_Annuities.pdf; Peter 
Nakada, Chris Breux, Mehrdad Honarkhah, Chris Hornsby, Dean Tolla & Rebecca 
Vessenes, The Fundamentals of Longevity Risk, 17 J. ALT. INV. 55 (2014); Diane 
Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play in Easing Risks in 
Public Pension Plans?, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. 6 (Issue Brief, Aug. 2015), 
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Annuities/annuities_aug_2015.p
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of living to age 82 and a 20 percent chance of living to age 89, and a 65-year-
old woman has a 50 percent chance of living to age 85 and a 20 percent 
chance of living to age 92.2 The joint life expectancy of a 65-year-old couple 
is even more remarkable: there is a 50 percent chance that at least one 65-
year-old spouse will live to age 88 and a 30 percent chance that at least one 
will live to 92.3 In short, many individuals and couples will need to plan for 
the possibility of retirements that can last for 30 years or more. There were 
48.6 million retirees in the United States in 2014, but there are expected to 
be 66.4 million retirees in 2025 and 82.1 million in 2040.4 
One of the best ways to protect against longevity risk is by securing 
a stream of lifetime income with a traditional defined benefit pension plan5 
or a lifetime annuity.6 Over the years however, there has been a decided shift 
                                                                                                                 
df; The Challenge of Longevity Risk: Making Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, 
AUSTL. ACTUARIES INST., INST. AND FACULTY OF ACTUARIES [U.K.], & AM. ACAD. 
OF ACTUARIES (Oct. 2015), http://www.actuary.org/files/The-Challenge-of-
Longevity-Risk.pdf. 
2 Calculations from the Soc’y of Actuaries, Life Expectancy Calculator (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.soa.org/Files/Xls/research-life-expect-calc.xls 
(based on the Social Security Administration’s 2010 mortality tables for the general 
U.S. population; an individual’s life expectancy is the average number of years until 
death). See also AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without 
Income for Life 4–8 (Discussion Paper, June 2013), https://www.actuary.org/ 
files/Risky-Business_Discussion-Paper_June_2013.pdf (showing the probability of 
living from age 65 to various ages and discussing various factors that can affect that 
probability); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Retirement & Survivors Benefits: Life Expectancy 
Calculator (last visited Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.socialsecurity.gov/ 
oact/population/longevity.html (a calculator that can be used to estimate individual 
and joint life expectancies). 
3 Soc’y of Actuaries, Life Expectancy Calculator, supra note 2.   
4 Robert A. Kerzner (President and CEO, LIMRA, LOMA, LL Global), 
Presentation to Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance 4 (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/Documents/LIMRA8.6.15.pdf. 
5 As more fully discussed in Part II.C.1.a, infra, in a defined benefit plan, an 
employer promises employees a specific “benefit” at retirement. For example, a 
traditional defined benefit plan might promise to pay a long-time employee a pension 
equal to 60 percent of her final pay for the rest of her life. 
6 As more fully discussed in Part II.D.2, infra, an annuity is a financial 
instrument (i.e., an insurance contract) that converts a lump sum of money into a 
stream of income payable over a period of years, typically for life. See, e.g., U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Annuities, http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm (last 
updated Apr. 6, 2011); Annuities, INVESTOR.GOV, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://m.investor.gov/investing-basics/investment-products/annuities (last visited 
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away from traditional pensions and towards 401(k) plans7 and other defined 
contribution plans8 that typically distribute benefits in the form of lump sum 
distributions rather than as lifetime annuities.9 When given the choice, 
people rarely choose to receive annuity distributions,10 nor is it common for 
people to buy annuities in the retail annuity market.11 All in all, Americans 
will have longer and longer retirements, yet fewer and fewer retirees will 
have secure, lifetime income streams. 
This Article considers how changes in the laws and regulations 
governing pensions and annuities could help promote secure, lifetime 
income streams. More specifically, this Article explores how the laws 
governing annuities could be changed to make voluntary annuitization more 
attractive and how pension laws could be changed to incentivize plan 
sponsors to offer more lifetime income options and to encourage plan 
participants to select those options. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of Social Security, 
pensions, annuities, and other lifetime income mechanisms in the United 
States. Next, Part III focuses on the legal rules that govern annuities and 
pension distributions, and Part IV discusses the role for pension, annuities, 
and other lifetime income mechanisms in providing secure, lifetime income 
streams. Finally, Part V considers some options for statutory and regulatory 
changes that would promote greater annuitization of retirement savings. 
 
                                                                                                                 
July 19, 2016); American Council of Life Insurers, Glossary (“Annuity”), 
https://www.acli.com/Tools/Pages/Glossary.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2016); Life 
Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lifeannuity.asp (last 
visited July 19, 2016). The person holding an annuity is called an annuitant. See, 
e.g., Annuitant, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annuitant.asp 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annuitant.asp (last visited July 19, 2016). 
7 As more fully discussed in Part II.C.1.b, infra, 401(k) plans are retirement 
savings plans that are authorized by I.R.C. § 401(k) (2014). 
8 As more fully discussed in Part II.C.1.b, infra, in a defined contribution plan, 
the plan sponsor promises to make a specific “contribution” into an individual 
investment account for each employee. For example, an employer might contribute 
10 percent of annual compensation each year to each employee’s account, and, at 
retirement, each employee would be entitled to a benefit based on all those 
contributions plus investment earnings. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See infra Parts II.D.2 & IV.A. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, AND 
OTHER LIFETIME INCOME MECHANISMS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
Elderly Americans can generally count on Social Security benefits 
to cover at least a portion of their retirement income needs. In addition, 
retirees use pensions, annuities, and a variety of other mechanisms to ensure 
that they have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years. These are 
discussed in turn. 
 
A. SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retirees and their 
families.12 A worker builds Social Security protection by working in 
employment that is covered by Social Security and paying the applicable 
payroll taxes. At retirement, disability, or death, monthly benefits are paid to 
insured workers and to their eligible dependents and survivors. While “full 
retirement age” was once age 65, it is currently age 66, and it is gradually 
increasing to age 67 for workers born after 1959 (who reach age 67 in or 
after 2027).13 In January of 2016, Social Security paid retirement benefits to 
more than 40.2 million retired workers, and the average monthly benefit paid 
to a retired worker was $1343.68.14 
Social Security retirement benefits are financed primarily through 
payroll taxes imposed on individuals working in employment or self-
employment that is covered by the Social Security system.15 Workers over 
the age of 62 generally are entitled to Social Security retirement benefits if 
                                                                                                                 
12 See, e.g., HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK: 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, Chapter 1: Social Security Introduction and 
Overview (2014), http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/2014-green-book. 
13 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Retirement Planner: Full Retirement Age, 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm (last visited July 19, 2016).   
14 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, January 2016 2 tbl.2, 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2016-01.pdf (last visited 
July 19, 2016). 
15 For 2017, employees and employers each pay a Social Security payroll tax of 
6.2 percent on up to $127,200 of wages, for a combined Old-Age and Survivors and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) rate of 12.4 percent. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2017 Social 
Security Changes, https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2017.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016). Self-employed workers pay an equivalent OASDI tax 
of 12.4 percent on up to $127,200 of net earnings. Id.   
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they have worked in covered employment for at least 10 years.16 Benefits are 
based on a measure of the worker’s earnings history in covered 
employment.17 The benefit formula is highly progressive,18 and, as a result, 
the Social Security retirement system favors workers with low lifetime 
earnings relative to workers with higher lifetime earnings.19 These 
redistributive Social Security retirement benefits play an important role in 
reducing poverty among the elderly.20 Roughly two-thirds of aged Social 
Security beneficiaries receive at least half of their income from Social 
Security.21 
                                                                                                                 
16 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2015); 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2004). 
17 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Social Security Benefit Amounts, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
oact/cola/Benefits.html (last visited July 19, 2016). 
18 Benefits for retired workers are based on a measure of the worker’s earnings 
history in covered employment known as the “average indexed monthly earnings” 
(AIME). Id. The starting point for determining the worker’s AIME is to determine 
how much the worker earned each year through age 60. Once those “benefit 
computation years” and “covered earnings” for those years have been identified, the 
worker’s earnings are indexed for wage inflation, using the year the worker turns 60 
to index the earnings of prior years. The highest 35 years of earnings are then 
selected, and the other years are dropped out. The AIME is then computed as the 
average earnings for the remaining 35 years (420 months). The AIME is then linked 
by a progressive formula to the monthly retirement benefit payable to the worker at 
full retirement age, a benefit known as the “primary insurance amount” (PIA). For a 
worker turning 62 in 2016, the PIA equals 90 percent of the first $856 of the worker’s 
AIME, plus 32 percent of the AIME over $856 and through $5157 (if any), plus 15 
percent of the AIME over $5157 (if any). Id.; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Primary Insurance 
Amount, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html (last visited July 19, 2016).   
19 See, e.g., Michael Clingman, Kyle Burkhalter & Chris Chaplain, Money’s 
Worth Ratios Under The OASDI Program For Hypothetical Workers, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., OFF. OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY (Actuarial Note No. 2015.7, Mar. 2016),  
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/NOTES/ran7/index.html.   
20 See, e.g., Kathleen Romig, Social Security Lifts 21 Million Americans Out of 
Poverty, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://www.cbpp.org/blog/social-security-lifts-21-million-americans-out-of-
poverty-0. See also Kathleen Short, The Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2014 9 
tbl.4a, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Report No. P60-254, Sept. 2015), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p60-
254.pdf (showing that with Social Security, just 14.4 percent of elderly Americans 
were poor in 2014, but without it 50.0 percent would have been); NAT’L ACAD. OF 
SOC. INS., The Role of Benefits in Income and Poverty, https://www.nasi.org/learn/ 
socialsecurity/benefits-role (last visited July 19, 2016).     
21 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2015 ii 
(Publication No. 13-11785, Sept. 2015), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ 
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Benefits may be increased or decreased for several reasons. Most 
importantly, benefits are indexed each year for inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index.22 Also, the “retirement earnings test” can reduce the 
monthly benefits of individuals who have not yet reached full retirement age 
but who continue to work after starting to draw Social Security retirement 
benefits.23 
In addition, workers who retire before their full retirement age have 
their benefits actuarially reduced.24 On the other hand, benefits payable to 
workers who choose to retire after their full retirement age are actuarially 
increased (but only up to age 70).25 In effect, beneficiaries can buy additional 
annuity protection by delaying retirement.26 For example, consider a worker 
who reached age 62 in January 2016 and earned the maximum taxable 
amount under Social Security for every year of her working life. If she 
claimed her Social Security benefits at 62, she would get a starting benefit 
of $2102 per month, but if she instead waited until she is 65 to start drawing 
her benefits, she would get $2491 per month, and if she waited until age 70, 
she would get $3576 per month—and she could get even more when cost-
of-living increases and extra earnings are factored in.27 
In addition to Social Security benefits, a means-tested Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program provides monthly cash benefits to certain 
low-income elderly, disabled, or blind Americans.28 In 2016, the maximum 
federal benefit for a single individual is $733 per month, and the maximum 
                                                                                                                 
chartbooks/fast_facts/2015/fast_facts15.pdf (64 percent of aged beneficiaries 
received at least half of their income from Social Security in 2013).   
22 See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2017 Social Security Changes, supra note 15.   
23 42 U.S.C. § 403(f) (2000). 
24 42 U.S.C. § 402(q) (2015). 
25 42 U.S.C. § 402(w) (2015). 
26 See, e.g., Kenn Beam Tacchino, David A. Littell & Bruce D. Schobel, A 
Decision Framework for Optimizing the Social Security Claiming Age, 28 BENEFITS 
Q. 40 (2012), https://www.iscebs.org/Documents/PDF/bqpublic/bq212f.pdf; 
Melissa A. Z. Knoll & Anya Olsen, Incentivizing Delayed Claiming of Social 
Security Retirement Benefits Before Reaching the Full Retirement Age, 74 SOC. SEC. 
BULL. 21 (2014), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v74n4/v74n4p21.pdf.   
27 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Workers with Maximum-Taxable Earnings, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/examplemax.html (last visited July 19, 2016).   
28 See, e.g., HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK: 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 12, at Chapter 3: Supplemental 
Security Income. 
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for a couple is $1,100 per month.29 In January of 2016, almost 2.2 million 
elderly Americans received SSI benefits from the federal government, and 
the average monthly benefit was $434.68.30 
 
B. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
 
Before delving into the details of pensions, annuities, and other ways 
of providing lifetime retirement income, it is worth taking a brief look at the 
magnitude and nature of household retirement savings. According to the 
Federal Reserve Board, Americans had $27.3 trillion in household retirement 
assets at the end of 2015, including $11.3 trillion in defined benefit plans, 
$6.3 trillion in defined contribution plans, $7.4 trillion in individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs), and $2.3 trillion in annuities.31 While Americans 
can also use their other financial assets, and even their houses,32 to help 
provide them with retirement income, the primary focus of this Article is on 
the household retirement saving items identified by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Of the $8.5 trillion in private-sector pension plans, $3.1 trillion was 
held by defined benefit plans, and $5.4 trillion was held by defined 
contribution plans.33 On the other hand, of the $5.6 trillion in state and local 
pension plans, $5.2 trillion was held by defined benefit plans, and just $478 
billion was held by defined contribution plans.34 Similarly, of the $3.8 trillion 
                                                                                                                 
29 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSI Federal Payments for 2016, 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited July 19, 2016).   
30 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Monthly Statistical Snapshot, January 2016, supra note 
14, at 3 tbl.3.   
31 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED 
MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: FOURTH QUARTER 2015 (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf, at tbl.L.117. See also 
INV. CO. INST., Quarterly Retirement Market Data, https://www.ici.org/ 
research/stats/retirement (last visited July 19, 2016) (providing data on retirement 
savings assets in the United States for the most recent quarter). For a discussion of 
IRAs, see Part II.C.1.d, infra.   
32 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Frequently Asked Questions 
About HUD’s Reverse Mortgages, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/ 
program_offices/housing/sfh/hecm/rmtopten (last visited July 19, 2016).   
33 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED 
MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: FOURTH QUARTER 2015, supra note 31, at 
tbls.L.118, L.118.b & L.118.c.   
34 Id. at tbls.L.120, L.120.b & L.120.c. 
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in federal government pension plans, $3.3 trillion was held in defined benefit 
plans, and just $430 billion was held in defined contribution plans.35 
 
C. PENSION PLANS 
 
The United States has a “voluntary” private pension system, and 
employers can decide whether and how to provide pension benefits for their 
employees.36 However, when employers do provide pensions, those pensions 
are typically subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).37 Overall, in March of 2016, 66 percent of 
private-sector workers had access to ERISA retirement plans, and 49 percent 
of them participated.38 
To encourage Americans to save for retirement in our voluntary 
pension system, the government relies on two major approaches. First, most 
pension plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. Basically, employer 
contributions to a pension are not taxable to the employee;39 the pension 
fund’s earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt;40 and employees pay 
                                                                                                                 
35 Id. at tbls.L.119, L.119.b & L.119.c. A little bit of caution is warranted here, 
as the federal government includes both its funded and unfunded obligations to the 
plans as “assets” of the plans. For example, of the $3.8 trillion “held” by federal 
pensions, $1.7 trillion is identified as marketable and nonmarketable Treasury 
securities, and $1.8 trillion represent claims of the pension funds on the sponsor. Id. 
at tbl.L.119. 
36 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost 
of “Choice” in a Voluntary Pension System, N. Y. U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & 
EXEC. COMP. 6-1, 6-4–6-5 (2013). 
37 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 864. See generally STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (Comm. Print 2016), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4865&chk=4865&no_
html=1.    
38 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Employee Benefits in 
the United States—March 2016 5 tbl.1 (New Release No. USDL-16-1493, July 22, 
2016), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf.   
39 I.R.C. § 402 (2014). 
40 I.R.C. § 501(a) (2015). Most pensions hold assets in a trust. I.R.C. § 401(a) 
(2014); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., A Guide to Common Qualified Plan 
Requirements, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/A-Guide-to-Common-
Qualified-Plan-Requirements (last updated June 6, 2016) (“A trust is a medium 
under which the retirement plan assets are accumulated. The employer or employees, 
or both, contribute to the trust, which forms part of the retirement plan. The assets 
40 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 
 
tax only when they receive distributions of their pension benefits.41 
Nevertheless, the employer is allowed a current deduction for its 
contributions (within limits).42 Distributions from a pension plan may 
generally be rolled over tax-free to another pension plan or to an IRA.43 
Second, employers and workers are given great flexibility in designing their 
pension plans, in making contributions, and in making (or taking) 
distributions.44 
Despite these retirement savings incentives, pension coverage and 
participation rates are low. At any point in time, only about one out of two 
American workers have pension plans. For example, of the 157.3 million 
Americans workers in 2013, just 80.7 million (51.3 percent) worked for an 
employer (or union) that sponsored a retirement plan, and just 64.2 million 
(40.8 percent) participated in that plan.45 The probability of pension coverage 
                                                                                                                 
are held in the trust until distributed to the employees or their beneficiaries according 
to the plan’s provisions.”). In passing, however, it should be noted that so-called 
“qualified annuity plans” are invested in annuity contracts rather than held in a trust. 
I.R.C. §§ 403(a) (2008), 404(a)(2) (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED 
RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 
37, at 18.   
41 I.R.C. §§ 72 (2015), 402 (2014). See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
Pension and Annuity Income (Publication No. 575, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf. As distributions are generally taxed at ordinary income tax 
rates of up to 39.6 percent, retirement accounts are, in effect, “smaller than they 
appear.” Richard L. Kaplan, What Now? A Boomer’s Baedeker for the Distribution 
Phase of Defined Contribution Retirement Plans, N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4-1, 4-4 (2013).   
42 I.R.C. § 404 (2014).   
43 I.R.C. § 402(c) (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 21; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Rollovers of Retirement Plan and IRA Distributions, 
https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Rollovers-of-
Retirement-Plan-and-IRA-Distributions (last updated Feb. 19, 2016).   
44 Forman & Mackenzie, The Cost of “Choice” in a Voluntary Pension System, 
supra note 36, at 6−18.   
45 Craig Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: 
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013 9 fig.1, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue 
Brief No. 405, Oct. 2014), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_405_ 
Oct14.RetPart.pdf.   
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is greater for older workers, for whites, for highly educated workers, for full-
time workers, for higher-income workers, and for workers at larger firms.46 
Participation in IRAs is even lower than participation in pensions. 
For example, while 32 percent of U.S. households had an IRA in 2015, only 
around 14 percent of households made contributions to their IRAs (in 
2014).47 
 
1. Types of Pension Plans 
 
Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based on the 
nature of the benefits provided: defined benefit plans and defined 
contribution plans. 
 
a. Defined Benefit Plans 
 
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a specific 
benefit at retirement.48 For example, a plan might provide that a worker’s 
annual retirement benefit (B) is equal to 2 percent times the number of years 
of service (yos) times final average compensation (fac) (B = 2 percent × yos 
× fac). Under this traditional, final-average-pay formula, a worker who 
retires after 30 years of service with final average compensation of $50,000 
would receive a pension of $30,000 a year for life ($30,000 = 2 percent × 30 
yos × $50,000 fac).49  
                                                                                                                 
46 Id. at 10 fig.2. 
47 Sarah Holden & Daniel Schrass, The Role of IRAs in U.S. Households’ Saving 
for Retirement, 2015, 22(1) ICI RES. PERSP. 2, 19 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.ici.org/research/retirement. See also Craig Copeland, Individual 
Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and Rollovers, 2013; With 
Longitudinal Results 2010–2013: The EBRI IRA Database, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 
(Issue Brief No. 414, May 2015), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ 
EBRI_IB_414.May15.IRAs.pdf.   
48 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN 
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 10–11. To provide that benefit, 
the employer typically makes payments into a trust fund, contributed funds grow 
with investment returns, and eventually the employer withdraws funds from the trust 
fund to pay the promised benefits. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
Employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all 
of the investment risks and responsibilities. 
49 Final average compensation is often computed by averaging the worker’s 
salary over the last three or five years prior to retirement. Alternatively, some plans 
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The default benefit for defined benefit plans is a retirement income 
stream in the form of an annuity for life.50 While many defined benefit plans 
allow for lump sum distributions, most retirees receive lifetime annuities. 
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 67.8 percent of 
workers who left employment and retired with a defined benefit pension 
from 2000 through 2006 took the defined benefit plan annuity.51 For married 
participants, defined benefit plans (and some defined contribution plans) are 
required to provide a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA) as the 
normal benefit payment, unless the spouse consents to another form of 
distribution.52 Defined benefit plans generally cannot make in-service 
distributions to a participant before age 62, but they may permit loans to 
participants.53 
 
b. Defined Contribution Plans 
 
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply 
withholds a specified percentage of the worker’s compensation, which it 
                                                                                                                 
use career-average compensation instead of final-average compensation. Under a 
career-average earnings formula, benefits are based on a percentage of an average 
of career earnings for every year of service by the employee. See, e.g., William J. 
Wiatrowski, The last private industry pension plans: a visual essay, 135(12) 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 13 (2012), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/ 
12/art1full.pdf; Olivia S. Mitchell, with Erica L. Dykes, New Trends in Pension 
Benefit and Retirement Provisions, in BENEFITS FOR THE WORKPLACE OF THE 
FUTURE 110 (Olivia S. Mitchell, David S. Blitzstein, Michael Gordon & Judith F. 
Mazo, eds.); EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., Fundamentals Chapter 4 - Pension Plans, 
https://www.ebri.org/publications/books/index.cfm?fa=fund04 (last visited July 19, 
2016). 
50 In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide 
annuities, i.e., “definitely determinable benefits . . . . over a period of years, usually 
for life after retirement.” Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1) (2016). 
51 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-400, RETIREMENT INCOME: 
ENSURING INCOME THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES 26 
(2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11400.pdf. 
52 ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2014); I.R.C. § 401(a)(11) (2014). A QJSA 
is an immediate annuity for the life of the pension plan participant and a survivor 
annuity for the life of the participant’s spouse. ERISA § 205(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 
1055(d)(1) (2014); I.R.C. § 417(b) (2014). 
53 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Choosing a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit 
Plan, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Choosing-a-Retirement-Plan:-
Defined-Benefit-Plan (last updated Oct. 20, 2015). 
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contributes to an individual investment account for the worker.54 For 
example, contributions might be set at 10 percent of annual compensation. 
Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given year would have 
$5,000 contributed to an individual investment account for her ($5,000 = 10 
percent × $50,000). Her benefit at retirement would be based on all such 
contributions plus investment earnings.55 Many defined contribution plans 
also provide for loans to participants,56 and some plans can also provide in-
service “hardship” distributions.57 
Unlike defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans usually 
make distributions as lump sum or periodic distributions rather than as 
lifetime annuities.58 Indeed, relatively few defined contribution plans even 
offer annuity options, and, in any event, relatively few participants elect 
                                                                                                                 
54 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN 
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 10. 
55 Defined contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans 
because each worker has her own account, as opposed to defined benefit plans, 
where the plan’s assets are pooled for the benefit of all of the employees. ERISA § 
3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (2008). 
56 I.R.C. § 72(p) (2015); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 31–33; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement Topics - Plan Loans, https://www.irs.gov/ 
Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Topics-Loans (last 
updated May 26, 2016); Many Have Access to 401(k) Loans, Few Have Outstanding 
Balances, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Fast Fact No. 264, Jan. 16, 2014), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/FF.264.K-loans.16Jan142.pdf (87 percent of participants 
in the 2012 EBRI/ICI 401(k) database were in plans offering loans at year-end 
2012); see also Jack VanDerhei, Sarah Holden, Luis Alonso, Steven Bass & 
AnnMarie Pino, 401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, Account Balances, and Loan Activity 
in 2013, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 408, 2014), 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_408_Dec14.401(k)-update.pdf. 
57 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW 
AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND 
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 31–33. 
58 See, e.g., WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, INTERNATIONAL PENSION PLAN SURVEY: 
REPORT 2016, at 14 (2016), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/ 
en/insights/2016/02/international-pension-plan-survey-report-2015 (indicating that 
lump sums distributions are “by far the most prevalent” form of distribution for 
defined contribution plans). 
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those annuity options.59 There are exceptions like TIAA—which reports that 
around 75 percent of its beneficiaries receive annuity payments.60 Also, some 
                                                                                                                 
59 In 2010, just 18 percent of private industry workers in defined contribution 
plans had annuities available to them. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., National 
Compensation Survey: Health and Retirement Plan Provisions in Private Industry 
in the United States, 2010 tbl.21 (Bulletin 2770, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/ 
ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2010/ebbl0047.pdf. See also John E. Foster & David C. 
Zook, Selected characteristics of savings and thrift plans for private industry 
workers, 4(11) BEYOND THE NUMBERS: PAY & BENEFITS cht.3 (July 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-4/selected-characteristics-of-savings-and-
thrift-plans-for-private-industry-workers.htm (showing that just 17 percent of 
participants in private-sector thrift and savings plans had an annuity option available 
in 2012); Annual Defined Contribution Benchmarking Survey Ease of Use Drives 
Engagement in Saving for Retirement, 2015 Edition, DELOITTE 32 ex.5.1 (2015), 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/human-capital/us-
hc-annual-defined-benchmarking-survey-2015.pdf (only 5 percent of 401(k) plan 
sponsors included an in-plan retirement income product in the menu of options 
presented to participants); Michael J. Brien & Constantijn W.A. Panis, Annuities in 
the Context of Defined Contribution Plans 12–14 (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/deloitte2011.pdf (finding that just 6.1 percent of 
workers who retire with a defined contribution plan convert their account balance to 
an annuity, although additional annuitization probably takes place among those 
retirees who roll their defined contribution balances into IRAs); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-400, RETIREMENT INCOME: ENSURING INCOME 
THROUGHOUT RETIREMENT REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES, supra note 51, at 28 
(also a 6.1 percent election rate); Lawrence A. Frolik, Rethinking ERISA’s Promise 
on Income Security in a World of 401(k) Plans, 20(2) CONN. INS. L.J. 371 (2013–
2014); Carlos Figueiredo & Sandy Mackenzie, Older Americans’ Ambivalence 
Toward Annuities: Results of an AARP Survey of Pension Plan and IRA Distribution 
Choices, TIAA INST. 6 n.9 (2012), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/ 
pdf/institute/events/pdfs/Older+Americans+Ambivalence+Toward+Annuities.pdf 
(noting that the 54th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans carried out 
by the Plan Sponsor Council of America found that just 16.6 percent offered 
annuities as an option, while 60.2 percent offered periodic withdrawals); JOHN J. 
TOPOLESKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40707, 401(K) PLAN AND RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 25 (2011), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1785&context=key_workplace (only 21 percent of 
401(k) plans offered lifetime annuity options in 2007, and fewer than 10 percent of 
participants in those plans chose that annuity option); Paul Yakoboski, Retirees, 
Annuitization and Defined Contribution Plans, TIAA-CREF INST. 3, 5 (Apr. 2010), 
https://www.tiaa-crefinstitute.org/public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/ti_ 
definedcontribution0410.pdf (finding that only around 19 percent of retirees with 
significant defined contribution plan assets but little defined benefit pension income 
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public sector plans allow their retirees to convert the balances in their defined 
contribution plans to annuities.61 
In the United States, there are a variety of different types of defined 
contribution plans, including money purchase pension plans, target benefit 
plans, profit-sharing plans, stock bonus plans, and employee stock 
                                                                                                                 
annuitized a portion of their retirement savings); Beverly I. Orth, Approaches for 
Promoting Voluntary Annuitization, in 2008 Retirement 20/20 Conference (Society 
of Actuaries Monograph No. M-RS08-1, 2009), http://www.soa.org/library/ 
monographs/retirement-systems/retirement2020/2008/november/mono-2008-m-
rs08-01-orth.pdf; Michael Hurd & Constantijn Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, 
Maintain, or Annuitize Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, 90(12) J. OF 
PUB. ECON. 2213 (2006) (finding that just 7 percent of workers who retired from a 
job with a defined contribution plan converted their retirement savings into an 
annuity). 
60 Josh B. McGee, Defined-Contribution Pensions Are Cost Effective, CTR. FOR 
ST. AND LOC. LEADERSHIP AT THE MANHATTAN INST. 13, (Aug. 2015), 
https://www.manhattan-institute.org/download/6361/article.pdf; Josh B. McGee & 
Paul J. Yakoboski, Equivalent Cost for Equivalent Benefits: Primary DC Plans in 
the Public Sector, TIAA-CREF INST. 3 (Oct. 2013), http://welcomentsa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/equivalent-cost-for-equivalent-benefits.pdf. See also Paul 
J. Yakoboski, How Retirees Manage Retirement Savings for Retirement Income?: A 
Survey of TIAA-CREF Participants,  TIAA-CREF INST. (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/pdf/How_Retirees_Manage_Savings_for_Inco
me_Data_Summary_FINAL.pdf (attitude survey); Yakoboski, Retirees, 
Annuitization and Defined Contribution Plans, supra note 59; Paul J. Yakoboski, 
Converting Assets to Income in Retirement: What Near-Retirees Are Thinking, 
TIAA-CREF INST. (Oct. 2009), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/pdf/ 
institute/research/trends_issues/ti_convertingassets1009.pdf (attitude survey); 
Teresa Hassara, The 403(b) lifetime income lesson for 401(k) plans, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (Nov. 30, 2015), http://www.pionline.com/article/20151130/PRINT/ 
311309998/the-403b-lifetime-income-lesson-for-401k-plans; David P. Richardson, 
How do TIAA-CREF Participants Annuitize?, INT’L CTR. FOR PENSION MGMT. 
DISCUSSION F. (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.icpmnetwork.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/04/David_P_Richardson_TIAA-CREF_ICPM_October_2013.pdf. 
61 See, e.g., Diane Oakley & Jennifer Erin Brown, Preserving Retirement 
Income Security for Public Sector Employees 14, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. (July 
2016), http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/Portability%20Report/ 
preserving_security_public_sector_web.pdf (noting that the Colorado Public 
Employees’ Retirement Association allows retirees to convert their defined 
contribution account balances into annuities “at the PERA assumed rate of return, 
which is less costly than purchasing an annuity from an insurance company”). 
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ownership plans (“ESOPs”).62 Of particular importance, profit-sharing and 
stock bonus plans often include a feature that allows workers to choose 
between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing the money 
in a retirement account according to Internal Revenue Code Section 401(k). 
Consequently, these plans are usually called “401(k) plans,” and they are the 
most popular type of retirement plan in the United States.63 The maximum 
annual amount of such elective deferrals that can be made by an individual 
in 2017 is $18,000, although workers over the age of 50 can contribute 
another $6,000 (for a total of up to $24,000).64 Also, since 2006, employers 
have been permitted to set up Roth 401(k) plans.65 Section 401(k) plans may 
be designed so that the employee automatically makes elective deferrals at a 
specified rate unless the employee elects otherwise.66 Such automatic 
enrollment features can lead to higher participation rates, and automatically 
escalating the participants’ levels of contributions can lead to even greater 
retirement savings.67 In passing, it should be noted that 401(k)-type rules also 
                                                                                                                 
62 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., Six Ways to Save 
for Retirement, 3(3) PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES 1, 2 (2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol3_issue3.pdf. A 
money purchase pension plan is a defined contribution plans that requires fixed 
annual contributions from the employer to the employee’s individual account. See, 
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., What You Should Know 
About Your Retirement Plan 18, 36 (2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
wyskgreenbook.pdf. 
63 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., BLS examines 
popular 401(k) retirement plans, 2(6) PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES 1 (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue6.pdf; see 
infra notes 114-116 and accompanying text. 
64 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS Announces 2017 Pension Plan Limitations; 
401(k) Contribution Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2017 (IR-2016-141, 
Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/irs-announces-2017-pension-
plan-limitations-401k-contribution-limit-remains-unchanged-at-18000-for-2017. 
65 I.R.C. § 402A (2014). Contributions to these plans are not excludable, but 
neither the plan’s investment returns nor distributions are taxable. 
66 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW 
AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND 
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 25–26. 
67 See, e.g., OECD, OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 45–76 (2012), 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-pensions-outlook-
2012_9789264169401-en; Jack VanDerhei, Increasing Default Deferral Rates in 
Automatic Enrollment 401(k) Plans: The Impact on Retirement Savings Success in 
Plans with Automatic Escalation, 33(9) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 12 (2012); 
Richard H. Thaler & Schlomo Bernartzi, The Behavioral Economics of Retirement 
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apply to so-called “403(b) plans” that are used by many tax-exempt 
organizations and public schools (including colleges and universities).68 
 
c. Hybrid Retirement Plans 
 
So-called “hybrid” retirement plans mix the features of defined 
benefit and defined contribution plans. For example, a cash balance plan is a 
defined benefit plan that looks like a defined contribution plan.69 
 
d. Individual Retirement Accounts 
 
Favorable tax rules are also available for individual retirement 
accounts (IRAs).70 Almost any worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other 
financial institution. In 2017, individuals without pension plans can 
contribute and deduct up to $5,500 to an IRA, although individuals over age 
50 can contribute and deduct another $1,000 (for a total of up to $6,500); and 
                                                                                                                 
Savings Behavior, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2007-02, 2007), 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/2007_02_savings.pdf. Of note, the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 made it easier for employers to include automatic enrollment 
features in pension plans. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 902, Public Law No. 
109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (adding I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(13), 401(m)(12) & 414(w)). 
68 I.R.C § 403(b) (2008); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 18–21 
(also discussing so-called “457(b) plans” used by State and local government and 
tax-exempt employers). 
69 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan 
Conversions, 25(1&2) OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379 (2000). Like other defined benefit 
plans, employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer 
bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Like defined contribution plans, 
however, cash balance plans provide workers with individual accounts (albeit 
hypothetical). A simple cash balance plan might allocate 10 percent of salary to each 
worker’s account each year and credit the account with 5 percent interest on the 
balance in the account. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $50,000 in a given 
year would get an annual cash balance credit of $5,000 ($5,000 = 10 percent × 
$50,000), plus an interest credit equal to 5 percent of the balance in her hypothetical 
account as of the beginning of the year. 
70 I.R.C. § 219 (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 36–39. 
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spouses can contribute and deduct similar amounts.71 If a worker is covered 
by another retirement plan, however, the deduction may be reduced or 
eliminated in 2017 if the worker’s income exceeds $62,000 for a single 
individual or $99,000 for a married couple.72 Like private pensions, IRA 
earnings are tax-exempt, and distributions are taxable.73 
Also, since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth 
IRAs.74 Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not deductible. 
Instead, withdrawals are tax-free.75 Like regular IRAs, however, Roth IRA 
earnings are tax-exempt.76 
These days, rollovers from pension plans account for most of the 
balances in IRAs. For example, according to one recent study, 14.5 times as 
many dollars added to IRAs in 2013 came from rollovers than came from 
contributions.77 Another recent study found that the majority (62 percent) of 
recent retirees with at least $75,000 in a defined contribution plan at 
retirement moved their assets out of those plans, and the overwhelming 
majority of them rolled their money into an IRA.78 
                                                                                                                 
71  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS Announces 2017 Pension Plan Limitations; 
401(k) Contribution Limit Remains Unchanged at $18,000 for 2017, supra note 64. 
72 Id. 
73 I.R.C. § 408 (2015). Also, so-called “Keogh plans” give self-employed 
workers an ability to save for retirement that is similar to plans that employers 
sponsor, and Keogh plans allow self-employed workers to contribute more than they 
could otherwise contribute to a regular IRA. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement 
Plans for Small Business (SEP, Simple, and Qualified Plans) 2, 12 (Publication No. 
560, Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p560.pdf. 
74 I.R.C. § 408A (2010). 
75 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN 
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 38–39. 
76 Id. 
77 Copeland, Individual Retirement Account Balances, Contributions, and 
Rollovers, 2013; With Longitudinal Results 2010–2013: The EBRI IRA Database, 
supra note 47, at 11. 
78 American College of Financial Services, The American College Defined 
Contribution Rollover Survey 7, 24 (Jan. 2016), http://retirement.theamerican 
college.edu/sites/amcol-nylcri/files/IRA_Rollover_ Research.pdf (online survey 
conducted by Greenwald & Associates on behalf of The American College’s New 
York Life Center for Retirement Income). 
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As more fully discussed in Part III.D below, individuals can use their 
IRAs to buy annuities, although data limitations make it hard to get an 
accurate estimate of how often that happens.79 
 
e. Other Tax Benefits for Retirement Savings 
 
Also, since 2002, certain low- and moderate-income individuals 
have been able to claim a saver’s tax credit of up to $1000 for certain 
qualified retirement savings contributions.80 Finally, qualified small firms 
may claim a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $500 for certain costs incurred 
in setting up a new retirement plan for employees (“start-up credit”).81 
 
2. The Regulation of Employment-based Plans 
 
Since it was enacted more than 40 years ago, the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) has been amended numerous 
times, and a whole regulatory system has grown up to enforce its provisions. 
The key agencies charged with the administration of ERISA are the U.S. 
Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).82 
                                                                                                                 
79 Brien & Panis, Annuities in the Context of Defined Contribution Plans, supra 
note 59, at 14. 
80 I.R.C. § 25B (2013); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement Savings 
Contributions Credit (Saver’s Credit), https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-
Participant,-Employee/Retirement-Savings-Contributions-Savers-Credit (last 
updated Feb. 22, 2016). The credit equals a percentage (50 percent, 20 percent, or 
10 percent) of up to $2,000 of contributions. In effect, the credit acts like an 
employer match: the government matches a portion of the employee’s contributions. 
Employer matches encourage workers to contribute, at least up to the match level, 
and the saver’s tax credit seems to have similar pro-savings effects. See, e.g., Lisa 
Southwirth & John Gist, The Saver’s Credit: What Does It Do For Saving?, AARP 
PUB. POL’Y INST.  (Insight on the Issues Paper, 2008), http://assets.aarp.org/ 
rgcenter/econ/i1_credit.pdf.  
81 I.R.C. § 45E (2002); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Retirement Plans Startup 
Costs Tax Credit, https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-Startup-
Costs-Tax-Credit (last updated Aug. 18, 2015). The credit is equal to 50 percent of 
up to $1,000 in eligible costs incurred in each of the first three years of the plan’s 
existence. 
82 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., About the Employee 
Benefits Security Administration, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/main.html 
(last visited July 19, 2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Tax Information for 
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Pension plans must be operated for the exclusive benefit of 
employees (and beneficiaries).83 To protect the interests of plan participants, 
ERISA requires significant reporting and disclosure in the administration 
and operation of employee benefit plans.84 ERISA also imposes extensive 
fiduciary responsibilities on plan sponsors and the administrators of 
employee benefit plans.85 
In general, a fiduciary includes any person who: (1) exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or disposition of the plan’s 
assets; (2) renders investment advice for a fee or other compensation with 
respect to any plan moneys or property, or has the authority or responsibility 
to do so; or (3) has any discretionary authority or responsibility in the 
administration of the plan.86 When acting as a fiduciary, the plan sponsor 
must: 
 
(1)  operate solely in the best interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries and with the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to them; 
(2)  carry out its duties prudently; 
(3) follow the plan documents (unless inconsistent with 
ERISA); and 
(4) diversify the plan’s investments; and pay only 
reasonable plan expenses.87 
 
                                                                                                                 
Retirement Plans, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans (last visited July 19, 2016); 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, About PBGC, http://www.pbgc.gov/about 
(last visited July 19, 2016). 
83 ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) 
(2014). 
84 ERISA §§ 101(a) et seq., 29 U.S.C. §1021 et seq. (2015).  See also U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Reporting and Disclosure Guide for 
Employee Benefit Plans (Sept. 2014), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/rdguide.pdf. 
85 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) (2014).  
86 ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2008). 
87 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Meeting Your 
Fiduciary Responsibilities 2 (2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
meetingyourfiduciaryresponsibilities.pdf (explaining to employers how to 
administer their retirement plans). 
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The fiduciary duty under ERISA is the “highest duty known to the law,”88 
and fiduciary “decisions must be made with an eye single to the interests of 
the participants and beneficiaries.”89 
Of note, the U.S. Department of Labor recently extended the 
definition of a fiduciary to virtually all retirement advisers who receive 
compensation for providing investment advice to plan sponsors, plan 
participants, or IRA owners.90 The new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule will 
apply to those who sell annuities to pension plans and IRAs.91 
In addition to the fiduciary responsibility rules, so-called “prohibited 
transaction” rules prevent parties in interest from engaging in certain 
transactions with the plan.92 ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code impose 
many other requirements on retirement plans, including rules governing 
participation,93 coverage,94 vesting,95 benefit accrual,96 contribution and 
                                                                                                                 
88 Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1069 (1982). 
89 Id. at 680 F.2d at 271. 
90 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Conflict of 
Interest Final Rule, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/conflictsofinterest.html (last 
visited July 19, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., 
Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,945 (Apr. 8, 2016), http://webapps.dol.gov/ 
FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28806. 
91 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Amendment to and 
Partial Revocation of Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE) 84-24 for Certain 
Transactions Involving Insurance Agents and Brokers, Pension Consultants, 
Insurance Companies, and Investment Company Principal Underwriters, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 21,147 (Apr. 8, 2016), http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/ 
PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=28810. See also David C. Kaleda, Department of Labor’s 
Final “Investment Advice” Regulation and Its Impact on the Retail Investor 
Marketplace, 23(7) THE INV. LAW. 1 (July 2016), http://www.groom.com/ 
media/publication/1719_DOL_Final_Investment_Advice_Regulation_and_Its_Imp
act_on_the_Retail_Investor_Marketplace.pdf; Scott Stolz, How Annuities Will Be 
Transformed by DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINKADVISOR (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/02/01/how-annuities-will-be-transformed-by-
dol-fiduciary.  
92 ERISA § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1974); I.R.C. § 4975 (2008). For example, 
an employer usually cannot sell, exchange, or lease any property to the plan. 
93 I.R.C. § 410(a) (2006); ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1989). 
94 I.R.C. § 410(b) (2006). 
95 I.R.C. § 411(a) (2011); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2010). 
96 I.R.C. § 411(b) (2011); ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2014). 
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benefits,97 nondiscrimination,98 and funding.99 Also, distributions made 
before age 59½ are subject to an additional 10-percent early distribution 
penalty unless an exception applies;100 and required minimum distribution 
(RMD) rules generally require plan participants to begin taking distributions 
soon after they reach age 70½.101 
In addition to meeting their funding obligations, defined benefit 
plans in the private sector must also pay premiums to the PBGC for plan 
termination insurance.102 In the event that an underfunded, private-sector 
                                                                                                                 
97 I.R.C. § 415 (2012). 
98 I.R.C. § 401(a)(4) (2011). 
99 I.R.C. § 412 (2016); ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2011). While plan 
sponsors are supposed to fully fund their defined benefit plans, for a variety of 
reasons, plans can become underfunded. When a private sector defined benefit plans 
becomes underfunded, the funding rules generally require them to make up that 
shortfall by making level installment payments amortized over seven years. As 
ERISA does not apply to governmental plans, however, many such plans are 
underfunded. ERISA § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (2012); Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre 
Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, How Did State/Local Plans Become Underfunded?, B.C. 
CTR. FOR RET. RES. (State and Local Pension Plans Issue in Brief No. 42, Jan. 2015), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/slp_42.pdf. 
100 I.R.C. § 72(t) (2012); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 43. 
101 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2011); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH 
CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED 
RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 
37, at 43–47. More specifically, distributions typically must begin no later than April 
1 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the employee attains age 
70½. Distributions after the death of a plan participant must also meet certain 
minimum distribution requirements. An exception allows older workers with a 
pension plan from their current employer to delay distributions until they retire, but 
workers with pensions from prior employers and IRA holders must begin taking 
distributions from those plans soon after they reach age 70½). I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) 
(2011). Failure to take the required minimum distribution can result in a 50 percent 
excise tax penalty on the excess of the amount required to have been distributed over 
the amount that actually was distributed. I.R.C. § 4974 (2007). In addition, a plan 
that fails to make the required minimum distributions can be disqualified. INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., Fixing Common Plan Mistakes - Failure to Timely Start Minimum 
Distributions, https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-sponsor/fixing-common-
plan-mistakes-failure-to-timely- start-minimum-distributions (last updated Jan. 22, 
2016). 
102 ERISA § 4006, 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (2012); PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 
Premium Rates, 
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defined benefit plan terminates (for example, because the employer goes out 
of business), the PBGC will pay annual pension benefits of up to $64,432 
per participant in 2017 ( $5,369.32 per month).103 The PBGC insures the 
benefits of more than 40 million workers and retirees, and it pays benefits to 
nearly 840,000 people each month.104 
Federal laws outside of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code can 
also impose limits on pension plans. For example, even though women tend 
to live longer than men,105 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars 
pension plans from requiring higher contributions from women than men or 
paying women lower benefits than men.106 
 
3. The Shift from Defined Benefit Plans to Defined 
Contribution Plans 
 
Over the past few decades, there has been a major shift from 
traditional defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans.107 As already 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/prem/premium-rates.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
103 PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., PBGC Guarantee Limit for Single-
Employer Plans Increases for 2017 (Oct. 28, 2016), http://pbgc.gov/news/press/ 
releases/ pr16-16.html; PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Maximum Monthly 
Guarantee Tables, http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum 
-guarantee.html#2017 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (noting that the guarantee is lower 
for those who retire early or when there is a benefit for a survivor. The guarantee is 
increased for those who retire after age 65). 
104 2016 ANNUAL REPORT: PRESERVING AND PROTECTING PENSIONS ii, iii 
(2016), http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/2016-annual-report.pdf. 
105 See, e.g., supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
106 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2012); Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred 
Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074–75 (1983) (per 
curiam) (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer 
from paying lower monthly retirement benefits to a woman than to a man who has 
made the same contributions); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (finding that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
an employer from requiring female employees to make larger contributions to its 
pension plan than male employees because of mortality table differentials between 
the sexes). 
107 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT 
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND 
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 56, 57 fig.2. See also 
William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-based Retirement 
Benefits, COMP. AND WORKING CONDITIONS ONLINE (U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/changing-
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mentioned, 66 percent of private-sector workers had access to ERISA 
retirement plans in 2016, and 49 percent of them participated;108 but defined 
contribution plans have come to dominate the pension landscape.109 For 
example, just 20 percent of Fortune 500 companies offered salaried 
employees a defined benefit plan in 2015, down from 59 percent in 1998.110 
According to the most recent complete data from the U.S. 
Department of Labor, there were 681,000 ERISA-covered private pension 
plans in the United States in 2013.111 Of these ERISA-covered plans, just 
44,163 were defined benefit plans, and these defined benefit plans had a total 
of $2.9 trillion in assets.112 These defined benefit plans had 39.1 million 
participants but just 15.2 million of those were active participants (i.e., 
current employees as opposed to retirees and other separated participants).113 
On the other hand, there were 636,991 defined contribution plans in 
2013, and these had a total of $5.0 trillion in assets.114 These defined 
contribution plans had 92.5 million participants, including 76.7 million 
active participants.115 Of these defined contribution plans, 527,000 were 
401(k)-type plans.116 
As more fully explained in Part III.E below, the current movement 
away from defined benefit plans in the private sector is known as “de-
risking.” All in all, the era of the traditional defined benefit plan in the private 
sector is largely behind us.117 
                                                                                                                 
landscape-of-employment-based-retirement-benefits.pdf; Wiatrowski, The last 
private industry pension plans: a visual essay, supra note 49, at 3. 
108 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
109 See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT 
LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND 
CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 54–57. 
110 Brendan McFarland, A Continuing Shift in Retirement Offerings in the 
Fortune 500, 26(2) WILLIS TOWERS WATSON INSIDER 1 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.towerswatson.com/DownloadMedia.aspx?media={E60DA978-55D4-
4332-AEAC-C2CBC8A0BD9B}. 
111 U.S. DEP’T of LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., DOL-OPS-14-D-0017, 
PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN (2015), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ 
2013pensionplanbulletin.pdf. 
112 Id. at 3 tbl.A1. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1, 2. 
117 See, e.g., GEORGE A. MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL 
PENSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREATS TO RETIREMENT SECURITY (2010); 
Barbara A. Butrica, Howard M. Iams, Karen E. Smith & Eric J. Toder, The 
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There has also been a shift from defined benefit plans to defined 
contribution plans in the public sector. For example, in 1986, the federal 
government replaced much of its traditional defined benefit plan for civilian 
employees with the “Thrift Savings” defined contribution plan.118 The shift 
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans among state and local 
governments has been more modest.119 
 
D. OTHER SOURCES OF LIFETIME INCOME 
 
In addition to voluntary saving through 401(k) elections and IRAs, 
individuals can also save money outside of the retirement system. Investment 
income is generally subject to federal income tax rates of up to 39.6 percent 
in 2017;120 however, capital gains and dividends are generally taxed at a 
preferential tax rate of 0, 15, or 20 percent, depending on the income tax rate 
that would be assessed on the same amount of ordinary income.121 Also, there 
                                                                                                                 
Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement 
Incomes of Baby Boomers, 69(3) SOC. SEC. BULL. 2 (2009); Janice Kay McClendon, 
The Death Knell of Traditional Defined Benefit Plans: Avoiding a Race to the 401(k) 
Bottom, 80(3) TEMP. L. REV. 809 (2007); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF 
THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED 
AMERICA (2004); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114(3) 
YALE L.J. 451 (2004). 
118 See, e.g., Wilmer L. Kerns, Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 
1986, 49(11) SOC. SEC. BULL. 5 (Nov. 1986), https://www.ssa.gov/ 
policy/docs/ssb/v49n11/v49n11p5.pdf; OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT., FERS 
Information, https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fers- information/ 
(explaining that the Federal Employees Retirement System [FERS] provides 
benefits from a basic defined benefit plan, Social Security, and the Thrift Savings 
defined contribution plan). See also KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL30387, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF THE THRIFT 
SAVINGS PLAN (2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ misc/RL30387.pdf.  
119 See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry & Mark Cafarelli, Defined 
Contribution Plans in the Public Sector: An Update, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T 
EXCELLENCE (Issue Brief, Apr. 2014), http://www.nasra.org/files/ 
Topical%20Reports/Plan%20Design/Defined_Contribution_Plans_An_Update.pdf. 
120 I.R.C. § 1 (1985); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707.  
121 I.R.C. § 1(h) (1985); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT FOR 2016 6 (Comm. Print 
2016) (“For 2016, the maximum rate of tax on the adjusted net capital gain of an 
individual is 20 percent on any amount of gain that otherwise would be taxed at a 
39.6-percent rate. In addition, any adjusted net capital gain otherwise taxed at a 10- 
or 15-percent rate is taxed at a zero-percent rate. Adjusted net capital gain otherwise 
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are various tax advantages associated with investments in homes,122 state and 
local bonds,123 annuities,124 and life insurance.125 This subpart focuses on two 
ways that individuals commonly generate lifetime income: 1) systematic 
withdrawals from an investment portfolio; and 2) annuities. 
 
1. Phased Withdrawals 
 
One of the simplest and most common strategies for managing 
retirement savings is to invest all of the retirement savings in a diversified 
portfolio and then use a conservative withdrawal rate and a systematic 
withdrawal plan (SWP) designed to have a high probability that the 
retirement savings will last for 20 or 30 years.126 This phased withdrawal 
strategy can be used with free-standing retirement savings or with retirement 
savings in defined contribution plans, IRAs, and those defined benefit plans 
that permit periodic withdrawals. 
In that regard, financial planners often suggest following the so-
called “4 percent rule.127 The basic idea is to set spending at 4 percent of 
                                                                                                                 
taxed at rates greater than 15 percent but less than 39.6 percent is taxed at a 15-
percent rate. These rates apply for purposes of both the regular tax and the alternative 
minimum tax. Dividends are generally taxed at the same rate as capital gains.”). In 
addition, there is also a 3.8 percent surcharge on the net investment income of certain 
individuals with incomes over $200,000, which includes capital gains, dividends, 
and other investment income such as rents). I.R.C. § 1411 (2012). Gains on 
investments are typically taxed only when they are realized at a sale or exchange. 
I.R.C. §§ 61, 1001 (2012). 
122 I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 121 (2012) (for example, home mortgage interest is 
generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a personal residence are often 
excludable). 
123 I.R.C. § 103 (2012) (interest exclusion). 
124 See I.R.C. § 72 (2012). The individual can exclude a fraction of each annuity 
payment from income. That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the amount 
of premiums or other after-tax contributions made by the individual. The exclusion 
ratio enables the individual to recover her own after-tax contributions tax free and 
to pay tax only on the remaining portion of benefits which represents income. The 
net effect is a deferral of taxation. 
125 I.R.C. § 101(a) (2012) (exclusion for insurance proceeds paid by reason of 
the death of the insured). 
126 See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 
163(3) U. PA. L. REV. 757, 770–771 (2015). 
127 See William P. Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical 
Data, J. OF FIN. PLAN., Oct. 1994, 171, 174–175 (explaining, using historical data, 
why retirees should withdraw no more than 4 percent of their retirement savings 
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retirement savings and invest those savings in a 50-percent-stock-50-
percent-bond portfolio.128 Each year thereafter, spending is increased to keep 
up with inflation. For example, assuming that an individual has a $1,000,000 
nest egg, in the first year of retirement, she would withdraw 4 percent 
($40,000), and each year thereafter that dollar amount would increase to keep 
up with inflation.129 Assuming a 3 percent annual inflation rate, annual 
withdrawals would increase to $41,200 in the second year, $42,436 in the 
third year, and so on. While there is a possibility of running out of money 
before death, many financial planners believe this strategy can usually work 
for 30 years. To minimize the prospect of outliving one’s nest egg in the 
recent economic recession, however, some financial advisers advised 
retirees to skip their scheduled inflation adjustments or to withdraw less than 
4 percent of their new balances.130 
                                                                                                                 
each year); see also JANEMARIE MULVEY & PATRICK PURCELL, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL40008, CONVERTING RETIREMENT SAVINGS INTO INCOME: ANNUITIES 
AND PERIODIC WITHDRAWALS 17 (2008), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1571&context=key_workplace (“[A] large body of 
research on safe withdrawal rates for individuals has determined that a real 
withdrawal rate in the neighborhood of 4 percent of the initial portfolio has a low 
chance of running out of money.” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Benjamin 
Bridges, Robert Gesumaria & Michael V. Leonesio, Assessing the Performance of 
Life-Cycle Portfolio Allocation Strategies for Retirement Saving: A Simulation 
Study, 70(1) SOC. SEC. BULL., 23 (2010) (examining the performance of life-cycle 
portfolio allocation strategies with varying exposure to stock and bond market risk 
based on observed historical U.S. asset returns); Joseph A. Tomlinson, Managed-
Payout Funds vs. Annuities: Who Wins?, RET. INCOME J. (Sept. 10, 2015), 
http://retirementincomejournal.com/issue/march-3-2016/article/ managed-payout-
funds-vs-annuities-who-wins. 
128 Bengen, Determining Withdrawal Rates Using Historical Data, supra note 
127, at 175. 
129 See Eleanor Laise, A Strategy for a Lifetime of Income, KIPLINGER (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/krr-a-strategy-for-a-lifetime-of-
income.html. 
130 Id.; see also R. Evan Inglis, The “Feel Free” Retirement Spending Strategy, 
in Soc’y of Actuaries, Diverse Risks: 2016 Call for Essays 4 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.soa.org/Library/Essays/2016/diverse-risk/2016-diverse-risks-
essay.pdf (suggesting that a safe percentage of savings to spend should be 
determined by dividing your age by 20; for example, someone who is 70 years-old 
could safely spend 3.5 percent of their savings [3.5 = 70/20]); Michael Finke, Wade 
D. Pfau & David M. Blanchett, The 4 Percent Rule is Not Safe in a Low-Yield World 
(2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201323; Dirk Cotton, Retirement Savings and 
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Another simple withdrawal strategy is for a retiree to base 
withdrawals on the retiree’s life expectancy (e). Under the simplest 
approach, each year the retiree would withdraw one over her life expectancy 
(i.e., 1/e), but then about half of retirees would run out of money.131 A better 
approach would be to recalculate the retiree’s life expectancy each year. For 
example, a 65-year-old man with a $1-million nest egg and a 17.75 year life 
expectancy would withdraw around $56,300 in his first year of retirement 
($56,300 = $1,000,000 × 1/17.75 [5.63 percent]).132 If he lives ten years to 
age 75, his life expectancy would then be around 11.03 (not 7.75 = 17.75 – 
10.00),133 and, accordingly, he would then withdraw just 9.07 percent (9.07 
= 1/11.03) of the balance in his retirement savings account. There is still a 
sizable chance of outliving his nest egg, but recalculating his life expectancy 
makes that risk less likely.  
In passing, it should be noted that many pensions and IRAs already 
make distributions based on life expectancy. In that regard, the required 
minimum distribution rules require that most retirement plan participants 
start receiving minimum distributions soon after they reach age 70½, and 
these distributions are based on life expectancy.134 In effect, the required 
minimum distribution rule is the default distribution rule for many pension 
                                                                                                                 
Annual Spending, THE RET. CAFE (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.theretirement 
cafe.com/2016/03/retirement-savings-and-annual-spending.html. 
131 See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without 
Income for Life: Information for Current and Future Retirees 1 (Oct. 2015), 
http://actuary.org/files/ Retiree_PreRetirees_IB_102215.pdf. 
132 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Period Life Table, 2013, http://www.ssa.gov/oact/ 
STATS/table4c6.html (last visited July 19, 2016) (According to the Social Security 
Administration, a 65-year- old male in the Social Security area population had a life 
expectancy of 17.75 years in 2013.).  0.056338 = 1/17.75. 
133 Id. (0.090661 = 1/11.03.) 
134 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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plans and IRAs.135 For example, TIAA has been offering a so-called 
“Minimum Distribution Option” since 1991.136 
 
2. Lifetime Annuities and Deferred Income Annuities 
 
Annuities are another common way to provide lifetime income, 137 
and, in general, most analysts believe that lifetime annuities offer better 
lifetime income security than systematic withdrawals.138 While the market 
for annuities is well-developed in the United States, the penetration rate is 
fairly low—just 8 percent of retirement assets in 2015—and declining in 
recent years.139  
                                                                                                                 
135 See, e.g., Wei Sun & Anthony Webb, Can Retirees Base Wealth Withdrawals 
on the IRS’ Required Minimum Distributions?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES.  (Issue in 
Brief No. 12-19, Oct. 2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/IB_12-
19-508.pdf; John Ameriks, How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow?, in PENSION 
DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE Chapter 13 
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus eds., 2004); Steve Vernon, Retirement 
Income in DC Plans: The Next Evolution in Plan Design, BENEFITS MAG. 14, 18 
(Nov. 2014), http://longevity3.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Benefits-
Mag-Vernon-November-2014- copy.pdf. 
136 Ameriks, How do Retirees Go from Stock to Flow?, supra note 135; TIAA-
CREF Financial Services, Minimum Distribution, http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/ 
support/forms/topics/Minimum_Distribution.html (last visited July 19, 2016). 
137 See, e.g., Farrell Dolan, Applying the 4-Box Strategy to Retirement Income 
Planning: Generating a Lifetime of Income, LIMRA’S MARKET-FACTS Q. 84, 88 
(Fall 2009), http://pjwalkercommunications.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/ 
Market-Facts.pdf; Darla Mercado, Making the case for annuities, 
INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20120325/REG/303259969&issuedate=20120323&sid=RI0326. 
138 See, e.g., Mark Warshawsky, Distribution Methods for Assets in Individual 
Accounts for Retirees: Life Income Annuities and Withdrawal Rates, 3(2) J. OF RET. 
105 (Fall 2015); but see Michael E. Kitces & Wade D. Pfau, The True Impact of 
Immediate Annuities on Retirement Sustainability: A Total Wealth Perspective (July 
15, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296867 (suggesting that immediate annuities 
should only be used to hedge significant longevity risk beyond life expectancy). 
139 See, e.g., Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions, The Coming Pensions 
Crisis 69–70, 80 (Mar. 2016), https://www.citivelocity.com/citigps/. The 
penetration rate can be estimated by dividing the Federal Reserve Board’s estimate 
of annuity reserves by its estimate of total retirement savings. For example, the 
Federal Reserve Board reported that at the end of 2015, there were $2.3 trillion in 
annuities out of a total of $27.3 trillion in household retirement assets, or 
approximately 8 percent (0.084249 = $2.3 trillion/$27.3 trillion). See supra note 31 
and accompanying text. 
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a. Types of Annuities 
 
There are various types of annuities. One distinction has to do with 
the way the annuity is designed. With a “fixed annuity,” the insurance 
company typically promises to make specific dollar payments to the 
annuitant for the term of the annuity contract, often for life.140 On the other 
hand, variable annuities allow the annuitant to select from a range of 
investment options, and she can do better if the underlying investments do 
well, or worse if those investments perform poorly.141 It should be noted, 
however, that many investors buy variable annuities primarily for their tax 
advantages and rarely elect to turn them into lifetime income streams.142 
Another distinction has to do with how long the insurance company 
makes the annuity payments. For example, term certain annuities pay a given 
amount per year for a certain number of years, regardless of what happens to 
                                                                                                                 
140 See, e.g., Fixed Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/f/fixedannuity.asp (last visited July 19, 2016). 
141 See, e.g., Variable Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/v/variableannuity.asp (last visited July 19, 2016); U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N, Variable Annuities: What You Should Know (Apr. 18, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm. 
142 See, e.g., Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play 
in Easing Risks in Public Pension Plans?, supra note 1, at 15; Anthony Webb, The 
United States Longevity Insurance Market, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT 
INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 63, 68 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John 
Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011); Jose Ruiz & Olivia S. Mitchell, Pension 
Payouts in Chile: Past, Present, and Future Prospects, in SECURING LIFELONG 
RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 106 (Olivia S. 
Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011); Monika Bütler & Stefan 
Staubli, Payouts in Switzerland: Explaining Developments in Annuitization, in 
SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND 
POLICY 195 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011); 
Hazel Bateman & John Piggott, Too Much Risk to Insure?  The Australian (non-) 
Market for Annuities, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL 
ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 50 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John Piggott & Noriyuki 
Takayama, eds., 2011); Edmund Cannon & Ian Tonks, Compulsory and Voluntary 
Annuity Markets in the United Kingdom, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT 
INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY 171 (Olivia S. Mitchell, John 
Piggott & Noriyuki Takayama, eds., 2011). 
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the annuitant over the course of that term.143 This Article is instead primarily 
concerned with various types of lifetime annuities, and in this section, we 
explain the distinction between level-payment fixed lifetime annuities, 
inflation-adjusted annuities, and deferred income annuities. 
 
i. Fixed Annuities 
 
Annuities are often used to provide lifetime retirement income. For 
example, for a 65-year-old man who purchased a $100,000 immediate fixed 
(lifetime) annuity without inflation protection on December 1, 2015, the 
annual payment would be around $6540 (6.54 percent of the annuity’s 
purchase price).144 Because women tend to live longer than men, the annual 
payments for a 65-year-old woman who elected an immediate fixed annuity 
on December 1, 2015 would be only $6132 (6.13 percent of the annuity’s 
purchase price).145 Unlike ERISA-covered pension plans,146 insurance 
companies can price the annuities that they offer to men and women 
differently.147 
In addition to lifetime annuities based on a single life, it is also 
possible to buy lifetime annuities that are based on the joint lives of a couple. 
For example, for a couple consisting of a 65-year-old man and a 60-year-old 
woman who purchased a $100,000 immediate fixed annuity without inflation 
protection on December 1, 2015, the annual payment would be around $5112 
(5.11 percent of the annuity’s purchase price).148 
Many analysts believe that most individuals will get the best value 
for their investment if they defer their decision to annuitize until age 75 or 
80.149 In that regard, a 75-year-old man who purchased a $100,000 
                                                                                                                 
143 See, e.g., Term Certain Annuity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/termcertainannuity.asp (last visited July 19, 
2016). 
144 See ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE 17 tbl.5 (2016), 
https://www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2016-01.pdf ($6540 
per year = 12 × an average payment of $545 per month). 
145 Id. ($6132 = 12 × an average payment of $511 per month). 
146 See supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text. 
147 But see Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in Insurance: The Next Chapter, 
49 GA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that gender discrimination laws should be 
expanded to prevent insurance companies from selling gender-based annuities). 
148 ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE, supra note 144, at 25 tbl.11 ($5112 = 
12 × an average payment of $426 per month). 
149 See, e.g., Moshe A. Milevsky, Optimal Annuitization Policies: Analysis and 
Options, 5 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 57 (2001); Anthony Webb, Providing Income for 
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immediate fixed annuity without inflation protection in December of 2015 
could get an annuity with an annual payout of $8892; an 80-year-old could 
get an annual payout of $10,920 and an 85-year-old could get an annual 
payout of $13,812.150 According to the Life Insurance Marketing and 
Research Association (LIMRA), 73 is the average age of purchasers of single 
premium immediate annuities (SPIAs).151  
 
ii. Inflation-adjusted Annuities  
 
Inflation-adjusted annuities offer an even better way to hedge 
against living too long. With inflation-adjusted annuities, annual payments 
would start out lower than level-payment fixed annuities but could end up 
higher. For example, if our hypothetical 65-year-old man instead chose an 
annuity stream with a 3-percent annual escalator, the initial annual payment 
would be just $4728, but, eventually, the annual payments would exceed the 
$6540 per year under the level-payment fixed lifetime annuity.152 
 
iii. Deferred Income Annuities 
 
Alternatively, retirees can protect against longevity risk by 
purchasing deferred income annuities (a/k/a longevity insurance).153 The 
                                                                                                                 
a Lifetime: Bridging The Gap Between Academic Research And Practical Advice, 
AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2009-11, 2009), 
http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/econ-sec/2009-11.pdf. 
150 ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE, supra note 144 at 21 tbl.7 (age 75: 
$8892 = 12 × an average payment of $741 per month), at 22 tbl.8 (age 80: $10,920 
= 12 × an average payment of $910 per month), and at 23 tbl.9 (age 85: $13,812 = 
12 × an average payment of $1151 per month). 
151 Kerzner, Presentation to Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance, supra 
note 4, at 22. 
152 ANNUITY SHOPPER, BUYER’S GUIDE, supra note 144 at 17 tbl.5 (showing 
average monthly payments to 65-year-old men with a 3-percent-cost-of-living 
adjustment of $394 per month in the first year of his retirement [$4728 in the first 
year = 12 × an average payment of $394 per month]).  
153 See, e.g., Katherine G. Abraham & Benjamin H. Harris, The Market for 
Longevity Annuities, 3 J. OF RET. 12 (2016); Wade Pfau, Why Retirees Should 
Choose DIAs over SPIAs, ADVISOR PERSPECTIVES (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2013/09/24/why-retirees-should-
choose-dias-over-spias.pdf; Kimberly Lankford, Deferred Income Annuities Offer 
Predictability, KIPLINGER (Aug. 2013), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/ 
retirement/T003-C000-S004-deferred-income-annuities-offer-predictability.html; 
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typical approach is to buy a deferred income annuity at age 65 that starts 
making annual payments only if the annuitant lives past age 80 or 85. For 
example, in February of 2012, a 65-year-old man could invest $100,000 in a 
MetLife deferred income annuity; and beginning at age 85, he would receive 
a level lifetime income of $25,451.04 per year.154 Companies do not offer 
inflation-adjusted deferred income annuities, but some companies do offer 
fixed step-ups.155 
With a relatively small upfront investment, a retiree can secure an 
income stream that starts sometime in the future, and the retiree can then use 
the rest of her savings to cover the fixed number of years until the year that 
the deferred income annuity payments start.156 There is some risk of running 
                                                                                                                 
Anthony Webb, Guan Gong & Wei Sun, An Annuity That People Might Actually 
Buy, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue in Brief No. 7-10, July 2007), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/07/ib_7-10-508.pdf; Moshe A. 
Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction to Advanced-
Life Delayed Annuities (ALDA), 9 N. AM. ACTUARIAL J. 109 (2005). 
154 Memorandum from Hersh L. Stern to author (Feb. 7, 2012) (on file with the 
author). Alternatively, he could purchase a deferred income annuity that instead 
starts at age 80 that pays $17,069.40 per year; at age 75 that pays $11,649.84 per 
year; or at age 70 and pays $8,133.60 per year. Id. See also Abraham & Harris, The 
Market for Longevity Annuities, supra note 153, at 16 ex.4, 18 (showing various 
2014 quotes for immediate and deferred income annuities and noting that 
“approximately two-thirds of the [deferred income] annuities sold had deferral 
periods of five years or less, with only 1% having deferral periods in excess of 15 
years”). 
155 Joseph A. Tomlinson, Income Choices, FIN. PLAN. (May 1, 2011), 
http://www.financial-planning.com/fp_issues/2011_5/income-choices-2672801-
1.html (comparing various investment strategies including systematic withdrawals, 
immediate annuities, deferred income annuities, and guaranteed lifetime withdrawal 
benefits). 
156 See, e.g., Michael Kitces, A Fix for Retirement Plan Guessing, FIN. PLAN. 
(Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/portfolio/kitces-
planning-for-the-long-haul-without-a-crystal-ball-2695826-1.html (discussing 
various ways to use deferred income annuities to plan for secure lifetime income and 
showing that deferred income annuities offer better returns than bonds); Stephen 
Sexauer, Michael W. Peskin & Daniel Cassidy, Making Retirement Income Last a 
Lifetime, 68 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 74 (2012) (proposing a “decumulation benchmark” 
that would use about 88 percent of retiree savings to purchase a laddered portfolio 
of Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities [TIPS] for the first 20 years and would 
purchase a deferred income annuity with the remaining 12 percent); Rick Wurster, 
DC 20/20: Pathways to a Secure Retirement, 4 ROTMAN INT’L J. OF PENSION MGMT. 
54, 58 (2011) (suggesting that an annuity providing 35 percent real income 
replacement at age 85 would cost about 7.5 percent of a participant’s average 
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out of money before the year that the deferred income annuity starts, but that 
is certainly a more manageable risk than trying to manage one’s retirement 
savings over the indefinite future.157 
Deferred income annuities have gotten a lot more attention since 
2014 when the IRS promulgated final regulations authorizing so-called 
“qualifying longevity annuity contracts” (QLACs).158 Under the regulations, 
pension plan participants and IRA holders can spend up to $125,000 on 
QLACs without running afoul of the required minimum distribution rules 
that normally require individuals to start taking taxable distributions by age 
70½.159 All in all, deferred income annuities could help improve retirement 
income security for elderly Americans.160 
                                                                                                                 
account balance at retirement). 
157 Finally, it is worth noting that workers might be able to buy deferred income 
annuities in installments, starting at a young age. For example, a worker could use a 
portion of her retirement savings each year to purchase a deferred income annuity 
that starts at age 65, or at the advanced ages of 70, 75, 80, 85, or even 90. 
Accordingly, this type of deferred income annuity product could be used to provide 
retirement benefits that mimic the lifetime pensions provided by traditional defined 
benefit plans. Milevsky, Real Longevity Insurance with a Deductible: Introduction 
to Advanced-Life Delayed Annuities, supra note 153. 
158 Longevity Annuity Contracts, 79 Fed. Reg. 37,633 (July 2, 2014) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-5, A-3 & 1.401(a)(9)-
6, A-12. 
159 See also Vorris J. Blankenship, Retiree Tax Planning With Qualified 
Longevity Annuity Contracts, THE TAX ADVISER (Nov. 1, 2014), 
http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2014/nov/blankenship-nov14.html. The 
$125,000 will be indexed for inflation in increments of $10,000. Treas. Reg. § 
1.401(a)(9)-6 (A-17)(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 2014). Recall that the required 
minimum distribution (RMD) rules generally requires plan participants to begin 
taking distributions soon after they reach age 70½. See supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
160 See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei, How Much Can Qualifying Longevity Annuity 
Contracts Improve Retirement Security?, 36(8) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 10, 
14 (2015), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_08_Aug15_HSAs-
QLACs.pdf; David Blanchett, Allocating to a Deferred Income Annuity in a Defined 
Contribution Plan, 2 J. OF RET. 54 (2015); Katharine G. Abraham & Benjamin H. 
Harris, Better Financial Security in Retirement? Realizing The Promise of Longevity 
Annuities, BROOKINGS 18-19 (2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
images/abraham_harris_paper_rev4.pdf; Blankenship, Retiree Tax Planning With 
Qualified Longevity Annuity Contracts, supra note 159; John A. Turner & David D. 
McCarthy, Longevity Insurance Annuities in 401(k) Plans and IRAs, 29 BENEFITS 
Q. 58 (2013), http://www.ifebp.org/inforequest/0163295.pdf.  
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b. The Market for Annuities 
 
The market for annuities is fairly complex because there are so many 
types of annuities and so many different purchasers. For example, many 
companies sell a range of variable annuities, and some of those annuities also 
provide a guaranteed payment period or a guaranteed minimum payment 
level.161 In any event, Table 1 shows that $236.7 billion in annuities were 
sold in the United States in 2015: $133 billion in variable annuities and 
$103.7 billion in fixed annuities.162 Most of those annuity policies were 
purchased by businesses or plan sponsors. Indeed, individual annuity sales 
are a very small portion of the market. In 2015, for example, Table 1 shows 
that individuals bought just $11.8 billion worth of fixed annuities ($9.1 
billion single premium immediate annuities and $2.7 billion deferred income 
                                                                                                                 
161 Benjamin Goodman & David P. Richardson, Achieving Retirement Income 
Security: A Comparison of Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal Benefit, Systematic 
Withdrawal and Partial Variable Annuity Strategies, TIAA INST. (May 2016), 
https://www.tiaainstitute.org/public/pdf/rd_achieving_retirement_income_security.
pdf. For example, many companies sell variable annuities with guaranteed lifetime 
withdrawal benefits (GLWB). A GLWB is based on a variable annuity, but it allows 
investors to lock in a minimum guarantee for life. Mechanically, the investor or 
retiree deposits or rolls over a sum of money into a variable annuity with subaccounts 
that are invested in a portfolio of stocks, bonds, and other generic investments. 
Depending on market performance, that investment portfolio grows (or shrinks). In 
any event, at retirement, the annuitant starts taking guaranteed withdrawals from the 
account. Payouts come from the invested funds, but if those funds are ever depleted 
due to long life and/or poor investment returns, the guaranteed minimum kicks in. 
On the other hand, if the investment portfolio performs well, payouts can be 
increased. See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of 
Social Insurance, Pensions, and Financial Products, 21 ELDER L. J. 375, 402–03 
(2014) and sources cited therein; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-75, 
RETIREMENT SECURITY: ANNUITIES WITH GUARANTEED LIFETIME WITHDRAWALS 
HAVE BOTH BENEFITS AND RISKS, BUT REGULATION VARIES ACROSS STATES 
(2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650739.pdf. 
162 Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association (LIMRA) Secure 
Retirement Institute, Annuity Industry Estimates, http://www.limra.com/ 
Posts/PR/Data_Bank/_PDF/2015-4Q-Annuity-Estimates.aspx (last visited July 20, 
2016). See also Life Insurance Marketing and Research Association (LIMRA), 
LIMRA Secure Retirement Institute: Indexed Annuities Break Quarterly and Annual 
Sales Records (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.limra.com/Posts/PR/News_Releases/ 
LIMRA_Secure_Retirement_Institute__Indexed_Annuities_Break_Quarterly_and
_Annual_Sales_Records.aspx. 
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annuities), but these individual annuity sales are expected to grow to $21.6 
billion in 2019.163 
 
Table 1. Annuity Industry Estimate 
Type of Annuities 2015 
Variable Annuities  
     Separate accounts 105.0 
     Fixed accounts 28.0 
     Total Variable 133.0 
Fixed Annuities  
     Fixed-rate deferred 31.9 
     Book value 21.3 
     Market value adjusted 10.6 
     Indexed 54.5 
     Fixed deferred 86.4 
     Deferred income 2.7 
     Fixed immediate 9.1 
     Structured settlements 5.5 
     Total Fixed 103.7 
Total 236.7 
 
c. The Tax Treatment of Annuities 
 
The federal income tax system generally provides favorable tax 
treatment of investments in annuities.164 Although the value of an annuity 
investment grows over time, no tax is imposed until annuity distributions begin. 
In short, there is no tax on the so-called “inside buildup” until the “annuity 
starting date.”165 Even then, the annuitant can exclude a fraction of each benefit 
                                                                                                                 
163 Kerzner, Presentation to Federal Advisory Committee on Insurance, supra 
note 4, at 19. 
164 See I.R.C. § 72 (2016); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Pension and Annuity 
Income, supra note 41.  
165 I.R.C. § 72(c)(4) (2015) ( “The annuity starting date in the case of any 
contract is the first day of the first period for which an amount is received as an 
annuity under the contract.”). See also DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RS20923, TAXES AND THE “INSIDE BUILD-UP” OF LIFE INSURANCE: RECENT 
ISSUES (2006), https://archive.org/details/RS20923-crs; ANDREW D. PIKE, CONG. 
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payment from income.166 That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the 
amount of premiums or other contributions made by the annuitant.167 More 
specifically, the exclusion ratio is determined at the annuity starting date by 
dividing the “investment in the contract” by the “expected return under the 
contract.” The investment in the contract is the annuitant’s premium costs for 
the annuity,168 and the expected return is simply the total amount expected to be 
received under the annuity.169 This method of taxation allows the annuitant to 
recover her own contributions tax-free. 
For example, assume that a 65-year old pays a $100,000 to an 
insurance company for an immediate fixed annuity that pays $7500 a year 
for life. Her investment in the contract is $100,000. According to the 
applicable IRS unisex life expectancy tables, 65-year-olds can expect to live 
for another 20 years,170 and that means that our 65-year-old will have an 
expected return of $150,000 ($150,000 = 20 × $7500). Accordingly, in each 
of the first 20 years that our hypothetical annuitant receives $7500, she will 
exclude $5000 ($5000 = $7500 × $100,000/$150,000). Accordingly, she will 
report $2500 in income in each of the first 20 years ($2500 = $7500 − $5000). 
If she lives more than 20 years, all $7500 she receives in year 21 and later 
years will be taxable, as she will have already recovered all $100,000 of her 
investment in the contract tax-free.171  
On the other hand, if an annuitant dies before she recovers her 
investment in the contract, she can usually deduct her unrecovered 
investment in the year of her death.172 For example, if our hypothetical 
annuitant died after receiving seven annual annuity payments, she would 
have recovered $35,000 of her original $100,000 investment tax-free 
($35,000 = 7 × $5000) (and she would have included $17,500 in income 
[$17,500 = 7 × $2500]). As she had not yet recovered her remaining $65,000 
investment in the contract, that $65,000 unrecovered investment can be 
deducted on the tax return filed for the year that she died.173 
                                                                                                                 
RESEARCH SERV., RL32000, TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE PRODUCTS: 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES (2003), http://crs.wikileaks-press.org/RL32000.pdf. 
166 I.R.C. § 72(b) (2015). 
167 Id. 
168 I.R.C. § 72(c)(1) (2015). 
169 I.R.C. § 72(c)(3) (2015). 
170 Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 tbl.V (1995). 
171 I.R.C. § 72(b)(2) (2015). 
172 I.R.C. §§ 72(b)(3)-(4) (2015). 
173 I.R.C. § 72(b)(3)(A) (2015). Literally, if an annuitant dies after the annuity 
starting date, she can deduct her unrecovered investment on her final income tax 
return. Id. 
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The current tax treatment of annuities results in some odd 
consequences. First, if an annuitant outlives her life expectancy, she will 
have to pay tax on the full amount of annuity payments that she receives each 
year for the rest of her life.174 That greater tax liability in later years may 
discourage some people from buying annuities, and that greater tax liability 
in later years is not necessarily balanced out by the deduction for those who 
die before they have recovered their full investment in the contract. 
Second, the rule allowing a deduction for unrecovered investments 
in the contract also has a quirk that can make deferred income annuities 
relatively unattractive as retirement income investments. The quirk is that 
the deduction for unrecovered investments is only available if the annuity 
payments “cease by reason of the death of an annuitant” . . . “after the annuity 
starting date (emphasis added).”175 For example, consider a 65-year-old man 
who buys a deferred income annuity for $100,000 that will pay him $40,000 
a year for life starting at age 85, and further assume that his expected return 
is $400,000, giving him an exclusion ratio of 25 percent (0.25 = $100,000 
investment in the contract/$400,00 expected return). Under the usual 
annuity-taxation rules, if he lives to 85, he would exclude $10,000 of the first 
$40,000 annuity payment from income and include the remaining $30,000 
in income, and he would continue to do so until—after ten years—he would 
have recovered his $100,000 investment in the contract (at which point all 
future $40,000-a-year payments until he died would be fully taxable). Also, 
if he died at 87, having recovered $30,000 tax-free ($30,000 = 3 × $10,000), 
he would be allowed to deduct his remaining $70,000 unrecovered 
investment. Unfortunately, if he dies before reaching age 85, he would not 
be allowed to deduct any portion of his $100,000 investment in the contract 
as his death would have occurred before the annuity starting date. In short, 
individuals who buy deferred income annuities are unable to deduct their 
losses if they die before the annuity starting date, and that makes deferred 
income annuities less attractive as retirement income investments. Pertinent 
here, just 37 percent of 65-year-old men can expect to live to age 85.176 
                                                                                                                 
174 I.R.C. § 72(b)(2) (2015). 
175 Id. 
176 Calculations from the Soc’y of Actuaries, Life Expectancy Calculator,  supra 
note 2, show that a 65-year-old man has a 37 percent chance of living 20 years to 
age 85. In passing, it should be acknowledged that those who buy annuities and 
especially deferred income annuities are probably healthier than the general 
population, and it may be more appropriate to use a “healthier” life expectancy table. 
In that regard, the Society of Actuaries calculator allows us to select such an 
alternative mortality table (the 2012 Individual Annuitant Mortality tables that were 
developed from a population of people buying individual immediate annuities), and 
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d. The Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Proceeds 
Paid after the Insured’s Death 
 
In passing, it is worth noting that a slightly different set of rules 
applies when the beneficiary of a life insurance policy elects to take 
payments for life rather than taking a lump sum payment. In general, life 
insurance proceeds paid to a beneficiary at the death of the insured are 
excluded from gross income.177 If the beneficiary instead elects to take 
annuity-like payments for the rest of her life, then a pro rata portion of each 
payment is excluded,178 and the rest is taxable.179 That pro rata exclusion 
continues for as long as the beneficiary lives, but if she dies before 
recovering the full amount that she could have received tax-free, no 
deduction (or other tax benefit) is allowed for the unrecovered portion. 
For example, if a husband dies with a $100,000 life insurance policy 
naming his wife as the beneficiary, she could exclude all $100,000 from her 
income. If she instead elected to take $7500 per year payments for the rest 
of her life—and her life expectancy is 20 years, then she could exclude $5000 
each year ($5000 = $100,000/20), and she would report $2500 each year in 
her gross income. If she lives more than 20 years, she could continue to 
exclude $5000 each year until she dies. On the other hand, if she died before 
receiving 20 annual payments, she would not be allowed to take a deduction 
or other tax benefit for any of her unrecovered excludable amount. For 
example, if she died after seven years, she would have excluded just $35,000 
($35,000 = 7 × $5000), but she would not be allowed to claim a deduction 
or other tax benefit for the remaining $65,000. 
 
                                                                                                                 
when we do, the results suggest that 60 percent of 65-year-old men who voluntarily 
buy annuities can expect to live 20 years to age 85. See also NAT’L ASS’N. OF INS. 
COMMISSIONERS [NAIC], NAIC Model Rule for Recognizing a New Annuity 
Mortality Table for Use in Determining Reserve Liabilities for Annuities (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-821.pdf, at Appendix II. The 2012 Individual 
Annuity Reserving (IAR) Mortality Tables are designed for use in determining the 
minimum standard of valuation for individual annuity or pure endowment contracts 
issued after the effective date of the rule. Id. at § 4.D. 
177 I.R.C. § 101(a) (2013). 
178 I.R.C. § 101(a) (2013); Treas. Reg. § 1.101-4 (as amended in 1961). 
179 I.R.C. § 61(a)(10) (1984). 
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E. CURRENT ESTIMATES OF THE TAX EXPENDITURES 
ASSOCIATED WITH SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, IRAS, AND 
ANNUITIES 
 
The special tax rules for Social Security, pensions, IRAs, and annuities 
are routinely identified as “tax expenditures” in the tax expenditure budgets 
prepared annually by the Office of Management and Budget.180 Policymakers 
often use these tax expenditure estimates as a rough guide to the cost of these 
special income tax provisions.181 For example, Table 2 reproduces the Office of 
Management and Budget’s 2017 Federal Budget estimates of the revenue losses 
attributable to the special income tax benefits for Social Security, pensions, 
IRAs, and annuities (and life insurance savings).182 All in all, these tax 
                                                                                                                 
180 See, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2017 228 tbl.14-1 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/ap_14_expenditures.pdf. 
181 Admittedly, however, tax expenditure estimates do not necessarily equal the 
increase in Federal revenues that would result from repealing the special provisions. 
See, e.g., Jonathan Barry Forman, Comparing Apples and Oranges: Some Thoughts 
on the Pension and Social Security Tax Expenditures, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
297, 308 n.50 (2001). 
182 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, supra 
note 180, at 228–229, 231. There are also tax expenditures associated with the exclusion of 
railroad retirement system benefits and veterans’ pensions, not reprinted here. 
Most of the items in Table 2 are also identified as tax expenditures in the tax 
expenditure budgets prepared annually by the Joint Committee on Taxation; 
however, in its most recent iteration, the Joint Committee on Taxation removed the 
exclusion for interest on life insurance and annuities from its list. STAFF OF THE J. 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for 
Fiscal Years 2015-2019 (Comm. Print 2015), https://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=download&id=4857&chk=4857&no_html=1. While the 
Joint Committee on Taxation acknowledged that a broad interpretation tax 
expenditures would include the exclusion of investment income on life insurance 
and annuity contracts, it noted that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 defined tax expenditures as “revenue losses attributable to 
provisions of the Federal tax laws [emphasis added] which allow a special exclusion, 
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a 
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” The Joint Committee on 
Taxation then decided that it would no longer include in its tax expenditure budget 
items for which no provision of the federal tax law specifically allows an exclusion, 
such as (in its opinion) the exclusion of investment income on life insurance and 
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expenditures are quite large.183 In fact, two of these items are among the top ten 
largest tax expenditures each year, and five are in the top 20.184 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
annuity contracts. Id. at 20. See also Aaron E. Lorenzo, JCT Change on Insurance, 
Annuity Inside Buildup Won’t Hurt, 15 BNA DAILY TAX REP. G-1 (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T11100/split_display.adp?fedfid=82088380
&vname=dtrnot&wsn=502760000&searchid=27029402&doctypeid=13&type=dat
e&mode=doc&split=0&scm=T11100&pg=0; Warren S. Hersch, AALU to 
Congress: Life insurance is not a tax expenditure, LIFEHEALTHPPRO (Apr. 30, 
2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/04/30/aalu-to-congress-life-insurance-
is-not-a-tax-expen; Letter from Kenneth Kies to Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Secretary 
for Tax Policy, (Dec. 29, 2015) (on file at Bloomberg BNA), 
http://taxandaccounting.bna.com/btac/T11100/split_display.adp?fedfid=81337913
&vname=dtrnot&jd=a0h7h6y1j5&split=0; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFF. OF 
TAX ANALYSIS, THE TAX EXPENDITURE FOR LIFE INSURANCE INSIDE BUILDUP 
(Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/Life-Insurance-Inside-Buildup.pdf (explaining why the 
Treasury continues to view the exclusion of inside buildup as a tax expenditure).  
183 Admittedly, the government’s tax expenditure estimates are inflated as they 
do not take into account the present value of taxes that will be paid on retirement 
plan distributions outside of the government’s 10-year budget window. See, e.g., 
Peter J. Brady, How America Supports Retirement: Challenging the Conventional 
Wisdom on Who Benefits 39-45, INV. CO. INST. (Jan 20, 2016), 
https://www.ici.org/research/retirement/retirement; Peter Brady, Who Benefits from 
the U.S. Retirement System, 21(7) ICI RES. PERSP. 1 (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.ici.org/research/retirement/retirement (also noting that “[w]hen 
evaluating the U.S. retirement system, it is important to assess both the Social 
Security system and tax deferral”); Judy Xanthopoulos & Mary M. Schmitt, 
Retirement Savings and Tax Expenditure Estimates, AM. SOC’Y OF PENSION 
PROFESSIONALS & ACTUARIES (May 2011), https://www.asppa.org/Portals/ 
2/APerspectiveOnTaxPolicyToPromoteRetirementSavingsMay2011.pdf.pdf. 
184 OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017, 
supra note 180, at 243. 
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Table 2. Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 
2016, 2017, 2016–2025 (In millions of dollars) 
 2016 2017 2016–25 
Exclusion of social security benefits:    
     Social Security benefits for retired workers  26,900 28,280 315,420 
     Social Security benefits for disabled workers 8,490 8,580 94,920 
     Social Security benefits for spouses, dependents & survivors 4,160 4,310 48,010 
Net exclusion of pension contributions & earnings:    
     Defined benefit plans 66,600 66,760 622,530 
     Defined contribution plans 64,710 65,620 921,480 
     IRAs 16,850 16,970 197,420 
     Self-Employed plans 28,030 30,800 155,530  
     Low and moderate income savers credit 1,280 1,270 13,120 
Exclusion of interest on annuities (and life insurance savings) 18,870 23,380 370,840 
Source: EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND OFFICE OF 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 228 tbl.14-1 (2016). 
 
F. RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY 
 
Social Security is the most common source of income for households 
aged 65 or older. For example, in 2014, 84.2 percent of households aged 65 
or older received Social Security benefits.185 Moreover, Social Security 
provided more than half of total income for 47.8 percent of aged beneficiary 
couples that year and 70.7 percent of total income for aged single 
beneficiaries.186 Only 43.8 percent of households received retirement 
benefits from sources other than Social Security, and only 61.8 percent 
received income from other assets.187 
                                                                                                                 
185 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE POPULATION 55 AND OLDER, 2014, 34 
(SSA Publication No. 13-11871, 2016), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ 
statcomps/income_pop55/2014/incpop14.pdf.  See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME 
OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, 2012, (SSA Publication No. 13-11727, 2014), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/income_aged/2012/iac12.pdf; U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, A PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS: 2015, 
http://www.aoa.acl.gov/aging_statistics/profile/2015/docs/2015-Profile.pdf (last 
visited July 22, 2016). 
186 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, supra note 185, at 9. 
See also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security, 2015,  
supra note 21 (64 percent of aged beneficiaries received at least half of their income 
from Social Security in 2013). 
187 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, supra note 185, at 
34. 
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All in all, Social Security provided 33.2 percent of personal income 
of households aged 65 or older in 2014.188 Earnings accounted for another 
32.2 percent of their income, pensions 20.9 percent, and asset income 9.7 
percent.189 Of course, as people age, earnings decline, and their inflation-
adjusted Social Security benefits become an even larger portion of their 
incomes.190 Still, Social Security alone cannot ensure that Americans will 
have adequate incomes throughout their retirement years. 
Unfortunately, retirement savings may be inadequate for many 
retirees.191 As already mentioned, at any point in time, only about one out of 
two American workers has a pension plan.192 Over their lifetimes, most 
households will accumulate some retirement savings through current or past 
work.193 Moreover, as households get closer to retirement age, they are even 
more likely to have accumulated some retirement assets, and recent cohorts 
of retirees tend to have more retirement assets than previous cohorts.194 Still, 
                                                                                                                 
188 Id. at 16. 
189 Id. 
190 See, e.g., Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, 
Pensions, and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 382–384 and sources cited 
therein; Sudipto Banerjee, A Look at the End-of-Life Financial Situation in America, 
36(4) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2 (2015), https://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_04_Apr15_EoL-PolFor.pdf (showing the importance of 
Social Security to older households). 
191 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: 
LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES (2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676942.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING 
RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
680/670153.pdf. See also Nari Rhee & Ilana Boivie, The Continuing Retirement 
Savings Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON RET. SEC. (2015), 
http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/RSC%202015/final_rsc_2015.p
df. 
192 See Copeland, Employment-Based Retirement Plan Participation: 
Geographic Differences and Trends, 2013, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
193 See, e.g., Jesse Bricker, Arthur B. Kennickell, Kevin B. Moore & John 
Sabelhaus, Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 37 (2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2012/pdf/scf12.pdf (finding that, in 
2010, 55.1 percent of families had rights to some retirement plan other than Social 
Security through current or past work of the family head or that person’s spouse or 
partner). 
194 Peter Brady, Kimberly Burham & Sarah Holden, The Success of the U.S. 
Retirement System 12, INV. CO. INST. (2012), https://www.ici.org/ 
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low participation rates in pension plans, in general, and low contributions 
rates to 401(k) plans, in particular, have led many analysts to wonder whether 
current and future generations of retirees will have adequate retirement 
incomes.195 Indeed, according to a recent study by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, about 29 percent of households age 55 and older had 
no retirement savings in 2013 (nor a defined benefit plan).196 Even among 
those households that had some retirement savings, the median amount of 
those savings was just $104,000 for households age 55–64 and $148,000 for 
households age 65–74, which amounts could be used to purchase modest 
inflation-adjusted annuities of $310 and $649 per month, respectively.197 
Similarly, according to recent research by the Employee Benefit Research 
Institute, more than 40 percent of Baby-Boomer and Gen-Xer households 
are at risk of running short of money in retirement, and more than 15 percent 
are projected to have less than 80 percent of what they will need.198 The 
                                                                                                                 
pdf/ppr_12_success_ retirement.pdf  (finding that households headed by a working 
individual aged 55 to 64 are doing especially well: while these near-retiree 
households are less likely to be covered by a defined benefit plan than previous 
cohorts, about 70 percent of them had defined contribution plans and/or IRAs, and 
the median amount of their total retirement accumulations was $101,350 in 2010, up 
from just $63,719 in 2001 [in 2010 dollars]). 
195 See, e.g., Pension Savings: Are Workers Saving Enough for Retirement?: 
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor & Pensions, 
113th Cong., SENATE, (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/ 
hearing/?id=4cd69c00-5056-a032-52b4-2693a6672740; Melissa M. Favreault, 
Richard W. Johnson, Karen E. Smith & Sheila R. Zedlewski, BOOMERS’ RET. 
INCOME PROSPECTS (Urban Institute, Program on Retirement Policy, Brief No. 34, 
2012), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412490-boomers-retirement-income-
prospects.pdf (4 out of 10 late baby-boomers will lack sufficient income at age 79 
to replace 75 percent of what they earned between ages 50 and 54); Jack VanDerhei, 
Retirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012 
EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model®, 33(5) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 
NOTES 2 (2012), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_05_May-
12.RSPM-ER.Cvg1.pdf. 
196 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: 
MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE LOW SAVINGS, supra note 
191, at 8, 10. 
197 Id. at 11, 15. 
198 Jack VanDerhei, What Causes EBRI Retirement Readiness RatingsTM to 
Vary: Results from the 2014 Retirement Security Projection Model®, EMP. BENEFIT 
RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 396, 2014), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/ 
briefspdf/EBRI_IB_396_Feb14.RRRs2.pdf; see also Jack VanDerhei, Retirement 
Savings Shortfalls: Evidence from EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model®, 
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bottom line is that many Americans are not saving enough in retirement plans 
or otherwise.199 
 
III. THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES AND PENSION 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
This Part focuses on the laws and regulations governing retail 
annuities and pension distributions. This Part also takes a more detailed look 
at the rules governing pension risk transfer transactions in defined benefit 
plans. 
 
A. THE REGULATION OF RETAIL ANNUITIES 
 
Individuals can use their freestanding and IRA savings to buy retail 
annuities in the marketplace. In general, companies offering annuities are 
subject to comprehensive regulation by state insurance departments.200 With 
                                                                                                                 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 410, 2014), https://www.ebri.org/ 
pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_410_Feb15_RS-Shrtfls.pdf (finding that there is an 
aggregate national retirement savings deficit number of $4.13 trillion for all U.S. 
households where the head of the household is between 35 and 64 years-old); Alicia 
H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou & Anthony Webb, NRRI Update Shows Half Still 
Falling Short, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue in Brief No.14-20, Dec. 2014), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/IB_14-20-508.pdf (estimating that, in 
2013, some 52 percent of households were expected to have replacement rates that 
fall more than 10 percent below the target). 
199 See, e.g., CHRISTIAN E. WELLER, RETIREMENT ON THE ROCKS (2016); 
CHARLES D. ELLIS, ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANDREW D. ESCHTRUTH, FALLING 
SHORT: THE COMING RETIREMENT CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2014), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/IB_15-7.pdf; Sudipto Banerjee, 
Income Composition, Income Trends, and Income Shortfalls of Older Households, 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue Brief No. 383, 2013), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/ 
briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02-13.No383.IncmEld.pdf; Barbara A. Butrica & Mikki D. 
Waid, What Are the Retirement Prospects of Middle-Class Americans?, AARP PUB. 
POL’Y INST.  (Middle Class Security Project Paper No. 2013-01, 2013), 
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/security/ 
2013/retirement-prospects-middle-class-AARP-ppi-sec.pdf; Joelle Saad-Lessler, 
Teresa Ghilarducci & Kate Bahn, Are U.S. Workers Ready for Retirement? Trends 
in Plan Sponsorship, Participation, and Preparedness, SCHWARTZ CTR. FOR ECON. 
POLICY ANALYSIS (2015), http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/ 
research/retirement_security/Are_US_Workers_Ready_for_Retirement.pdf. 
200 See, e.g., State Regulation of Annuities, INSURED RET. INST., 
http://www.irionline.org/government-affairs/annuities-regulation-industry-
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a typical annuity, an insurance company bears the risk of making certain 
guaranteed payments, and because insurance companies bear such risks, they 
are heavily regulated and must maintain adequate reserves.201 In addition, all 
states have state-based guaranty funds that provide protections for annuitants 
in case the insurance company that sold them the policy becomes 
insolvent.202 While the guarantee limits vary from state to state, every state 
provides a minimum of $100,000 in benefit protection for annuities, and 
most states provide at least $250,000 in protection.203 These guarantees apply 
regardless of whether the annuities are in deferred or payout status at the time 
of the insurance company’s insolvency.204 
 
B. THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
 
As mentioned, the default benefit for defined benefit plans is a 
lifetime pension in the form of an annuity.205 Defined benefit plans typically 
                                                                                                                 
information/state-regulation-of-annuities (last visited July 28, 2016). Both the U.S. 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) and state insurance departments regulate 
variable annuities; however, the SEC does not view fixed annuities as securities, and 
so it does not regulate them. Annuities, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 6, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm. 
201 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ Model Standard 
Valuation Law generally requires insurance companies to maintain annuity reserves 
according to the Commissioners’ Annuity Reserve Method (CARVM). See, e.g., 
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Special Issues for Variable Annuities 2 (1999), 
https://www.actuary.org/files/publications/Practice_Note_Special_Issues_for_Vari
able_Annuities_july1999.pdf; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS, Standard 
Valuation Law 820, §§ 5a, 6 (July 2010), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-
820.pdf. See also Kush Kotecha, Ben Yahr & James Collingwood, Statutory 
Reserving for Fixed Indexed Annuities with Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal 
Benefits, 90 FIN. REP. 4 (Sept. 2012), https://www.soa.org/library/ 
newsletters/financial-reporter/2012/september/frn-2012-iss90-kotecha.aspx; Keith 
P. Sharp, Commissioners Annuity Reserve Valuation Method, 7 J. OF ACTUARIAL 
PRAC. 107 (1998), http://www.jofap.org/documents/vol7/v7_sharp.pdf. 
202 See, e.g., NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASSOCIATIONS, The 
Nation’s Safety Net (2014), https://www.nolhga.com/resource/file/NOLHGA% 
20Safety%20Net%202014.pdf; NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASSOC., 
Policyholder Information: Frequently Asked Questions (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.nolhga.com/policyholderinfo/main.cfm/location/questions. 
203 NAT’L ORG. OF LIFE & HEALTH INS. GUAR. ASSOCIATIONS, The Nation’s 
Safety Net, supra note 202, at 3. 
204 Id. 
205 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
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manage a portfolio of investment assets in a trust and pay those lifetime 
pension benefits directly from the trust.206 Alternatively, defined benefit 
plans sometimes purchase retail annuities in order to meet their pension 
obligations. While defined benefit plans must offer pension benefit in the 
form of a lifetime annuity, the plans may also offer lump sum distributions 
and other payment options at retirement or job separation.207 
 
1. Rules Governing Lump Sum Distributions 
 
As mentioned, the default benefit for defined benefit plans is a 
lifetime pension in the form of an annuity, and for married participants, the 
default benefit is a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA).208 These 
days, most defined benefit plans also offer participants some type of lump 
sum distribution option.209 Participants who can take a lump sum distribution 
can generally take that distribution when they terminate employment, or they 
can defer the distribution until a later date.210  
When a lump sum alternative is offered to a participant, the 
minimum lump sum amount must be determined in accordance with certain 
actuarial “relative valuation” rules.211 The minimum lump sum must have a 
value equal to the actuarially-determined present value of the participant’s 
expected stream of lifetime pension benefits.212 Those rules ensure that any 
lump sum distribution is the actuarial equivalent of the promised lifetime 
pension benefit. Basically, the Internal Revenue Code and related guidance 
specify the applicable interest rates and mortality tables that must be used to 
determine the minimum value of the lump sum. 
                                                                                                                 
206 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Alternatively, a defined benefit 
pension plan can be designed to invest directly in annuity contracts. Id. 
207 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. In general, these pay-
benefits-in-the-form-of-an-annuity rules also apply to defined contribution plans 
that are money purchase pension plans. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. 
BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan, supra 
note 62, at 18, 36. 
209 Sudipto Banerjee, Annuity and Lump-Sum Decisions in Defined Benefit 
Plans: The Role of Plan Rules, 381 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. 1, 4 (Issue Brief No. 
381, Jan. 2013), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_01-13.No381. 
LSD2.pdf. 
210 Id. 
211 I.R.C. § 411(c)(3) (2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1(e) (2016). 
212 For an explanation of the mathematics of these present value determinations, 
see infra Part IV.B. 
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The plan sponsor must also provide an explanation of the “relative 
value” of the lump sum when compared to the participant’s lifetime pension 
benefit.213 While plan sponsors have a good deal of flexibility about how to 
convey this information, the explanations “must be expressed to the 
participant in a manner that provides a meaningful comparison of the relative 
economic values of the two forms of benefit without the participant having 
to make [her own] calculations.”214 For example, if a lump sum is offered, 
participants must be shown how that lump sum compares with the present 
value of the lifetime pension benefit. 
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 raised the interest rates that 
defined benefit plans use to determine lump sum distribution amounts and 
so made lump sum distributions significantly less expensive for plan 
sponsors.215 Basically, the Internal Revenue Code used to require plan 
sponsors to use low 30-year-Treasury-bill interest rates to determine the 
minimum value of the lump sum,216 but now plan sponsors can use higher 
interest rates—calculated using three different corporate interest rates based 
on segments of the corporate bond yield curve.217 
Also, until updated mortality tables are required for 2017 or later,218 
plan sponsors can continue to use out-of-date mortality tables that reflect 
relatively shorter life expectancies than the new mortality tables will 
                                                                                                                 
213 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.417(a)(3)-1, 1.417(e)-1. 
214 Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1. 
215 I.R.C. § 417(e)(3) (2016); Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 67, at 
§§ 301-303 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); 
as enhanced by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), 
Pub.L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405, 850-53, §§ 40221-22 (2012). 
216 See, e.g., Notice 2002-26, 2002-1 C.B. 743 (requiring rates of interest based 
on 30-year Treasury securities during the four-year period ending on the last day 
before the beginning of the plan year). 
217 See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Minimum Present Value Segment 
Rates, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Minimum-Present-Value-Segment-
Rates (last visited July 20, 2016). 
218 See Notice 2015-53, 2015-33 I.R.B. 1, 2–3 (suggesting new mortality tables 
would be required for 2017). But see David B. Brandolph, De-Risking: IRS Window 
for 2016 Plan Mortality Table Rules Closing, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX 
REPORTER (Mar. 17, 2016), http://benefits.bna.com/bprc/2226/ 
split_display.adp?fedfid=84832144&vname=pbdnotallissues&jd=a0j0p0e2b3&spli
t=0 (wondering if the IRS will issue mortality table guidance in time for 2017). As 
we were going to press, the IRS issued new mortality tables for 2017 that made no 
meaningful changes.  Notice 2016-50, 2016-38 I.R.B. 371. 
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provide.219 In that regard, as life expectancies increase, pensions will need to 
make monthly payments to participants over more years, and that means 
lump sum distributions will cost more. Accordingly, shifting to the new 
mortality tables is expected to result in a 5 to 7 percent increase in pension 
liabilities for the average plan.220 
The Internal Revenue Code also generally restricts a defined benefit 
plan’s ability to cash out a participant’s benefit without the participant’s 
consent.221 The plan generally does not need the participant’s consent if the 
present value of her benefit is $5000 or less;222 however, if the accrued 
benefit is over $1000, the plan must also offer the employee the option of 
rolling such distributions into an IRA or a new employer’s plan.223 If the 
participant’s consent is needed and the participant is married, then spousal 
consent is also required.224 In any event, when a lump sum distribution is 
available, the participant is typically given the opportunity to roll it over to 
another pension plan or to an IRA.225 
                                                                                                                 
219 To get an idea of the improved mortality experience that the IRS will 
incorporate in its future sets of required mortality tables, see RP-2014 Rates, Soc’y 
of Actuaries, Total Dataset (2014), https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Exp-
Study/research-2014-rp-mort-tab-rates.xlsx; RP-2014 Mortality Tables, Soc’y of 
Actuaries (2014), https://www.soa.org/Research/Experience-Study/pension/ 
research-2014-rp.aspx; RP-2014 Mortality Tables Report 5 n.2, Soc’y of Actuaries 
(Nov. 2014), https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Exp-Study/research-2014-rp-
report.pdf. See also Selecting and Documenting Mortality Assumptions for Pensions, 
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES (2015), http://actuary.org/files/ Mortality_ 
PN_060515_0.pdf; Joshua Gotbaum & William G. Gale, Good news for retirement 
policy in spite of gridlock, BROOKINGS (Dec. 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/opinions/2015/12/18-good-news-retirement-policy-gale-gotbaum (“IRS 
regulations specify the use of outmoded mortality tables . . .”). 
220 MetLife, NISA Investment Advisors, L.L.C. & Prudential, Pension Risk 
Transfer Comes of Age, PENSION SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES: THE DERISKING 
MARKET GROWS APACE 4, 5 (July 27, 2015), https://www.metlife.com/ 
assets/cao/institutional-retirement/plan-sponsor/defined-benefit/pension-
settlement-strategies-conference-supplement.pdf. 
221 I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c) (2006). 
222 Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(3) (2006). 
223 I.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(B) (2014); I.R.S. Notice 2005-5, 2005-1 C.B. 337. 
224 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.417(a)(3)-1 (2006), 1.401(a)-20 (2006). 
225 I.R.C. § 402(c) (2014); STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., 
PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT 
SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 21; 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Rollovers of Retirement Plan and IRA Distributions 
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While these lump sum distribution rules provide a variety of 
protections for plan participants, many analysts worry that employees who 
take lump sum distributions will dissipate them too quickly.226 The worry is 
even greater when it comes to younger workers who take and spend their 
lump sum distributions when they change jobs.227 Participants may take a 
lump sum distribution (or roll over their account balance into an IRA) and 
subsequently purchase an annuity in the individual market, but individuals 
rarely buy annuities voluntarily.228 
 
2. Rules Governing the Purchase and Monitoring of 
Annuities 
 
The selection of an annuity provider is a fiduciary decision, and 
under U.S. Department of Labor Interpretive Bulletin 95-1, the plan sponsor 
must choose the “safest available” provider.229 The plan sponsor must 
evaluate a potential annuity provider’s claims-paying ability and 
creditworthiness but cannot rely solely on ratings provided by insurance 
rating services. Factors that the plan sponsor should consider include: 
 
                                                                                                                 
(Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,-Employee/ 
Rollovers-of-Retirement-Plan-and-IRA-Distributions. 
226 See, e.g., Lori Lucas, Plug the Drain: 401(k) Leakage and the Impact on 
Retirement, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION INST. INV. ASS’N (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.dciia.org/assets/Publications2/WhitePaper/white%20paper_8.1.2011%
20dciia%20plug%20the%20drain.pdf; Frolik, Rethinking ERISA’s Promise on 
Income Security in a World of 401(k) Plans, supra note 59, at 376–82; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-715, 401(K) PLANS: POLICY CHANGES COULD 
REDUCE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LEAKAGE ON WORKERS’ RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294520.pdf. 
227 Craig Copeland, Lump-Sum Distributions at Job Change, 30(1) EMP. 
BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2 (2009), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/ notespdf/EBRI_ 
Notes_Jan09_Rollovers.pdf; Hurd & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or 
Annuitize Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59. 
228 See infra notes 336–339 and accompanying text. 
229 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1 (2016) (a/k/a Interpretive Bulletin 95-1, Interpretive 
bulletin relating to the fiduciary standards under ERISA when selecting an annuity 
provider for a defined benefit pension plan); Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 
286, 298 (5th Cir. 2000) (discussing the “safest available” standard); Riley v. 
Murdock, 83 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1996) (declining to apply the “safest available” 
standard). 
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(1)  the quality and diversification of the annuity provider’s 
investment portfolio; 
(2)  the size of the insurer relative to the proposed contract; 
(3)  the level of the insurer’s capital and surplus; 
(4)  the lines of business of the annuity provider and other 
indications of its exposure to liability; 
(5)  the structure of the annuity contract and guarantees 
supporting the annuities, such as the use of separate 
accounts; and 
(6)  the availability of additional protection through state 
guaranty associations and the extent of those 
guarantees.230 
 
A plan sponsor also has a duty to monitor the appropriateness of the annuity 
providers that it selects, but that duty ends when the plan transfers the plan’s 
liability with respect to the individual’s benefits to that annuity provider.231 
The U.S. Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest 
rule will also apply to financial advisers who sell annuities to defined benefit 
plans and plan participants,232 and it will have a transformative impact on the 
sales of annuities to defined benefit plans and plan participants.233 The new 
rule is almost certain to change the current commission structure of annuities 
offered to plans and plan participants, and probably for the better (i.e., lower 
and more transparent commissions and fees).234 
                                                                                                                 
230 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(c) (2008). See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. 
WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Report of the Working Group on 
Retirement Distributions & Options (2005), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
publications/AC_1105A_report.html (recommending that the U.S. Department of 
Labor revise Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 to clarify the prudent procedures for annuity 
selection and monitoring). 
231 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(b) (2008). 
232 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
233 See, e.g., Sean Forbes, Fixed Annuity Sales Surge Amid Fiduciary Rule 
Concerns, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 7, 2016), http://www.bna.com/fixed-indexed-
annuity-n57982076676/; Stolz, How Annuities Will Be Transformed by DOL 
Fiduciary Rule, supra note 91.  
234 Stolz, How Annuities Will Be Transformed by DOL Fiduciary Rule, supra 
note 91. See also Greg Iacurci, DOL fiduciary rule will transform the annuity 
industry, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Feb. 21, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.investment 
news.com/article/20160221/FREE/160219910/dol-fiduciary-rule-will-transform-
the-annuity-industry?issuedate=20160221&sid=ANNUITY22016; Michael Kitces, 
Why The DoL Fiduciary Rule Won’t Kill Annuities, It Will Make Them Stronger!, 
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C. THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION 
PLANS 
 
Annuities can also play a role in defined contribution plans. First, 
defined contribution plans may offer deferred income annuities among their 
investment options. Second, a defined contribution plan may offer 
participants the option to annuitize their account balances at retirement or 
job separation. Third, almost all defined contribution plan participants may 
take a lump sum distribution (or roll over their account balance into an IRA) 
and subsequently purchase an annuity.235 
 
1. Rules Governing Lump Sum Distributions 
 
Defined contribution plans are not required to offer annuities, and as 
already mentioned, most defined contribution plans make distributions in 
lump sum or periodic distributions rather than lifetime annuities.236 In that 
regard, defined contribution plans typically allow lump sum distributions 
whenever an employee leaves employment—both at retirement or simply 
upon job separation.237 Plans are not required to offer departing employees a 
lump sum distribution (at least not until they are eligible to retire), but most 
plans do.238 If the accrued benefit of the departing employee is under $5000, 
the plan is allowed to distribute the accrued amount in a lump sum 
distribution without the employee’s consent;239 however, if the accrued 
benefit is over $1000, the plan must also offer the employee the option of 
rolling such distributions into an IRA or a new employer’s plan.240 All in all, 
departing employees can leave the money in the plan, roll it over into an IRA 
or other plan, or cash it out and spend it. Many analysts worry about 
                                                                                                                 
KITCES.COM (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.kitces.com/blog/why-dol-fiduciary-
wont-kill-annuities-it-will-make-them-stronger/. 
235 Brien & Panis, Annuities in the Context of Defined Contribution Plans, supra 
note 59, at 12. 
236 See supra Part II.C.1.b. 
237 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., What You Should Know 
About Your Retirement Plan, supra note 62, at 21. 
238 Id. 
239 I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(3) (2006). 
240 I.R.C. § 401(a)(31)(B); Notice 2005-5, 2005-1 C.B. 337. 
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employees dissipating their retirement savings when they receive lump sum 
distributions (or loans) and spend them before retirement.241 
 
2. Rules Governing the Purchase and Monitoring of 
Annuities 
 
a. Fiduciary Duties Generally 
 
When a defined contribution plan does offer an annuity, the selection 
of an annuity provider is, of course, a fiduciary function.242 The current safe 
harbor provides that a defined contribution plan fiduciary satisfies its 
fiduciary responsibility if the fiduciary: 
 
(1) engages in an objective, thorough and analytical search 
for the purpose of identifying and selecting providers 
from which to purchase annuities; 
(2) appropriately considers information sufficient to assess 
the ability of the annuity provider to make all future 
payments under the annuity contract; 
(3) appropriately considers the cost (including fees and 
commissions) of the annuity contract in relation to the 
benefits and administrative services to be provided 
under such contract; 
(4) appropriately concludes that, at the time of the selection, 
the annuity provider is financially able to make all 
future payments under the annuity contract and the cost 
of the annuity contract is reasonable in relation to the 
                                                                                                                 
241 See, e.g., Lucas, Plug the Drain: 401(k) Leakage and the Impact on 
Retirement, supra note 226, at 1; Copeland, Lump-Sum Distributions at Job Change, 
supra note 227, at 2; Hurd & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize 
Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59, at 7. 
242 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-4 (2008) (relating to the safe harbor on defined 
contribution annuity distribution options). See also Robert N. Eccles, Gregory F. 
Jacob & Wayne Johnson, Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal Benefits: Fiduciary 
Considerations for Plan Sponsors, 27(2) BENEFITS L. J. 379 (Summer 2014), 
http://www.iricouncil.org/docs/BenefitsLawJournalGLWBFiduciaryConsideration
s.pdf; Bruce Ashton, The Retirement Income Dilemma: An In-plan Solution, 
DRINKER BIDDLE (Mar. 2016), https://secure02.principal.com/ publicvsupply/ 
GetFile?fm=HZ2364&ty=VOP&EXT=.VOP. 
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benefits and services to be provided under the contract; 
and 
(5) if necessary, consults with an appropriate expert or 
experts for purposes of compliance with these 
provisions.243 
 
A defined contribution plan sponsor also has a duty to monitor the 
appropriateness of the annuity providers that it selects, but that duty ends 
when the plan transfers the plan’s liability with respect to the participant’s 
benefits to that annuity provider.244 
A defined contribution plan is relatively free to impose restrictions 
on the amount of assets that may be annuitized, even “unpalatable” 
restrictions.245 For example, the plan may require the participant to annuitize 
either all or none of her account balance.246 
 The U.S. Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule 
also applies to financial advisers who sell annuities to defined contribution 
plans and plan participants.247 
 
b. Annuity Investments within Defined 
Contribution Plans 
 
While a defined contribution plan sponsor can select the investments 
for its plan, ERISA Section 404(c) generally allows plans to permit 
individual participants to direct their own investments (a/k/a, “self-directed” 
or “participant-directed” accounts).248 To be eligible for this safe harbor, the 
                                                                                                                 
243 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-4 (2008). See also Field Assistance Bulletin 2015-2 
(U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Jul. 13, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2015-2.pdf 
(clarifying the meaning of “the time of selection”). 
244 Field Assistance Bulletin 2015-2, supra note 243; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-4 
(2008). 
245 Brien & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize Pension 
Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59, at 14. 
246 Id. (noting plan limits may also make it difficult to wait to select an annuity). 
247 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
248 ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. §1104(c) (2008) (providing plans with a “safe 
harbor” from liability for losses that a participant suffers in their 401(k) accounts to 
the extent that the participant exercises control over the assets in her 401(k) account). 
See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Meeting Your 
Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra note 87, at 6; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
Retirement Topics - Participant-Directed Accounts (Oct. 7, 2015), 
2016 LIFETIME ANNUITIES IN PENSION PLANS 85 
 
plan must provide the participant with the opportunity “to exercise control 
over assets in his individual account” and “to choose, from a broad range of 
investment alternatives.”249 The plan must also provide the participant with 
“the opportunity to obtain sufficient information to make informed decisions 
with regard to investment alternatives available under the plan,” including 
information about transaction fees and expenses.250 Also, “the act of 
designating investment alternatives in an ERISA Section 404(c) plan is a 
fiduciary function,” and “in deciding whether and to what extent to invest in 
a particular investment, or to make a particular fund available as a designated 
investment alternative, a fiduciary must ordinarily consider only factors 
relating to the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries in their 
retirement income.”251 Defined contribution plans can include fixed and 
variable annuities among their investment alternatives.252 
When a plan sponsor allows participants to direct their own 
investments, the plan sponsor must also choose a default investment for 
workers who do not otherwise direct their own investments.253 Historically, 
plan sponsors used low-yield, stable-value bond funds for that purpose, but 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended ERISA Section 404(c) to 
improve the default investments for workers who do not otherwise direct 
their own investments.254 That law—and the U.S. Department of Labor’s 
regulation—encouraged employers to replace their low-yield, stable-value 
bond funds with balanced funds (funds with an unchanging mix of stocks 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-topics-
participant-directed-accounts. 
249 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1) (2010). 
250 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B) (2010). 
251 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., OFF. OF 
REG. AND INTERPRETATIONS, ADVISORY OPINION NO. 98-04(A) (May 28, 1998). 
252 See, e.g., TIAA-CREF FINANCIAL SERVICES, Defined Benefit vs. Defined 
Contribution Plans, http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/public/support/help/ask-tiaa-cref/db-
vs-dc/index.html (last visited July 19, 2016) (noting TIAA defined contribution 
plans have both fixed and variable annuity options that the plan sponsor can include 
in its offerings). See also Raimond Maurer, Olivia Mitchell, Vanya Horneff & Ralph 
Rogalla, Variable Annuities, Lifetime Income Guarantees, and Investment Downside 
Protection, TIAA INST., 1 (Mar. 2016), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/ public/pdf/ti_ 
variable_annuities_lifetime_income_guarantees.pdf; TIAA-CREF FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, The Case for Guaranteed Annuities in Defined Contribution Plans (Oct. 
2010), https://www.tiaa.org/public/pdf/case_guaranteed_annuities.pdf. 
253 ERISA § 404(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(5) (2008). 
254 Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 67 (amending ERISA § 404(c), 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2008)).  
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and bonds) and life-cycle funds (funds that gradually shift their investments 
from stocks towards bonds as workers age).255 More specifically, the final 
regulation provides for four types of so-called “qualified default investment 
alternatives” (QDIAs) and also clarifies that a QDIA may be offered through 
variable annuity contracts or other pooled investment funds.256 In response 
to these rule changes, defined contribution plans have generally moved away 
from stable-value bond funds and towards target date funds,257 but plan 
sponsors can also offer annuities.258 
Recently issued guidance makes it easier for defined contribution 
plan sponsors to offer annuities.259 More specifically, if certain conditions 
are satisfied, plan sponsors can offer, as investment options, a series of target 
date funds that include deferred income annuities among their assets, even if 
some of the target date funds within the series are available only to older 
participants.260 In related guidance the U.S. Department of Labor noted that 
target date funds that serve as qualified default investment alternatives may 
include annuities as part of their investment portfolios.261 
                                                                                                                 
255 Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2008). See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. 
BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN, Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed 
Individual Account Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,452, 60,461 (Oct. 24, 2007), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fedreg/final/07-5147.pdf (amending 29 C.F.R. Part 
2550); Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus & Takeshi Yamaguchi, 
The Dynamics of Lifecycle Investing in 401(K) Plans, PENSION RES. COUNCIL 12-13 
(Population Aging Research Center Working Paper No. 19, 2008), 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1018&context=parc_worki
ng_papers. 
256 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Fact Sheet: Regulation 
Relating to Qualified Default Investment Alternatives in Participant-Directed 
Individual Account Plans (2008), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsQDIA.pdf. 
257 Andrew Bary, Target-Date Funds Take Over, BARRON’S (Jul. 5, 2014) 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB5000142405311190454400457965113401926
6274; Meaghan Kilroy, Vanguard finds soaring use of auto enrollment, target-date 
funds 10 years after PPA, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jun. 8, 2016), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20160608/ONLINE/160609873/vanguard-finds-
soaring-use-of-auto-enrollment-target-date-funds-10-years-after-ppa 
258 See, e.g., TIAA-CREF FINANCIAL SERVICES, The Case for Guaranteed 
Annuities in Defined Contribution Plans, supra note 252. 
259 Notice 2014-66, 2014-46 I.R.B. 820. 
260 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Treasury Issues Guidance to Encourage 
Annuities in 401(k) Plans (Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2673.aspx.  
261 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Information letter from 
Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary for EBSA, U.S. Department of Labor, to Mark 
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Regardless of how participants invest over the course of their 
careers, at retirement or job separation, a defined contribution plan can offer 
an in-plan annuity distribution option.262 To avoid the fiduciary risks that 
come from selecting and monitoring annuity providers, however, plan 
sponsors can instead offer annuities outside the plan as an IRA rollover 
option.263 
 
D. THE REGULATION OF ANNUITIES IN INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT 
ACCOUNTS 
 
Individuals can also use their IRAs to buy annuities. For example, 
an individual might roll over a lump sum pension distribution into an IRA 
and then have the IRA purchase an annuity. For that matter, the individual 
could roll over the funds directly to an “IRA annuity” offered by an insurance 
company.264 Having an IRA purchase an immediate fixed (lifetime) annuity 
will usually satisfy the required minimum distribution rules.265 The U.S. 
Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule will also apply 
to financial advisers who sell annuities to IRA holders.266 
 
E. PENSION RISK TRANSFERS 
 
Over the years, defined benefit plan sponsors have found it 
challenging to manage the risks associated with those plans. This has been 
                                                                                                                 
Iwry, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Retirement 
and Health Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/information-
letters/10-23-2014. 
262 See, e.g., Steve Utkus, Annuity—or not?, VANGUARD BLOG FOR INST. 
INVESTORS (Nov. 20, 2015), http://vanguardinstitutionalblog.com/2015/11/ 
20/annuity-or-not/. 
263 Id. 
264 See, e.g., Hersh Stern, Can I Buy An Annuity With My IRA or 401k?, 
IMMEDIATEANNUTIES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.immediateannuities.com/roll-
over-ira-or-401k/. 
265 Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 (2014). See, e.g., Hersh Stern, Required 
Minimum Distribution (RMD), IMMEDIATEANNUTIES (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://www.immediateannuities.com/required-minimum-distribution/ (noting that 
the required minimum distribution (RMD) rules generally require plan participants 
to begin taking distributions soon after they reach age 70½). See supra note 101 and 
accompanying text. 
266 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
88 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 
 
particularly true since the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
began requiring corporate employers to recognize the funding obligations 
associated with their defined benefit plans.267 Also, recent fluctuations in the 
national economy have resulted in changes in the value of plan assets and in 
market interest rates, which, in turn, have led to volatility in the funded status 
of defined benefit plans and in the pension contributions that plan sponsors 
are required to make.268 In general, corporate employers have responded by 
“freezing,” terminating, or replacing their traditional defined benefit plans.269 
Many plan sponsors have also chosen to reduce their risks by managing their 
plan assets with so-called “liability driven investing” (LDI).270 Finally, many 
plan sponsors are now focused on de-risking their defined benefit plans—
pension risk transfer strategies that transfer risk to insurance companies by 
purchasing annuities for participants (insurance annuity risk transfers) or that 
transfer risk to participants by making lump sum distributions to the 
participants (lump sum risk transfers).271 
                                                                                                                 
267 See, e.g., FASB Improves Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit 
Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (Sep. 29, 
2016), http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/FASBContent_C/NewsPage&cid=9000000 
04155. 
268 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE PENSIONS: 
PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS THAT 
REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS 3 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/670/668106.pdf. 
269 See, e.g., Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-based 
Retirement Benefits, supra note 107; Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension 
Plans: A Visual Essay, supra note 49; Justin Owens & Joshua Barbash, Defined 
Benefit Plans: A Brief History, (2014), http://www.russell.com/documents/ 
institutional-investors/research/defined-benefit-plans-a-brief-history.pdf.; U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., “Frozen” Defined-benefit Plans, 2 
PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES ON DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (2010), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/perspectives/program_perspectives_vol2_issue3.pdf; 
Pension Freezes, PENSION RIGHTS CTR., http://www.pensionrights.org/ 
publications/fact-sheet/pension-freezes#sthash.04SP0a6P.dpuf) (last visited July 
20, 2016). 
270 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND 
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant 
Protections, 13–14 (Nov. 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2013ACreport2.pdf. 
271 See, e.g., id. at 14–17; Joanne Sammer, Companies Eye Pension De-Risking,  
HR MAGAZINE (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-
magazine/pages/0216-pension-de-risking.aspx; AONHEWITT, PENSION 
SETTLEMENTS THROUGH TERMINATED VESTED LUMP SUM WINDOWS: INSIGHTS 
INTO PLAN SPONSOR EXPERIENCE 2 (Feb. 2013), http://www.hekblog.com/wp-
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1. An Overview of Risk Transfer Strategies for Defined 
Benefit Plans 
 
Defined benefit plan sponsors can significantly reduce their financial 
risks by engaging in lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk 
transfers.272 In a lump sum risk transfer, the participant gets a lump sum 
distribution that has a value that is the actuarial equivalent of the remaining 
expected payments under her pension. In an insurance annuity risk transfer, the 
participant gets an insurance company annuity instead of her pension. In both 
types of risk transfers, the plan sponsor is able to reduce the size of its pension 
                                                                                                                 
content/uploads/2013/03/Pension-Settlements-through-TV-Windows-
_3_18_13.pdf; CFO Research & Mercer, Taking the Next Step in Pension Risk 
Management, CFO.COM (July 2015), http://www.cfo.com/research/index.cfm/ 
download/14717490; Marcia Wagner, De-Risking Strategies, PLAN SPONSOR (Feb. 
2016) http://www.plansponsor.com/MagazineArticle.aspx?id=6442517918; 
Rebecca Moore, Risk Capture, PLAN ADVISER 50 (Jan.–Feb. 2016), 
http://www.planadviserdigital.com/planadviser/january_february_2016?sub_id=F0
7mtVh0axU7&folio=50&pg=54#pg54; Timothy J. Geddes, Bradley B. Howard, 
Anthony G. Conforti & Allison R. Steinmetz, Pension Risk Transfer: Evaluating 
Impact and Barriers for De-Risking Strategies, DELOITTE 6  (2014), 
https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Projects/2014-pension-risk-transfer-study.pdf 
(noting that pension de-risking strategies fall under three main categories: plan 
design; funding and investment policy; and liability management); Paul M. Secunda 
& Brendan S. Maher, Pension De-Risking, 93(3) WASHINGTON U. L. REV. 733 
(2016). 
272 See, e.g., supra note 271 and accompanying text. Note that defined 
contribution plans do not need to engage in risk transfer strategies. A defined 
contribution plan sponsor’s principal financial obligation is to fully fund its plan by 
making the required (defined) contributions. Thereafter, the plan sponsor is required 
to manage the plan’s assets as the individual account balances grow and to make 
distributions from those individual accounts when the participants retire or terminate 
their employment, but, unlike a defined benefit plan sponsor, a defined contribution 
plan sponsor has no further financial obligations (absent a breach of fiduciary 
duties). Defined contribution plan sponsors can, however, “outsource” many of their 
plan administration duties to third-party administrators, but that is not at all like the 
de-risking of financial risks by defined benefit plans). U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Outsourcing 
Employee Benefit Plan Services (Nov. 2014), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
pdf/2014ACreport3.pdf. 
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plan and its pension costs, for example, by reducing its PBGC premiums.273 In 
short, pension risk transfers reduce risks for defined benefit plan sponsors. 
At the same time, however, pension risk transfers generally increase 
risks for participants and often push them away from receiving streams of 
lifetime income. For example, participants who receive lump sum 
distributions must bear all of the longevity risk for making their money last 
for the rest of their lives; they must bear all the costs and risks of managing 
their investments; and their assets are no longer entitled to the creditor and 
other protections of ERISA.274 Participants who receive insurance company 
annuities have their PBGC guarantees replaced by the less generous 
guarantees of state guaranty funds.275 
 
2. The Recent (and Coming) Increase in Pension Risk 
Transfers 
                                                                                                                 
273 See, e.g., PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Premium Rates, supra note 102 
(noting plan sponsors have to pay both per-participant PBGC premiums and a 
variable-rate premium that is based on the plan’s level of funding); The Bipartisan 
Budget Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (providing for significant 
increases in PBGC premiums). Id. For example, for single-employer plans, the per-
participant flat premium rate for plan years beginning in 2017 is $69 for single-
employer plans and the variable-rate premium (VRP) for single-employer plans is 
$34 per $1000 of unfunded vested benefits (UVBs). PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 
Premium Rates, supra note 102. 
274 See, e.g., Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers: 
Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit 
Plans 5 (May 28, 2015) (statement of Roberta Rafaloff, MetLife), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015risk8.pdf (“The relative 
value statement does not even begin to evaluate the costs and risks assumed by the 
participant. In accepting the lump sum, the participant assumes the investment, 
mortality and longevity risks. The value of these risks, which the participant will pay 
if they attempt to turn the lump sum into lifetime income with a retail annuity, is not 
part of the relative value disclosure.”). See also Gotbaum & Gale, Good news for 
retirement policy in spite of gridlock, supra note 219 (“Many retirement experts 
view lump sum payments that substitute for pensions to be pernicious because they 
divert professionally-managed accounts and instead put large sums in the hands of 
individuals who have little or no investment expertise.”). 
275 See supra Part III.A. Not everyone believes that the state guarantees are less 
valuable than PBGC guarantees. See, e.g., Barry Burr, Study finds little difference in 
pension guarantee between PBGC and annuities, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Mar. 
21, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/20160321/PRINT/160329995/study-
finds-little-difference-in-pension-guarantee-between-pbgc-and-
annuities?utm_campaign=saxo_rss&utm_source=rss02_rss&utm_medium=rss. 
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In recent years, we have seen a significant increase in these pension de-
risking transactions. According to one recent study of private pension plans, 
more than one million participants were affected by de-risking from 2009–
2013.276 There were $8.5 billion in pension buy-out transactions in 2014, and 
more than $8 billion in the first three-quarters of 2015,277 and de-risking 
transactions are expected to continue to rise.278 
Increasingly, plan sponsors—especially those with frozen defined 
benefit plans—view their defined benefit plans as legacy liabilities that are 
no longer a strategic part of their current compensation packages. Through 
lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk transfers, plan sponsors 
can reduce the number of plan participants. As a result a plan sponsor can 
save money by reducing the plan’s administrative costs and its ever-
increasing PBGC premiums.279 Removing participants from the plan also 
reduces the size of the pension and so reduces the impact of market volatility 
on pension plan funding and contribution rates (and on corporate balance 
sheets). Also, as already-mentioned, until the new mortality table regulations 
come into effect in 2017 or later, plan sponsors can still use the currently-
required mortality tables to calculate lump sums—tables that reflect shorter 
life expectancies than the new mortality tables.280 All in all, it is less 
expensive for plans to enter into lump sum risk transfers sooner rather than 
later.281 
                                                                                                                 
276 Neela Ranade, Armando Saavedra & Tim Rhodes, Risk Transfer Study Plan 
Years 2009–2013 25 (2015), http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Risk-Transfer-with-
Notes-December-2015.pdf (study of Form 5500 filings compiled by the PBGC for 
plans with 1000 or more participants). 
277 Rob Kozlowski, More Plans than Ever Solve Liabilities Problem by 
Dumping Them, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Feb. 22, 2016) 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20160222/PRINT/302229979. See also Citi GPS: 
Global Perspectives & Solutions, The Coming Pensions Crisis, supra note 139, at 
61 fig.41 (listing notable recent pension risk transfer transactions in the United States 
and the United Kingdom); Amy Kessler, William McCloskey & Arnaud Benoussan, 
The Pension Risk Transfer Market at $240 Billion: Innovation, Globalization, and 
Growth, PENSION & LONGEVITY RISK TRANSFER FOR INST. INVESTORS 18 (2015). 
278 See, e.g., De-Risking and Rescue Plan Petitions Expected to Rise, 43 BNA 
PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 128 (2016). 
279 See, e.g., PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Premium Rates, supra note 102 
(showing scheduled increases through 2019). 
280 See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
281 On the other hand, there is no similar cost savings for an insurance annuity 
risk transfer as insurance companies have already taken the new life expectancy 
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Lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk transfers are still 
relatively expensive in today’s low-interest-rate environment, and they 
present significant challenges for currently-underfunded defined benefit 
plans. Pertinent here, higher interest rates generally have a bigger effect on 
a plan’s liabilities than on its assets.282 Among other things, that means that 
(if and) when market interest rates increase, pension plan funding ratios will 
improve.283 As a result, many currently underfunded plans would “become” 
fully funded, and once plans are 110 percent funded, many observers believe 
that many of those plans would then implement de-risking and termination 
strategies.284 As more fully explained in Part III.E.3.a below, it is fairly easy 
for a plan sponsor to terminate a fully funded plan, and participants in those 
“standard terminations” generally get lump sum distributions or insurance 
annuities: there is no way for a participant to stay with a plan that is 
terminating. 
 
3. The Current Rules Governing Pension Risk Transfers 
 
A variety of ERISA rules can have an impact on lump sum risk 
transfers and insurance annuity risk transfers. 
 
a. Standard Terminations 
 
It is fairly easy for a plan sponsor to terminate a fully funded defined 
benefit plan.285 In general, these standard terminations involve purchasing 
                                                                                                                 
projections into account in pricing their annuities. Once a plan adopts the new 
mortality tables, however, annuities will look relatively better compared to the plan’s 
liability. 
282 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT: GRAPPLING WITH CRISIS LEGACIES 75 (Sept. 2011), https://www.imf.org/ 
External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf.  
283 Rich White, Is Your Defined-Benefit Pension Plan Safe?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/retirement/08/safe-db-
plan.asp (noting a defined benefit plan’s funding ratio is the ratio of its assets to its 
liabilities). 
284 See, e.g., Sammer, Companies Eye Pension De-Risking, supra note 271; see 
also Taking the Next Step in Pension Risk Management, MERCER 4 (July 2015), 
http://www.mercer.com/content/dam/mercer/attachments/global/Retirement/merce
r-cfo-research-pension-risk-survey-2015.pdf (showing that a large percentage of the 
213 large companies surveyed were likely or very likely to undertake risk transfers 
in 2015 or 2016). 
285 See generally ERISA § 4041(b)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(1)(D) (2012); 
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annuities from an insurer, although participants can also be offered lump sum 
distributions.286 A terminating plan can only require a participant to accept a 
lump sum if the present value of her benefit is $5,000 or less.287 A typical 
standard termination involves numerous steps including: calculating 
individual participant benefit amounts and payment form options, 
communicating information to plan participants, and distributing the assets. 
The whole process typically takes 12 to 18 months.288 
Unless the participant elects otherwise, she will receive an insurance 
annuity that is equivalent to her pension. As already mentioned, the selection 
of an annuity provider is a fiduciary decision, and the plan sponsor must 
choose the safest available provider.289 A key step in any standard 
termination is providing an individualized notice of plan benefits to each 
participant.290 These notices of plan benefits include general information 
about the plan and the data used to calculate each participant’s benefit, and 
they may also include the plan’s benefit election form. When a lump sum 
alternative is offered to a participant, the minimum lump sum amount must 
be determined in accordance with the relative valuation rules, and the notice 
of plan benefits must explain the relative value of the lump sum when 
compared to the participant’s lifetime pension benefit.291 
                                                                                                                 
Standard Terminations, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., http://www.pbgc.gov/ 
prac/terminations/standard-terminations.html (last visited July 21, 2016); 
Retirement Plans FAQs Regarding Plan Terminations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Retirement-Plans-FAQs-regarding-Plan-
Terminations (last updated Feb. 19, 2016); Harold J. Ashner, PBGC Issues: 
Planning a Standard Termination—A Checklist for Practitioners, 16 J. PENSIONS & 
BENEFITS 67 (2009), http://www.keightleyashner.com/publications/Pensions 
Benefits_012009.pdf; Blaine Brickhouse, Path to Defined Benefit Plan Termination, 
FINDLEY DAVIES, http://www.findleydavies.com/images/ServiceLineLeftThumb 
nailsAndPDFs/Summary-of-the-Pension-Plan-Termination-Process-3-25-14-with-
new-logo.pdf (last visited July 29, 2016); Plan Termination: Getting It Done!, 
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES (Oct. 16-19, 2011), https://www.soa.org/files/pd/annual-
mtg/2011-chicago-annual-mtg-118-4.pdf; American Bar Association Retirement 
Funds, Plan Termination, PLAN ADM’R GUIDE (2015), http://www.aba 
retirement.com/ePAG/aba-0h0-plan-termination-web-.html. 
286 ERISA § 4041(b)(3)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 
4041.28(c) (2015). 
287 I.R.C. § 411(a)(11) (2012). See supra notes 221–225 and accompanying text. 
288 Brickhouse, Path to Defined Benefit Plan Termination, supra note 285, at 1. 
289 See supra Part III.B.2. 
290 29 C.F.R. § 4041.24 (2015). 
291 I.R.C. § 411(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1(e) (1977). See supra Part 
III.B.1. 
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b. Lump Sum Risk Transfers 
 
In a typical lump sum risk transfer, the employer amends its defined 
benefit plan to provide participants with a choice between the lifetime 
pension benefit promised by the plan and a lump sum distribution that has 
an actuarially-equivalent present value.292 Usually, the employer makes its 
“lump sum window” offer available to separated participants (also known as 
terminated deferred vested participants), and they are given a window of time 
(e.g., 90 days) to make their choice. For example, a separated participant 
who is not yet in pay status could be offered a lump sum that is the actuarial 
equivalent of her promised lifetime pension benefit. As more fully explained 
in Part V.A.5 below, however, while that lump sum is the actuarial 
equivalent of her promised pension, because of the way that retail annuity 
markets work, that lump sum could almost never be enough to buy a retail 
annuity that would replicate the promised lifetime pension benefit.293 
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code impose a number of limits on 
the ability of plan sponsors to engage in lump sum risk transfers. At the 
outset, a plan sponsor’s decision to implement a lump sum risk transfer is a 
matter of plan design that is viewed as a settlor function rather than a 
fiduciary function.294 On the other hand, when the plan sponsor implements 
that lump sum risk transfer, the plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary.295 
Also, whenever the plan sponsor makes a lump sum distribution, the 
plan sponsor must comply with the relative valuation rules.296 Also, as 
already-mentioned, until the new mortality table regulations come into effect 
in 2017 or later, plan sponsors can still use the currently-required mortality 
                                                                                                                 
292 See, e.g., supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
293 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE 
PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS 
THAT REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 25–29. 
294 A “settlor” is the person who creates a trust. See, e.g., W.J. Stewart, Settlor, 
COLLINS DICTIONARY OF LAW (2006), http://legal dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
settlor. 
295 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) (2016). See also 
Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the 
ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459 (2015); Lee v. Verizon 
Communications, Inc., 623 F. App’x. 132, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588 (5th Cir. 
Aug 17, 2015). 
296 I.R.C. § 411(c)(3) (2014); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-1(e) (2016). See supra 
notes 211–220 and accompanying text. 
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tables to calculate lump sums—tables that reflect shorter life expectancies 
than the new mortality tables.297  
The Internal Revenue Code used to require plan sponsors to use low 
30-year-Treasury-bill interest rates to determine the minimum value of the 
lump sum, but now plan sponsors can use higher interest rates—calculated 
using three different corporate interest rates based on segments of the 
corporate bond yield curve.298 These higher “applicable interest rates” have 
made lump sum distributions less expensive for plan sponsors—and less 
generous for participants. In addition, the interest rules permit plan sponsors 
to select an applicable interest rate from up to 17 months prior to the month 
in which the lump sum offer is made. That means that a plan sponsor can 
gain a financial advantage for itself by selecting a so-called “lookback” 
interest rate from up to 17 months earlier—when that interest rate is higher 
(and so results in lower lump sums) than the rate that prevails at the time the 
lump sum offer is made.299 
Another rule lets plan sponsors ignore many additional pension plan 
benefits when calculating lump sum distribution amounts.300 For example, a 
plan sponsor can calculate the lump sum for a separated participant based on 
that participant’s normal retirement benefit, even though that participant 
might have eventually been eligible for a subsidized early retirement 
benefit.301 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 added new benefit restrictions 
that generally prohibit pension risk transfers that result in the plan having a 
funding ratio after the transaction that is below 80 percent: basically, defined 
benefit plans that fall below 80 percent are prevented from paying out lump 
sums.302 
Historically, plan sponsors have usually implemented a lump sum 
strategy by offering the lump sum to separated participants, but more 
recently plans were also offering lump sums to retirees already in pay status 
(e.g., already receiving monthly pension benefits).303 Now, however, IRS 
                                                                                                                 
297 See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 215–217 and accompanying text. 
299 Once an interest rate or other variable is set in a plan, it may later end up 
working against the plan sponsor, for example, if interest rates increase after the 
lump sum window offer locks in at a relatively lower interest rate. 
300 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND 
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant 
Protections, supra note 270, at 21. 
301 Id. 
302 ERISA § 206(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2014); I.R.C. § 436(c) (2014); Notice 
2011-96, 2011-52 I.R.B. 915. 
303 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND 
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Notice 2015-49 prevents plan sponsors from implementing lump sum risk 
transfers for retirees in pay status.304 More specifically, Notice 2015-49 
informs taxpayers that the Treasury and the IRS intend to amend the required 
minimum distribution rules to prohibit defined benefit plans from replacing 
ongoing annuity payments with a lump sum payment or any other form of 
accelerated payment.305 
All in all, ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code provide a number 
of protections and disclosures for participants (and beneficiaries) who are 
offered lump sum alternatives to their lifetime pension benefits. The 
following disclosures are currently required in a lump sum risk transfer:306 
                                                                                                                 
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant 
Protections, supra note 270, at 16. 
304 Notice 2015-49, 2015-30 I.R.B. 79. Notice 2015-49 also provides that, with 
certain exceptions, the regulations contemplated will be effective retroactively back 
to July 9, 2015. Id. See also Zorast Wadia, De-Risking Your Pension Plan: Do New 
Regulations Make 2016 the Best Time to Offer Lump-Sum Distributions?, 28 
BENEFITS L.J. 1 (2015), http://us.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/2015/de-
risking-pension-plan.pdf; Elizabeth Thomas Dold & David N. Levine, Employee 
Benefits Corner: IRS Ends Lump Sum Windows for Individuals in Pay Status, 93 
TAXES THE TAX MAG. 27 (2015), http://www.groom.com/media/publication/ 
1622_IRS_Ends_Lump_Sum_Windows_for_Individuals_in_Pay_Status.pdf. Also, 
applicants requesting determination letters for their defined benefit (DB) plans now 
need to tell the IRS whether the plan has lump-sum risk transfer language in it, and, 
if it does, to show how the plan satisfies one of the conditions in Notice 2015-49. 
New Process for Defined Benefit Determination Letter Applications, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/new-process-for-defined-
benefit-determination-letter-applications (last updated June 29, 2016). 
305 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) generally requires plans to make minimum required 
distributions to retirees over age 70½, and it is clear that the regulations 
contemplated in Notice 2015-49 will bar lump sum distributions to those retirees 
over age 70½ who are in pay status. On the other hand, some analysts wonder 
whether those regulations will be broad enough to reach retirees under age 70½. See, 
e.g., IRS Shuts Down Pension Plan De-Risking Technique of Offering Lump Sums 
to Retirees in Pay Status, VENABLE (July 27, 2015), https://www.venable.com/irs-
shuts-down-pension-plan-de-risking-technique-of-offering-lump-sums-to-retirees-
in-pay-status-07-27-2015/. In passing, it should be noted that Notice 2015-49 marks 
a reversal of the position that the IRS had taken in a number of private letter 
rulings—rulings that, in effect, had permitted plan sponsors to offer lump sum 
distributions to participants already in pay status. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
401.06-01 (Apr. 19, 2012); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201228051 (Apr. 19, 2012). 
306 This paragraph follows Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk 
Transfers: Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension 
Benefit Plans (May 28, 2015) (statement of Robert S. Newman, Covington & 
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(1) the material features of the optional forms of benefit 
available under the plan;307 
(2) the right, if any, to defer receipt of the distribution;308 
(3) the consequences of failing to defer;309 
(4) a description of the optional forms available under the 
plan, including: the amount payable in each form, the 
conditions for eligibility for each form, the relative 
value of the form compared to the qualified joint and 
survivor annuity (QJSA), and an explanation of relative 
value;310 and 
(5) an explanation of the ability of the participant to roll 
over the lump sum distribution to another tax-qualified 
retirement plan or individual retirement arrangement, 
including the tax effects of doing so (the rollover 
notice).311 
 
In addition, plan sponsors and their advisers typically provide additional 
communication materials.312 Needless to say, choosing between an annuity 
and a lump-sum payout is a “cognitively challenging task.”313 
                                                                                                                 
Burling LLP), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015risk10.pdf. 
307 Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-11(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2006). 
308 Id. 
309 Notice 2007-7, 2007-1 C.B. 395, Q&A-32, 33; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-
11(c)(2)(vi), 73 Fed. Reg. 59575 (Oct. 9, 2008). 
310 Treas. Reg. § 1.417(a)(3)-1(as amended in 2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.417(e)-1 
(as amended in 2003). 
311 I.R.C. § 402(f) (2014), Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(f)-1, 31.3405(c)-1 (as amended 
in 2007); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.402(f)-1 (as amended in 2007), 31.3405(c)-1 (as amended 
in 2007). The IRS has provided safe harbor notices. See Notice 2009-68, 2009-2 
C.B. 423, updated by Notice 2014-54, 2014-41 I.R.B. 670. 
312 See, e.g., Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers: 
Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit 
Plans 1–2 (May 28, 2015) (statement of Craig Rosenthal, Mercer, on behalf of the 
American Benefits Council), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisory 
council2015risk11.pdf (on file with author). 
313 Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers: Hearing Before 
the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans (May 28, 
2015) (statement of Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Dartmouth College), http://www.dol.gov/ 
ebsa/pdf/erisaadvisorycouncil2015risk1.pdf. See also Michael Kitces, How to 
Evaluate the Pension Versus Lump Sum Decision, and Strategies for Maximization, 
KITCES.COM (July 22, 2015), https://www.kitces.com/blog/how-to-evaluate-the-
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c. Insurance Annuity Risk Transfers 
 
In an insurance annuity risk transfer, the plan sponsor replaces the 
participants’ pension benefits with retail annuities.314 Basically, the plan 
sponsor purchases a group annuity contract, and the insurer distributes 
annuity certificates to the covered individuals.315 Under the minimum 
funding rules, however, the plan cannot purchase the group annuity unless 
the plan remains at least 80 percent funded after the transaction.316 As with 
standard terminations, the selection of an annuity provider is a fiduciary 
function, and the plan sponsor must choose the safest available provider.317 
After the distribution of the certificates to individual plan participants, those 
individuals cease to be covered by the plan.318 That should also free the plan 
sponsor from any further fiduciary responsibilities with respect to those 
former participants.319 
Insurance annuity risk transfers totaled $14.4 billion in 2015, up 54 
percent from the previous year.320 Buy-out products accounted for $13.6 
billion (95 percent) of the total group annuity risk transfer market in 2015; 
                                                                                                                 
pension-versus-lump-sum-decision-and-strategies-for-maximization/; Annuity or 
Lump Sum?, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. (July 21, 2016), 
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/annuity-or-lump-sum.html (offering some advice 
for making the choice between taking an annuity or a lump sum). 
314 See, e.g., Margaret G. McDonald & Scott E. Gaul, Preparing for Pension 
Risk Transfer, PRUDENTIAL RET. INS. AND ANNUITY CO. (2015), 
http://pensionrisk.prudential.com/pdfs/prep-for-prt_prtwp004_0263513-00004-
00_2015-06-15.pdf (outlining the steps involved in buy-out transactions). 
315 See, e.g., Private Sector Pension De-Risking and Participant Protections: 
Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit 
Plans 4-5 (June 5, 2013) (statement of Robert S. Newman, Covington & Burling 
LLP), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/covingtonburling060513.pdf. 
316 Id. at 4; ERISA § 206(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 436(c) (2012). 
317 See supra Part III.E.3.a; see also Ellen Shaer, Pension Plans: To Terminate 
or Not to Terminate, CAPTRUST (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.captrustadvisors.com/ 
resources/institutional-consulting/to-terminate-or-not-to-terminate/. 
318 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(d)(2)(ii) (2015). 
319 29 C.F.R. § 2509.95-1(b) (2015). 
320 Group Annuity Risk Transfer Sales Top $14 Billion in 2015, LIMRA Secure 
Retirement Institute Reports, LIFE INS. MKTG. & RESEARCH ASS’N (LIMRA) (Feb. 
29, 2016), http://www.limra.com/Posts/PR/News_Releases/Group_Annuity_Risk_ 
Transfer_Sales_Top_$14_Billion_in_2015,_LIMRA_Secure_Retirement_Institute
_Reports.aspx. 
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and single premium buy-ins accounted for just $7.2 million of risk 
transfers.321 
 
4. The ERISA Advisory Council’s Recent Focus on 
Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk 
Transfers 
 
Building on its prior work,322 the ERISA Advisory Council recently 
focused on the information that participants need to make informed decisions 
when they are faced with lump sum risk transfers and insurance annuity risk 
transfers.323 More specifically, in 2015, the ERISA Advisory Council 
developed draft model notices and disclosures that can be used by plan 
sponsors, participants, and the public.324 On November 4, 2015, the ERISA 
Advisory Council presented its findings to the U.S. Department of Labor, 
and its final report includes model notices for lump sum risk transfers and 
for insurance annuity risk transfers.325 In the end, the guidance that is 
                                                                                                                 
321 Id. See also John Manganaro, Pension Risk Transfers Topped $14 Billion 
Last Year, PLANADVISER (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.planadviser.com/Pension-
Risk-Transfers-Topped-14-Billion-Last-Year/. 
322 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION 
BENEFIT PLANS, Private Sector Pension De-risking and Participant Protections, 
supra note 270. 
323 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION 
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers (2015), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACmodelnotice1.pdf. 
324 Id.; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND 
PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers 
(Nov. 2015), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2015ACreport2.pdf. See also 
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BD., Pension Lump-sum Payouts and Your Retirement 
Security (Jan. 2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201601_cfpb_pension-
lump-sum-payouts-and-your-retirement-security.pdf. The author was privileged to 
testify before the Advisory Council. Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk 
Transfers: Hearing Before the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension 
Benefit Plans (Aug. 18, 2015) (statement of Jonathan Barry Forman, Univ. of Okla. 
Coll. of Law), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/FormanRiskTransfer081815.pdf. 
325 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION 
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers, supra 
note 324, at 34 (lump sum notice) & 40 (insurance company risk transfer notice); 
ERISA Advisory Council Presents Recommendations to DOL on Lifetime Plan 
Participation, Defined Benefit Plan De-Risking, VOYA (Dec. 2015), 
https://investments.voya.com/idc/groups/public/documents/retirement/144575.pdf;  
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION 
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ultimately issued by the U.S. Department of Labor may have a significant 
impact on the size and nature of the defined benefit pension plan system and 
on the lifetime incomes of its participants.326 
 
IV. THE ROLE FOR ANNUITIES AND OTHER LIFETIME 
INCOME MECHANISMS 
 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF ANNUITIES 
 
As Part II.C.3 above showed, traditional defined benefit pension 
plans have been in decline for decades. Individuals now have the primary 
responsibility to participate in, contribute to, and manage their retirement 
savings accounts throughout their working years; and they must also manage 
all of their retirement savings throughout their retirement years. These are 
daunting tasks.327 To have adequate income throughout retirement, 
individuals have to make good financial choices through their working years 
and beyond. They need to make wise choices about when to retire, when to 
claim Social Security benefits, how to plan for an unknown length of 
retirement, how to plan for medical expenses and long-term care, how to use 
a home to provide retirement income, how to manage a retirement portfolio, 
and how to convert accumulated retirement savings into a lifetime income 
stream.328 
That is where traditional pensions, annuities, and similar lifetime 
income products come in. Although estimates vary, it seems that relatively 
few retirees receive income from traditional pensions and annuities.329 
                                                                                                                 
BENEFIT PLANS, Lump Sum Notice, etc. (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/pub/4d76162e-ca83-84d3-e1c3-
705cf3b07458. 
326 Ideally, those disclosure requirements should be designed to give participants 
the information that they need to make informed decisions. At the same time, 
however, those disclosure requirements should not be so burdensome on plan 
sponsors that it spurs them to terminate their plans. 
327 See, e.g., Pamela Perun, Retirement Savings: Confronting the Challenge of 
Longevity, THE ASPEN INST. INITIATIVE ON FIN. SEC. (2010), 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/ConfrontingLon
gevity_AspenIFS.pdf. 
328 See, e.g., Retiree Lifetime Income: Choices & Considerations, AM. ACAD. 
OF ACTUARIES 1, 1–7 (Oct. 2015), http://actuary.org/files/Retiree_Choices_ 
IB_102215.pdf. 
329 See, e.g., Craig Copeland, Pension Income of the Elderly and Characteristics 
of Their Former Employers, 28(3) EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 2 (2007), 
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According to one estimate, in 2010, 44 percent of retirees received income 
from a traditional pension and another 10 percent received income from an 
annuity.330 Another study suggests that only around one-third of retirees 
receive income from annuities, but for the majority, these instruments 
provide just 4 percent of their income.331 
It is not altogether clear what the “right” level of annuitization is.332 
Studies do show that annuitization helps reduce poverty in old age333 and that 
retirees who receive lifetime income from annuities or traditional pensions 
were generally more satisfied than those without such lifetime income.334 All 
in all, while some individuals with low levels of retirement savings might be 
better off using their savings for emergencies rather than annuitizing them,335 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/ebri_notes_03-20071.pdf. 
330 Steve Nyce & Billie Jean Quade, Annuities and Retirement Happiness, 
TOWERS WATSON INSIDER 1, 9 n.1 (Sept. 2012), https://www.towerswatson.com/en-
US/Insights/Newsletters/Americas/insider/2012/Annuities-and-Retirement-
Happiness. 
331 Danielle Andrus, One-Third of Retirees Receive Annuity Income, 
THINKADVISER (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2011/09/23/one-
third-of-retirees-receive-annuity-income. 
332 See, e.g., Barry P. Bosworth, Gary Burtless & Mattan Alalouf, Do Retired 
Americans Annuitize Too Little? Trends in the Share of Annuitized Income, B.C. 
CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Working Paper No. 2015-9, June 2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/wp_2015-9.pdf (finding little evidence that the annuity-
like share of total income has fallen for aged families). 
333 See, e.g., Constantijn W.A. Panis & Michael J. Brien, Implications of 
Expanded Annuitization for Old-Age Well-being, DELOITTE (Sept. 4, 2015), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/implicationsofexpandedannuitizationforoldagewellbei
ng.pdf; Natalia S. Orlova, Matthew S. Rutledge & April Yanyuan Wu, The 
Transition from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution Pensions: Does It Influence 
Elderly Poverty?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Working Paper No. 2015-17, July 
2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/wp_2015-17.pdf (finding that 
households with pensions that are annuitized with the joint-and-survivor life option 
and that do not take lump sum distributions before age 55 are best able to avoid 
income and asset poverty). 
334 See, e.g., Panis & Brien, supra note 333; Nyce & Quade, Annuities and 
Retirement Happiness, supra note 330; Keith A. Bender & Natalia A. Jivan, What 
Makes Retirees Happy?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue Brief No. 28, Feb. 2005), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/02/ib_28.pdf; Constantijn Panis, 
Annuities and Retirement Well-Being, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW 
LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 259, 259–274 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen 
P. Utkus eds., 2004). 
335 See, e.g., Cotton, Retirement Savings and Annual Spending, supra note 130; 
STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND 
102 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 23 
 
it seems likely that many individuals would be better off if more of their 
retirement savings was annuitized. 
Unfortunately, people rarely choose to buy annuities voluntarily.336 
The demand for annuities is significantly lower than expected, and this 
shortfall has come to be known as the “annuity puzzle.”337 Some of the 
reasons for the low demand for annuities include: the existence of alternative 
annuities such as Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, and 
traditional defined benefit plans; a willingness to rely on phased distributions 
from defined contribution plans, IRAs, and other retirement savings 
vehicles; the desire to leave bequests; the incompleteness or inefficiencies in 
the retail annuity market that lead to poor prices for retail annuities; and the 
behavioral and cultural challenges involved in getting individuals to make 
decisions about complex investments like annuities.338 There are also 
                                                                                                                 
BACKGROUND RELATING TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN 
RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 34 (noting that for some 
individuals Social Security benefits may provide sufficient lifetime retirement 
income). 
336 See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without 
Income for Life: Information for Current and Future Retirees, supra note 131 
(explaining the advantage of annuities in generating lifetime income). 
337 See, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi, Alessandro Previtero & Richard H. Thaler, 
Annuitization Puzzles, 25(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 143, 154-57 (2011) (discussing 
behavioral and institutional factors leading to the low demand for annuities, and 
noting that only 21 percent of defined contribution plans in the United States offer 
annuities as an option); Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the 
Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 297, 307 (1986) (“[I]t is a well-known fact 
that annuity contracts, other than in the form of group insurance through pension 
systems, are extremely rare.”); Menahem E. Yaari, Uncertain Lifetime, Life 
Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer, 32 REV. ECON. STUD. 2, 137 (1965) 
(analyzing the effect of the uncertainty of lifespan on consumer behavior).  
338 See, e.g., Robert Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private 
Annuities: Issues and Options (Revised Draft Mar. 30, 2015), http://international-
pension-workshop.com/papers-pdf/Holzmann.pdf; Lee M. Lockwood, Bequest 
Motives and the Annuity Puzzle, 15 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 2, 226 (2012) 
(suggesting that people with bequest motives may be better off not annuitizing any 
wealth); Kelli Hueler, Paula Hogan & Anna Rappaport, Public Policy and Consumer 
Disclosure for the Income Annuity Market, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 795, 807 
(2013) (noting that low annuitization rates may indicate problems in the 
marketplace); Pinar Çebi, Can Annuities Enhance Retirement Lifestyles?, AM. 
COUNCIL FOR CAP. FORMATION, 4-5 (Apr. 2006), http://accf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/annuitiesWhitepaper.pdf (discussing why individuals do 
not purchase annuities). 
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constraints on the supply of lifetime annuities, including inefficient 
regulation of annuity markets and the limited availability of inflation-
adjusted and longevity assets that can be matched against insurer annuity-
related liabilities.339 
Before moving on to considering options for reforming the legal 
rules governing annuities and pension distributions in the United States, this 
Part of the Article provides a little bit more background on annuities and 
annuitization. At the outset, this Part explains the mathematics of converting 
a lump sum into an annuity (and vice versa) and looks at how retail annuities 
compare with actuarially fair annuities.340 This Part also explores the role of 
annuitization around the world. Finally, this Part explores some of the 
cultural and economic challenges to increasing annuitization in the United 
States. 
 
B. THE MATHEMATICS OF CONVERTING A LUMP SUM INTO AN 
ANNUITY (AND VICE VERSA) 
 
 The mathematics of converting a lump sum into an actuarially fair 
lifetime annuity is pretty straightforward. If an individual has a fixed 
principal sum to invest today, and we know the interest rate that she can earn 
and how long she is expected to live, we can determine the annuity amount 
                                                                                                                 
339 See, e.g., Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities: 
Issues and Options, supra note 338, at 11–18. (there is not yet much of a market in 
longevity bonds—bonds that would pay returns that would be linked to the 
survivorship of a given cohort, say, 65-year-old American males born in 1945. See, 
e.g., id. at 16–18; Pablo Antolin & Hans Blommestein, Governments and the Market 
for Longevity-Indexed Bonds, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., (2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/pensions/insurance/37977290.pdf; David Blake, Tom 
Boardman & Andrew Cairns, The Case for Longevity Bonds, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. 
RES. (Issue Brief No. 10-10, 2010), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/06/IB_10-10-508.pdf; Abraham & Harris, The Market for Longevity Annuities, 
supra note 153, at 23–24. 
340 An actuarially fair annuity is one without insurance agent commissions or 
insurance company reserves, risk-taking, and profits. See also Guan Gong & 
Anthony Webb, Evaluating the Advanced Life Deferred Annuity—An Annuity 
People Might Actually Buy 1 n.1, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Working Paper No. 
2007-15, June 2007), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/09/wp_2007-
15.pdf (defining “an actuarially fair annuity as one whose expected return, 
discounted by an interest rate and annual survival probabilities derived from 
population mortality tables, equals the premium paid”). 
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that that person (i.e., the annuitant) will receive each period.341 For example, 
if an individual has $100,000 to invest in an annuity today, can earn 5 percent 
interest per year, and can expect to receive 20 annual annuity payments (i.e., 
live for 20 years), a simple annuity calculator shows that each annual annuity 
payment would be $8024.26.342 Annuities typically make monthly payments, 
but the mathematical principles are the same for yearly or monthly annuities. 
By the same token, the mathematics of converting a lifetime annuity 
into a lump sum is also quite straightforward. Basically, a lump sum value is 
determined by converting a stream of projected future benefit payments into 
a present value.343 Again, the mathematics is pretty straightforward: we just 
need to know the applicable interest rate and the number of future benefit 
payments that the individual expects to receive.344 The interest rate (also 
known as the discount rate) is the rate of return that can be earned on the 
investment, and it is determined by market forces. The number of future 
benefit payments that the individual is expected to receive is extrapolated 
from a mortality table. In our example, when the discount rate is 5 percent, 
the present value of a stream of 20 annual payments of $8024.26 
                                                                                                                 
341 The general formula to solve for the periodic annuity amount is: w = [P(1 + 
r)Y−1r ] / [(1 + r)Y − 1], where P is the present value (= starting principal) of a stream 
of annual withdrawal amounts (w) given an interest rate (r) over a number of Years 
(Y). See, e.g., MONEY CHIMP, Annuity, http://www.moneychimp.com/articles/ 
finworks/fmpayout.htm (last visited July 21, 2016). 
342 See MONEY CHIMP, Annuity Calculator, http://www.moneychimp.com/ 
calculator/annuity_calculator.htm (last visited July 21, 2016) (starting Principal: 
$100,000.00; growth rate: 5 percent; years to pay out: 20 years; payouts at: the end 
of each year; to get Annual Payout Amount = $8024.26). 
343 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE 
PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS 
THAT REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 60. 
344 Here is a very simple present value example. Suppose you have $1000 today, 
and you can earn 10 percent annual interest on an investment. That means you could 
earn $100 interest in a year ($100 = 10 percent × $1000), and if you made that 
investment and held it for one year, you would have $1100 at the end of the year 
($1100 = $1000 + $100), and the present value of the right to receive $1100 in one 
year is $1000. Similarly, if you kept your money in that investment for another year 
(two years total), it would grow to $1210 ($110 = 10 percent × $1100; $1210 = 
$1100 + $110); and the present value of the right to receive $1210 in two years is 
$1000. The general formula for the present value of a stream of annuity payments 
is: P = w[(1 + r)Y − 1] / [(1 + r)Yr] where P is the present value (= starting principal) 
of a stream of annual withdrawal amounts (w) given an interest rate (r) over a 
number of Years (Y), see, e.g., MONEY CHIMP, Annuity, supra note 341.  
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commencing one year from today is $100,000.345 In short, the present value 
of a 20-year, $8024.26-per-year annuity is $100,000 (that is, when a 5 
percent interest rate and a 20-year life expectancy are the correct actuarial 
assumptions). Accordingly, $100,000 would be the minimum actuarially-
equivalent lump sum that must be offered to a participant getting a lump sum 
distribution instead of an $8024.26 per year pension.346 
 
C. RETAIL ANNUITIES VERSUS ACTUARIALLY FAIR ANNUITIES 
 
Compared to actuarially fair annuities,347 retail annuities can be quite 
expensive. Indeed, experts estimate that the typical insurance company 
lifetime annuity has a 12 percent “load” factor due to the combination of 
administrative expenses and adverse selection.348 That is, the typical retail 
lifetime annuity provides benefits that are worth just 88 percent of an 
actuarially fair annuity (i.e., a “money’s worth ratio” of 88 percent).349 Put 
differently, the payouts from actuarially fair annuities would be around 15 
percent higher than what can actually be purchased in current annuity 
markets.350 
                                                                                                                 
345 See MONEY CHIMP, Present Value of an Annuity Calculator, 
http://www.moneychimp.com/calculator/present_value_annuity_calculator.htm 
(last visited July 21, 2016) (Annual payout: $8024.26; growth rate: 5 percent; years 
to pay out: 20 years; make payouts at: the end of each year; calculate and get present 
value = $100,000.02).  
346 See supra Parts III.B.1 & III.E.3.b (discussing the relative valuation rules 
used to compute lump sum payouts). 
347 See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
348 See, e.g., MARK J. WARSHAWSKY, RETIREMENT INCOME: RISKS AND 
STRATEGIES 66 (2012) (“[D]ue to a combination of administrative costs and 
selection effects, the nominal annuity is assumed to have a money’s worth ratio of 
0.88, that is, the couple faces a 12 percent load factor on their annuity purchase.”). 
349 Id.  
350 Id.; see also James Poterba, Steven Venti & David Wise, The Composition 
and Drawdown of Wealth in Retirement, 25(4) J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 102 tbl.3 (Fall 
2011) (showing that the actuarially fair lifetime annuity for a 65-year-old-man in 
2008 was 9.95 percent while the Annuity Shopper price for a retail lifetime annuity 
at that time was just 8.46 percent, indicating a load factor of 17.6 percent [17.6 
percent = 9.95 percent/8.46 percent – 100 percent]); Jeffrey R. Brown, Olivia S. 
Mitchell & James M. Poterba, The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an 
Individual Accounts Retirement Program, RISK ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED 
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 321, 321–322 (John Y. Campbell & Martin Feldstein, 
eds., 2001) (“[T]he expected present value of annuity payouts is typically below the 
purchase price of the annuity . . . .”); James M. Poterba & Mark Warshawsky, The 
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Basically, individuals are rarely able to purchase actuarially fair 
annuities in the retail annuities market. In that regard, however, it is worth 
emphasizing that, in effect, the Social Security system does allow workers 
to buy actuarially fair lifetime annuities merely by delaying retirement 
beyond age 62.351 
Finally, it is worth noting that there are a few other problems with 
annuity markets in the United States. One problem has to do with the rates 
of return on annuities. While many analysts believe that stocks do better than 
bonds in the long run,352 retail prices for annuities are tied to the relatively 
low yields that accompany bond rates.353 That can make annuities relatively 
unattractive investments compared to stock-based mutual funds.354 
                                                                                                                 
Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF INVESTMENT-BASED SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 173, 
173–174 (John B. Shoven, ed., 2000) (“The cost of such annuities, including both 
administrative and sales costs, the ‘adverse selection’ costs associated with 
voluntary purchase behavior, and return on capital for the insurance company 
offering the annuity policy, affect the retirement income that the participant receives 
for a given level of wealth accumulation.”); Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. 
Warshawsky, The Cost of Annuities: Implications for Saving Behavior and Bequests, 
105(1) Q. J. ECON. 135, 152 (1990) (arguing that actuarially-unfair annuity costs are 
a cause of lack of public participation in the individual lifetime annuity market); 
Olivia S. Mitchell, James M. Poterba, Mark J. Warshawsky & Jeffrey R. Brown, 
New Evidence on the Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 
1299, 1309 (1999) (finding that a typical retiree “would perceive a noticeable 
‘transaction cost’ when purchasing an annuity from a retail insurance carrier”); 
Elizabeth Bauer, Decumulation for a New Generation, in Soc’y of Actuaries, 
Diverse Risks: 2016 Call for Essays, supra note 130, at 28. 
351 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
352 Jonathan Burton, Stocks or Bonds? The Pros Say..., WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702047911045771 
0837231308403. See generally JEREMY J. SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN (5th 
ed., 2014). 
353 Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play in Easing 
Risks in Public Pension Plans?, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
354 Certainly, the prices of fixed annuities are tied to bond prices. On the other 
hand, variable annuities typically allow the annuitant to invest in equities, at least 
during the accumulation phase. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Variable 
Annuities: What You Should Know, supra note 141. For example, TIAA’s College 
Retirement Equity Funds (CREF) operates eight investment accounts that differ by 
objective: stocks, bonds, money market, and social choice. See Prospectus, College 
Retirement Equities Fund, TIAA GLOBAL ASSET MANAGEMENT 26 (May 1, 2016). 
https://www.tiaa.org/public/pdf/cref_prospectus.pdf). 
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Another problem is that there is relatively little disclosure of the fees 
that insurance companies and agents charge for annuities.355 In the end that 
means that annuities are sold not bought, and the financial advisers and 
insurance agents selling annuities “can put their own financial interests ahead 
of the interests of the person they are advising.”356 In that regard, agents may 
be motivated to sell products that will generate bigger fees, perks, or even 
kickbacks.357 The U.S. Department of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-
interest rule should help improve retail annuity prices, at least with respect 
to the sale of annuities to pension plan participants and IRA holders.358 
 
D. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF LIFE EXPECTANCY 
 
While lifetime pensions and annuities offer a great way to protect 
against longevity risk, annuities may be more valuable for some 
demographic groups than others. In that regard, life expectancy varies with 
such demographic factors as gender, income, educational level, and race and 
Hispanic origin.359 Indeed, as already mentioned, women tend to live longer 
than men,360 and because of that, insurance companies tend to make smaller 
                                                                                                                 
355 Oakley, Retirement Security Risks: What Role can Annuities Play in Easing 
Risks in Public Pension Plans?, supra note 1, at 16; Hueler et al., Public Policy and 
Consumer Disclosure for the Income Annuity Market, supra note 338. 
356 Memorandum from Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Villas, Castles, and 
Vacations: How Perks and Giveaways Create Conflicts of Interest in the Annuity 
Industry 2 (Oct. 2015) (on file with Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren at 
http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/2015-10-
27_Senator_Warren_Report_on_Annuity_Industry.pdf).  
357 Id. at 2. The report notes that in addition to cash compensation to annuity 
sellers, companies “may offer “non-cash compensation” such as merchandise, gifts, 
marketing support, sponsorships, seminars, entertainment and travel expenses.” Id. 
at 7 n.44 (quoting from a variable annuity contract prospectus of Lincoln National 
Life Insurance Company); see also Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 
Lincoln ChoicePlus AssuranceSM (B Share) Individual Variable Annuity Contracts 
Lincoln Life Variable Annuity Account N 135 (May 1, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://vpx.newriver.com/print.asp?clientid=lfgvpx&fundid=53422 
E439&doctype=pros.  
358 See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text. 
359 See, e.g., National Center for Health Statistics: Life Expectancy, CTR. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-expectancy.htm (last 
visited Apr. 27, 2016) (various sources of data related to life expectancy); Forman, 
Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, Pensions, and Financial 
Products, supra note 161, at 384–85 and sources cited therein. 
360 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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lifetime annuity payments to women than to same-age men,361 although 
pension plans are not permitted to discriminate in that way.362 It is also well 
established that people with higher incomes tend to live longer than people 
with lower incomes.363 Also, healthy individuals tend to live longer than 
unhealthy individuals.364 All in all, policymakers need to bear in mind that 
some policies to encourage greater annuitization might have undesirable 
distributional consequences.365 
 
E. WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM OTHER COUNTRIES? 
  
The demand for and supply of lifetime annuities are consistently low 
in most of the world, although there are a few notable exceptions.366 The gold 
                                                                                                                 
361 See supra notes 144–147 and accompanying text. 
362 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
363 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-354, RETIREMENT 
SECURITY: SHORTER LIFE EXPECTANCY REDUCES PROJECTED LIFETIME BENEFITS 
FOR LOWER EARNERS 21 (2016) http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676086.pdf 
(discussing studies that show that lower-income men approaching retirement, live 
on average 3.6 to 12.7 fewer years than higher-income men). See also Raj Chetty et 
al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 
2001–2014, 315 (16) J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 1750 (2016); Forman, Supporting 
the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, Pensions, and Financial Products, 
supra note 161, at 384–385 and sources cited therein. 
There is also some evidence that working longer may lead to living longer. See, e.g., 
Chenkai Wu, Michelle C. Odden, Gwenith G. Fisher & Robert S. Stawski, 
Association of retirement age with mortality: a population-based longitudinal study 
among older adults in the USA, J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH (Mar. 21, 
2016), http://jech.bmj.com/content/early/2016/03/21/jech-2015-207097 (suggesting 
that early retirement may be a risk factor for mortality and that prolonging working 
life may provide survival benefits). 
364 For example, mortality tables show that healthy individuals have lower death 
probabilities than the general population. See, e.g., Soc’y of Actuaries, RP-2014 
Rates; Total Dataset, supra note 219 (comparing death probabilities at various ages 
for employees, healthy annuitants, and disabled retirees). An individual’s death 
probability is her probability of dying within one year. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
Period Life Table, 2013, supra note 132. 
365 In that regard, for example, life expectancy differences reduce the 
progressivity of the Social Security system. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-16-354, RETIREMENT SECURITY: SHORTER LIFE EXPECTANCY REDUCES 
PROJECTED LIFETIME BENEFITS FOR LOWER EARNERS, supra note 363, at 33–35. 
366 See, e.g., Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities: 
Issues and Options, supra note 338, at 1; Çebi, Can Annuities Enhance Retirement 
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standard is probably the Netherlands, where benefits from occupational 
pensions must be paid out in the form of an inflation-indexed annuity to 
qualify for tax benefits.367  
In many countries, however, participants can choose among lump 
sum distributions, phased withdrawals, and annuities, just as they often can 
in the United States. Experiences vary, but there are at least a few countries 
where participants generally select annuitization. For example, in 
Switzerland, around 80 percent of retirement savings accumulations are 
converted to lifetime annuities;368 and, in Chile, 70 percent of retirees choose 
lifetime annuitization of their public pension benefits over the phased-
withdrawal alternative.369 On the other hand, annuitization in Australia is 
extremely rare.370 For example, in 2012, half of those who accessed their 
                                                                                                                 
Lifestyles?, supra note 338, at 6; Ken Hohman, Lifetime Income: An International 
Worry, BRYAN, PENDLETON, SWATS & MCALLISTER, LLC, DEVELOPMENTS, WELLS 
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money”); Mitchell & Piggot, Turning Wealth into Lifetime Income: The Challenge 
Ahead, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS 
AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 1, 3–5; Robert Rocha, Dimitri Vittas & Heinz P. 
Rudolph, Annuities and Other Retirement Products: Designing the Payout Phase, 
WORLD BANK 179 (2011), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/ 
10986/2272/600520PUB0ID181rement09780821385739.pdf?sequence=1. 
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Brief, Aug. 2013), at 20,  http://www.nirsonline.org/storage/nirs/documents/ 
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368 Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities: Issues and 
Options, supra note 338, at 2; Monika Bütler & Federica Teppa, The Choice Between 
an Annuity and a Lump Sum: Results from Swiss Pension Funds, 91(10) J. PUB. 
ECON. 1944 (2007), http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Buetler_Teppa_JPub_ 
07_tcm47-172517.pdf; see also Bütler & Staubli, Payouts in Switzerland: 
Explaining Developments in Annuitization, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT 
INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 195. 
369 Holzmann, Addressing Longevity Risk through Private Annuities: Issues and 
Options, supra note 338, at 2; see also Ruiz & Mitchell, Pension Payouts in Chile: 
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GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 106. 
370 Julie Agnew, Australia’s Retirement System: Strengths, Weaknesses, and 
Reforms, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES. (Issue Brief No. 13-5, Apr. 2013), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/IB_13-5-508.pdf; The Challenge of 
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Superannuation Funds took lump sums, and 98 percent of the rest chose 
phased withdrawal over an annuity.371 The United Kingdom used to have 
high levels of annuitization, but it recently moved away from requiring 
retirees to purchase annuities,372 and even more recently, it gave existing 
annuity holders more freedom to sell their existing annuity contracts.373 
When coupled with the shift towards more lump sum distributions 
that we see in the United States, it seems that the international trend favors 
giving individuals more choices about how to manage their retirement 
                                                                                                                 
Longevity Risk: Making Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, supra note 1, at 13–16. 
371 Agnew, Australia’s Retirement System: Strengths, Weaknesses, and 
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Superannuation Bulletin, AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REL. AUTHORITY at 2, 7, tbl.4 (June 
2015), http://www.apra.gov.au/Super/Documents/2016ASBPDF201506.pdf. See 
also Jonathan Barry Forman & Gordon D. Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined 
Contribution Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension 
Systems?, 66(3) TAX LAW. 613, 645 (Spring 2013); Bateman & Piggott, Too Much 
Risk to Insure?  The Australian (non-) Market for Annuities, in SECURING LIFELONG 
RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 
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372 See, e.g., Dan Hyde, Budget 2014: How Will the New Pensions System 
Work?, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
finance/personalfinance/pensions/10710606/Budget-2014-How-will-the-new-
pensions-system-work.html; Pension Flexibility, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS 
UK.GOV (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/ government/publications/pension-
flexibility-2016/pension-flexibility-2016; Joseph A. Tomlinson, Eyewitness to 
History in the UK, RET. INCOME J. (Mar. 20, 2014), 
http://retirementincomejournal.com/issue/march-20-2014/article/eyewitness-to-
history-in-the-uk; HM TREASURY, REMOVING THE REQUIREMENT TO ANNUITISE BY 
AGE 75 (2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/ 
attachment_data/file/81232/consult_age_75_annuity.pdf. See also Cannon & 
Tonks, Compulsory and Voluntary Annuity Markets in the United Kingdom, in 
SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS AND 
POLICY, supra note 142, at 171; The Challenge of Longevity Risk: Making 
Retirement Income Last a Lifetime, supra note 1, at 17–21. 
373 See, e.g., Tanya Jefferies, Five Million Pensioners Given Chance to Offload 
Unwanted Annuities for Cash from April 2017, THIS IS MONEY (Dec. 15, 2015), 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/pensions/article-3360602/Pensioners-given-
chance-offload-unwanted-annuities-cash-April-2017.html; Existing pensioners to 
be allowed to ‘sell’ annuities from 2016, UK government announces, OUT-LAW.COM 
(Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2015/march/existing-
pensioners-to-be-allowed-to-sell-annuities-from-2016-uk-government-announces/. 
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savings, even if those choices result in less annuitization. Still, there is a lot 
that the United States can learn from other countries about how to help 
Americans get secure streams of lifetime income.374 For example, the United 
States can probably learn from the various strategies that other countries use 
to increase participants’ knowledge and understanding of their spend-down 
options.375 Some countries also make it harder for financial advisers to 
charge high commissions or offer inappropriate investment advice.376 
Many countries also use incentives and withdrawal rules to help 
encourage annuitization.377 For example, in Switzerland, some plans use 
annuities as the default form of distribution, although participants can opt 
out.378 Several countries require participants to meet certain minimum-
retirement-income requirements if they want to withdraw all or part of their 
defined contribution plan assets as a lump sum.379 Also, while plan sponsors 
in the United States have a fiduciary obligation to assess the financial 
stability of the insurance companies that sell annuities to the plans, plan 
sponsors in many countries have no such obligation.380 Instead, plan 
sponsors in those countries can simply rely on insurance regulators and 
industry standards to oversee and monitor annuity providers.381 
All in all, the international trend seems to be to give participants 
access to multiple spend-down options. At the same time, however, many 
countries are trying to find strategies to increase participants’ knowledge and 
understanding of annuity options, and they are also using withdrawal rules 
and limits on lump sum distributions to encourage participants to select those 
annuity options. 
 
F. CHALLENGES TO ANNUITIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
There are a number of cultural and economic challenges to 
increasing annuitization in the United States. In particular, as Part II.F above 
showed, many Americans have simply not saved enough in their retirement 
                                                                                                                 
374 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-9, 401(K) PLANS: 
OTHER COUNTRIES’ EXPERIENCES OFFER LESSONS IN POLICIES AND OVERSIGHT OF 
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375 Id. at 24–32.  
376 Id. at 34. 
377 Id. at 32–33, 35–37. 
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379 Id. at 35. 
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plans or otherwise to make annuitization practical. Americans also have a 
woefully low level of financial literacy, and that limited financial literacy 
makes it hard for them to conduct meaningful retirement planning.382 
Annuities are particular hard for individuals to understand and appreciate.383 
For example, individuals often underestimate their life expectancies and 
overvalue the modest lump sums that they have accumulated.384 
 
V. OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
This Part considers a variety of possible legislative and regulatory 
changes that could encourage greater annuitization of retirement savings. 
 
A. INCREASE AND PRESERVE RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
 
1. Encourage Workers to Save More for Retirement  
 
At the outset, government policies could be designed to encourage 
workers to save more for retirement.385 If workers saved more during their 
                                                                                                                 
382 See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic 
Importance of Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52(1) J. OF ECON. LIT. 5 
(2014); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-242, RETIREMENT SECURITY: 
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WORKERS PLAN FOR RETIREMENT 4–5 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/680/675526.pdf; FINRA Investor Education Foundation, Financial 
Capability in the United States 2016 (2016), http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/ 
downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf.   
383 See, e.g., John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian 
& Stephen P. Zeldes, What Makes Annuitization More Appealing?, 116 J. PUB. 
ECON. 2 (Aug. 2014), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
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385 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: 
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careers, they would have larger nest eggs at retirement and a greater ability 
to buy annuities and other lifetime income products. Perhaps the best way to 
increase retirement savings would be for the United States to adopt a 
mandatory universal pension system like Australia, Singapore, and Chile 
have done.386 A recent proposal would require employees without a pension 
plan to contribute 3 percent of pay to new guaranteed retirement accounts 
that would provide lifetime annuities.387 
A less intrusive federal mandate would be to require employers 
without plans to at least offer automatic payroll-deduction IRAs to their 
employees.388 The United Kingdom’s new National Employment Savings 
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Pension System?, 16(2) J. PENSION BENEFITS 48 (2009); Jonathan Barry Forman & 
Adam Carasso, Tax Considerations in a Universal Pension System, URBAN-
BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 20, 2007), http://www.urban.org/ 
publications/411593.html. 
387 See, e.g., GHILARDUCCI, WHEN I’M SIXTY-FOUR: THE PLOT AGAINST 
PENSIONS AND THE PLAN TO SAVE THEM, supra note 386; Teresa Ghilarducci & 
Hamilton E. James, Opinion, A Smarter Plan to Make Retirement Savings Last, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/opinion/a-smarterplan-
to-make-retirement-savings-last.html?_r=0. 
388 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals 134 (Feb. 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/ 
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Trust (NEST) program is an example of this type of mandate.389 Pertinent 
here, the Obama Administration recently rolled out no-fee retirement savings 
accounts known as myRAs, short for My Retirement Account.390 A number 
of state governments in the United States are also considering requiring 
employers to at least offer pension plans to their uncovered workers.391 In 
that regard, the U.S. Department of Labor recently issued guidance that will 
make it easier for state governments to set up state-managed retirement plans 
for private-sector workers.392 In general, automatically enrolling workers 
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into these types of individual retirement savings accounts should achieve 
higher levels of participation.393 Automatic enrollment and similar 
behavioral economics nudges are not likely to solve the problem of 
inadequate retirement savings,394 but they are better than nothing. 
There are also a variety of other proposals to expand the current 
voluntary pension system. For example, both Congress and the Obama 
Administration recommended amending ERISA to permit unaffiliated 
employers to join multiple-employer plans (MEPs).395 The Obama 
Administration also recommended expanding to expand coverage to allow 
long-term, part-time workers to participate in existing retirement plans.396 
Under the proposal, employees who have worked at least 500 hours a year 
for three years for an employer with a 401(k) plan would be allowed to 
contribute to the plan.397 
The Obama Administration also recommended tripling the 
retirement plan start-up tax credit for small businesses—from the current 
maximum of $500 per year for three years to a maximum of $1500 per year 
for four years.398 Also, many believe that making the $1000 retirement 
saver’s tax credit refundable would help encourage low-income workers to 
save for retirement.399 Finally, the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
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estimates that the elimination of pension eligibility and vesting waiting-
periods would increase retirement savings by 10 percent overall, and by 15 
percent for low-income workers.400 
 
2. Help Participants Get Better Returns on Their 
Retirement Savings 
 
In addition to getting workers to save more, government policies 
could encourage workers to do a better job with their investments. In that 
regard, the qualified default investment alternatives (QDIA) regulations have 
already helped move millions of participants away from low-yield, stable-
value bond funds and towards better-diversified investments like target-date 
funds.401 The U.S. Department of Labor could clarify those QDIA 
regulations402 and also make it easier for plan sponsors to include annuities 
in their line-up of QDIA investment alternatives.403 
The government could also do a better job of regulating the fees and 
expenses associated with retirement plans. In that regard, high fees can 
significantly reduce the size of retirement nest eggs.404 The U.S. Department 
of Labor’s new fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule should help.405 Managing 
retirement savings is a challenging task,406 and, as a result, many Americans 
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seek investment advice from financial advisers.407 Often, however, the 
compensation that those financial advisers receive can vary depending on the 
investment products that the savers choose.408 That opened the door to 
conflicted advice that could put the rewards for the adviser ahead of the best 
interests of the savers. That conflicted advice can easily result in lower 
investment returns (net of fees). For example, a recent study by President 
Barrack Obama’s Council of Economic Advisors estimated that conflicted 
advice led to returns that are about one percentage point lower each year,409 
and that, over a 30-year retirement, a retiree receiving such conflicted advice 
would lose an estimated 12 percent of her savings.410 Eventually, the new 
fiduciary conflict-of-interest rule should result in better advice at lower costs 
for pension plan participants and IRA holders, and that should translate into 
higher returns on their retirement savings.411 
Another way to help retirees get better returns on their retirement 
savings would be to encourage retirees to keep their savings in their 
relatively low-cost pension plans, as opposed to rolling their balances over 
into relatively higher-cost IRAs. Because there are economies of scale, 
pension plans tend to have much lower fees per participant than IRAs.412 
Unfortunately, the vast majority of retirees move their defined-contribution 
plan savings to IRAs soon after they retire. For example, according to a 
recent Vanguard study, after five years less than 20 percent of participants 
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remained in their defined contribution plans.413 Better financial education 
could help encourage participants to keep their savings in those low-cost 
pension plans, and plan sponsors could also be encouraged to make it easier 
for participants to take partial distributions as needed, rather than lump sum 
distributions.414 Pertinent here, the 2015 ERISA Advisory Council made 
suggestions for plan sponsor education and a model notice that employers 
could use to encourage plan participants to keep their retirement savings in 
their pension plans rather than rolling their retirement savings into IRAs or 
taking lump sum distributions.415 
 
3. Encourage Workers to Work Longer 
 
The government could also encourage workers to remain in the 
workforce longer.416 Working longer increases retirement savings and 
reduces the number of years that retirement savings need to cover, thereby 
increasing annual income when workers actually retire.417 For example, 
because Social Security provides actuarial increases in benefits to those who 
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BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Plan Sponsor Education on Lifetime Plan 
Participation (Nov. 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-
ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2015ACreport1.pdf.  
416 Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, Pensions, 
and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 406–07; Alicia H. Munnell, Natalia 
Sergeyevna Orlova & Anthony Webb, How Important is Asset Allocation to 
Financial Security in Retirement?, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. (Working Paper No. 2012-
13, Apr. 2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/wp-2012-13.pdf. 
417 See, e.g., Jack VanDerhei & Craig Copeland, The Impact of Deferring 
Retirement Age on Retirement Income Adequacy, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Issue 
Brief No. 358, 2011), http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_06-
2011_No358_Defr-Ret.pdf; Joseph Quinn, Kevin Cahill & Michael Giandrea, Early 
Retirement: The Dawn of a New Era?14, TIAA-CREF INST. (Policy Brief, July 
2011), http://www1.tiaa-cref.org/ucm/groups/content/@ap_ucm_p_inst/documents/ 
document/tiaa02030420.pdf; Alicia H. Munnell, How Much to Save for a Secure 
Retirement, B.C. CTR. FOR RET. RES., (Issue in Brief No. 11-13, Nov. 2011), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/IB_11-13-508.pdf; Barbara Butrica, 
Karen E. Smith & C. Eugene Steuerle, Working for a Good Retirement, URBAN INST. 
RET. PROJECT (Discussion Paper No. 06-03, 28 fig.2, 2006), 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311333_good_retirement.pdf. 
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delay taking their benefits,418 the government could encourage people to 
delay taking their benefits until they reach their full retirement age or, better 
still, until age 70.  
For that matter, the government could increase all of the statutory 
ages associated with retirement.419 For example, the 10 percent early 
distribution penalty on premature withdrawals applies only to distributions 
made before an individual reaches age 59½,420 and the early retirement age 
for Social Security is age 62.421 It could make sense to increase both early 
retirement ages to 65. It could also make sense to increase both the normal 
retirement age for Social Security (currently age 66 but gradually increasing 
to age 67)422 and the normal retirement age for pensions (typically age 65)423 
to age 70. Finally, it could make sense to increase both the delayed retirement 
age for Social Security (currently age 70)424 and the required minimum 
distribution age for pensions (age 70½)425 to age 75 or beyond.426 In passing, 
however, policymakers need to bear in mind that some policies to raise 
retirement ages may have undesirable distributional consequences.427 
                                                                                                                 
418 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
419 See, e.g., Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, 
Pensions, and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 406–08; Risky Business: 
Living Longer Without Income for Life, supra note 2, at 33–34. 
420 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
421 See supra note 16 and accompanying text 
422 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
423 ERISA generally defines “normal retirement age” as the earlier of the time 
specified in the plan or age 65. I.R.C. § 411(a)(8) (2014); ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(24) (2008). 
424 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
426 See also Richard L. Kaplan, Reforming the Taxation of Retirement Income, 
32 VA. TAX REV. 327, 357 (2012); Jacob A. Mortenson, Heidi R. Schramm & 
Andrew Whitten, The Effect of Required Minimum Distribution Rules on 
Withdrawals from Traditional Individual Retirement Accounts (May 6, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2764435 (finding that 52 percent of IRA owners subject to 
the required minimum distribution rules would take an IRA distribution less than 
their required minimum if they were unconstrained). 
427 See supra Part IV.D. See also ANNE L. ALSTOTT, A NEW DEAL FOR OLD AGE 
95–98 (2016) (suggesting that retirement age could be linked to lifetime income in 
a way that favors those workers with relatively lower lifetime earnings over those 
with relatively higher lifetime earnings); Henry Aaron, Recent Social Security 
blogs—some corrections, BROOKINGS (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/opinions/2016/04/15-recent-social-security-blogssome-corrections-aaron 
(explaining how raising the full benefit age for Social Security is simply an across-
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The federal government could also amend the required minimum 
distribution rules to make it easier to use retirement savings to buy deferred 
income annuities.428 In that regard, new regulations from the IRS have 
already eased the required minimum distribution rules to allow plan 
participants to spend up to $125,000 on deferred income annuities that are 
qualifying longevity annuity contracts (QLACs).429 Also, the Obama 
Administration recently called for legislation that would completely exempt 
an individual from the required minimum distribution rules if her tax-favored 
retirement plan accumulations do not exceed $100,000.430 All in all, the 
minimum distribution rules could be reformed to prioritize lifetime income 
provision over Treasury revenue-collection.431 
 
4. Preserve Benefits until Retirement 
 
Government policies could also be designed to get workers to 
preserve their retirement savings until retirement, for example, by 
discouraging premature pension withdrawals and loans.432 While defined 
                                                                                                                 
the-board cut in benefits for all new claimants, regardless of their incomes or life 
expectancies); Peter Coy, How to Raise the Retirement Age for People Who Want to 
Work, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2016-06-16/how-to-raise-the-retirement-age-for-people-who-want-towork 
(discussing ways to take work capacity into account). 
428 I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (2014); Natalie Choate, New! Longevity Insurance for 
IRAs, MORNINGSTAR ADVISOR (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.morningstar.com/ 
advisor/t/52769065/new-longevity-insurance-for-iras.htm. 
429 See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. 
430 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 143. The author favors a 
much higher cap. Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, 
Pensions, and Financial Products, supra note 161, at 411–412. 
431 Mark J. Warshawsky, Reforming Retirement Income: Annuitization, 
Combination Strategies, And Required Minimum Distributions, GEORGE MASON U. 
MERCATUS CTR., (Dec. 2015), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/ 
WarshawskyCombination-Retirement.pdf; Brown, Income As the Outcome: 
Reframing The 401(k) Plan, supra note 403; U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Private 
Retirement Benefits in the 21st Century: Achieving Retirement Security 18 (2016), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/uscc_achieving_ret
irement_security_0.pdf.   
432 See, e.g., Forman & Mackenzie, Optimal Rules for Defined Contribution 
Plans: What Can We Learn from the U.S. and Australian Pension Systems?, supra 
note 371, at 650; Orlova et al., supra note 333, at 3; Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement 
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benefit plans typically provide lifetime annuities for retirees and their 
spouses, defined contribution plans are leaky: they often allow participants 
to withdraw all or a portion of their individual accounts, and many plans 
allow participants to borrow against their accounts.433 All in all, a significant 
portion of these premature distributions and loans are dissipated before 
retirement.434 Accordingly, it could make sense to further limit or even 
prohibit premature distributions and loans from defined contribution plans 
and IRAs. Also, the process for rolling over defined contribution balances 
can be cumbersome and could be simplified.435  
Also, plan sponsors who make annuity investments available within 
a plan do not always have good options to remove the annuity investment 
option from the plan when it is no longer suitable (which can happen, for 
example, when the plan changes its investment offerings or its record 
keeper).436 The Obama Administration recently recommended legislation 
that would allow plan participants to roll over any unauthorized lifetime 
                                                                                                                 
Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 
283, 293–303 (1999). 
433 See supra notes 236–241 (distributions), 57 (hardship distributions), and 56 
(loans) and accompanying text. 
434 See, e.g., Lucas, Plug the Drain: 401(k) Leakage and the Impact on 
Retirement, supra note 226; Copeland, Lump-Sum Distributions at Job Change, 
supra note 227; Hurd & Panis, The Choice to Cash Out, Maintain, or Annuitize 
Pension Rights upon Job Change or Retirement, supra note 59. 
435 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-30, 401(K) PLANS: 
LABOR AND IRS COULD IMPROVE THE ROLLOVER PROCESS (2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652881.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., 
GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: LOW DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY 
POSE CHALLENGES, supra note 191, at 29–31 (discussing universal rollover and 
finding that eliminating cash-outs and instead rolling funds into IRAs or other 
retirement plans would increase average projected retirement annuities by 16 
percent). The ERISA Advisory Council is looking at how to facilitate plan-to-plan 
transfers and account consolidations. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, Participant Plan Transfers and 
Account Consolidation for the Advancement of Lifetime Plan Participation (Issue 
Statement 2016), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2016-participant-plan-transfers-
and-account-consolidation-scope-statement.pdf. 
436 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 142; STAFF OF THE J. 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 
TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS, supra note 37, at 85–88. 
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income investments to an IRA or other retirement plan—and so preserve 
these assets within the tax-favored retirement system.437 
 
5. Revise the Rules that Are Used to Calculate Lump 
Sum Distributions  
 
The Treasury and the IRS could also revise the rules that are used to 
calculate lump sum distributions. As we have seen, when a plan sponsor 
offers to replace a lifetime pension benefit with a lump sum, the minimum 
lump sum that is offered must be an amount that is actuarially equivalent to 
the promised lifetime pension benefit.438 Basically, that means that the 
minimum lump sum must have a value equal to the present value of the 
participant’s lifetime stream of pension benefits. Unfortunately, the 
applicable regulations permit the use of that actuarially-equivalent lump sum 
amount even though that amount is almost invariably less valuable than the 
promised lifetime pension benefit. In fact, that minimum lump sum amount 
would almost never be sufficient to buy an insurance annuity as generous as 
the promised lifetime pension benefit. As Part IV.C above showed, the 
typical retail lifetime annuity has a 12 percent “load” factor built in, and the 
payouts from actuarially fair annuities would be around 15 percent higher 
than what can actually be purchased in current retail annuity markets. 
Similarly, in its recent study of lump sum risk transfers, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office estimated that if a 65-year-old female participant were 
to accept a lump sum offer and then use that lump sum to purchase a retail 
annuity, her monthly annuity benefit would be 24 percent smaller than her 
lifetime pension benefit would have been (also estimating a 17 percent 
reduction for 65-year-old males).439 
                                                                                                                 
437 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, General Explanations of the Administration’s 
Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals, supra note 388, at 142. See also Institutional 
Retirement Income Council, In-Plan Guaranteed Lifetime Income: Debunking 
Portability Myths (2016), http://iricouncil.org/docs/Debunking_Portability_ 
Myths.pdf. 
438 See supra notes 211–220 and accompanying text. 
439 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE PENSIONS: 
PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS THAT 
REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 25; See also Mark Miller, 
Six Ways Pension Annuities Almost Always Beat a Lump Sum, 
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Mar. 9, 2012), http://wealthmanagement.com/data-
amp-tools/six-ways-pension-annuities-almost-always-beat-lump-sum; U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, 
Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers, supra note 324, at 17–
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In essence, in making a lump sum distribution, the plan sponsor 
shifts risk to the participant but does not fully compensate her for taking on 
that risk. The plan sponsor saves money, but it is generally a bad economic 
deal for the participant. Arguably, the right economic answer is that the plan 
sponsor should pay a premium to participants who take lump sum 
distributions. For example, instead of computing the lump sum as an amount 
equal to 100 percent of the actuarial present value of the participant’s lifetime 
pension benefit, perhaps, the plan sponsor should have to pay a premium of, 
say, 15 percent on top of that present value; that is, the plan sponsor could 
be required to pay a lump sum distribution equal to 115 percent of the present 
value of the participant’s lifetime pension benefit. 
At bottom, in the typical lump sum distribution offer, the interests of 
plan sponsors and participants are in direct conflict, and that raises some 
interesting issues. In our voluntary pension system, plan sponsors are 
relatively free to design pension plans to their liking. That is the nature of 
the settlor function.440 On the other hand, when a plan sponsor administers 
its plan it acts as a fiduciary and so must operate in the best interest of the 
participants (and beneficiaries).441 In short, a plan sponsor’s decision to offer 
lump sum distributions, as a matter of course—or as part of a pension risk 
transfer transaction, is a matter of plan design that is viewed as a settlor 
function rather than a fiduciary function, but when the plan sponsor 
implements lump sum distributions, it acts as a fiduciary.442 
The first set of issues relates to the plan sponsor’s ability to offer 
lump sum distributions. For example, as Part III.E.3.b above showed, 
amending a plan to offer participants a new lump sum benefit is pretty clearly 
a settlor function (not a fiduciary function). Accordingly, the plan sponsor is 
generally free to amend the plan to offer the lump sum distributions and is 
generally free to define the terms of that offer. Within certain regulatory 
limits the interest rate and the mortality table to be used in computing the 
lump sum will be identified in the plan amendment. As these selections 
involve the settlor function, a plan sponsor can select permissible interest 
                                                                                                                 
18 (showing estimates that if a 65-year-old male participant were to accept a lump 
sum offer and then use that lump sum to purchase a retail annuity, his monthly 
annuity benefit would be around 10 percent smaller than his lifetime pension benefit 
would have been [an $897 per month annuity versus a $1000 per month pension] 
and also estimating a 14 percent reduction for 65-year-old female [an $861 per 
month annuity versus a $1000 per month pension]). 
440 See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text. 
441 ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2008); I.R.C. § 401(a) (2015). 
442 See supra notes 294–295 and accompanying text. 
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rates and mortality tables that are advantageous to it. Under the current rules, 
for example, a plan sponsor can gain a financial advantage for itself by 
selecting a so-called “lookback” interest rate from up to 17 months earlier—
when that interest rate is higher (and so results in lower lump sums) than the 
rate that prevails at the time the lump sum offer is made.443 Similarly, until 
new mortality table regulations come into effect for 2017 or later,444 a plan 
sponsor can gain a financial advantage for itself by selecting the currently-
required mortality table with its relatively shorter life expectancies (that 
result in fewer months of pension benefits and so lower lump sums).445 
The second set of issues relates to the plan sponsor’s implementation 
of lump sum distributions. Here, the plan sponsor must act as a fiduciary. 
That makes it a real challenge for the plan sponsor, as its interests are 
economically adverse to the interests of its participants: the plan sponsor 
typically expects to save money by encouraging its plan participants to take 
lump sums that are almost invariably less valuable than the participants’ 
lifetime pension benefits. 
The author believes that a plan sponsor breaches its fiduciary duties 
to its participants if it downplays the very real reductions in value that occur 
when participants elect to take lump sum distributions rather than retaining 
their lifetime pension benefits. Acting as a fiduciary, the plan sponsor should 
be fully forthcoming with all the information that the participants (and 
beneficiaries) need to make informed decisions. It will never be enough for 
a plan sponsor to offer an unblemished picture of the pension risk transfer 
options: the plan sponsor should reveal the naked truth about lump sums, 
warts and all. The government has ample authority to require that plan 
sponsors make full disclosures about how the proffered lump sums truly 
compare with the participants’ lifetime pension benefits.446 
All in all, the author believes that the Treasury and the IRS should 
revise the relative value regulations that are used to compute lump sums.447 
Plan sponsors could be required to use the most up-to-date mortality tables 
for lump sum calculations.448 Plan sponsors could also be required to take 
                                                                                                                 
443 See supra notes 298–299 and accompanying text. 
444 See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. 
445 As the I.R.C. § 411(d)(6) anti-cutback rule protects a participant’s accrued 
benefits, a plan sponsor can never amend its plan to offer a lump sum alternative that 
actually cuts benefits. 
446 See, e.g., supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
447 See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-74, PRIVATE 
PENSIONS: PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS 
THAT REPLACE THEIR LIFETIME BENEFITS, supra note 268, at 51. 
448 See, e.g., Noel Abkemeier, et al., Risky Business: Living Longer Without 
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into account the value of any subsidies or other supplements provided by the 
plan. For example, if the plan offers an enhanced early retirement subsidy, 
revised relative value regulations could require that that subsidy be taken 
into account when computing the amount of a lump sum distribution.449 
Finally, the Treasury and the IRS might consider requiring plan sponsors to 
pay a premium (say 15 percent) on top of the actuarially-determined present 
value (although legislation might be needed before this requirement could be 
imposed). 
At the very least, the relative value notices required by the IRS and 
any notices of plan benefits required by the PBGC or the U.S. Department 
of Labor could make plan sponsors clearly disclose the very real reductions 
in value that occur when a participant elects to take a lump sum in lieu of 
retaining her lifetime pension benefit. While the present actuarial valuation 
rules permit plan sponsors to offer lump sums that are based on out-of-date 
interest rates and mortality tables, the applicable notices could require the 
prominent disclosure of the “right” interest rates and mortality tables. The 
notices could also explain how hard it is to invest a lump sum to provide 
equivalent lifetime income and how difficult it is to use a lump sum to 
purchase a retail annuity that replicates the participants’ lifetime pension 
benefit. The model lump sum risk transfer notice recommended by the 2015 
ERISA Advisory Council addresses these concerns, for example by noting 
that “[a]n annuity purchased in the insurance market will generally provide 
less income than your plan’s pension.”450 
 
B. REFORM THE TAX TREATMENT OF ANNUITIES AND DEFERRED 
INCOME ANNUITIES 
 
The current tax treatment of annuities has some features that 
encourage individuals to buy them and some features that do not. On the 
whole, the deferral of taxation on annuities until benefits are actually 
received is a very valuable tax benefit, especially when compared to, say, a 
regular bank account where the interest income is taxed on an annual basis 
                                                                                                                 
Income for Life: Legislative and Regulatory Issues, AM. ACAD.  OF ACTUARIES (Oct. 
2015), http://actuary.org/files/LegReg_IB_102215.pdf [hereinafter AM. ACAD.  OF 
ACTUARIES]. 
449 Id. at 6–7. 
450 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION 
BENEFIT PLANS, Model Notices and Disclosures for Pension Risk Transfers, supra 
note 324, at 35. 
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at ordinary income tax rates.451 As Table 2 above showed, the exclusion of 
investment income on annuity and life insurance was listed as a $23.4 billion 
tax expenditure in the U.S. Government’s Fiscal Year 2017 Budget, and over 
the years, including this “inside buildup” in taxable income has been a 
common tax-reform proposal.452 
In that regard, under a comprehensive income tax (i.e., a 
theoretically pure income tax), individuals would pay tax on the sum of the 
wages, interest, dividends, and other forms of economic income that they 
earn.453 Portions of the premiums paid for annuities are invested and earn 
interest, dividends, and other types of investment income. That investment 
income—the inside buildup—is generally not taxable until the annuitant 
begins receiving annuity distributions.454 Under a comprehensive income 
tax, investors would be taxed on those investment earnings annually, just like 
investors in bank accounts, taxable bonds, and mutual funds, and it could 
make sense to extend comprehensive income tax treatment to annuities (and 
life insurance) by taxing the inside buildup in those policies. According to 
                                                                                                                 
451 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (2015). 
452 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2014 to 
2023 126 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/ 
44715-OptionsForReducingDeficit-3.pdf; DAVID F. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR 
BASIC TAX REFORM 178 (2d ed., revised 1984); CONG. RES. SERV., Tax 
Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions, S. 
Rep. No. 45, 112th Cong., 2d Sess. 321–27 (2012), http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CPRT-112SPRT77698/pdf/CPRT-112SPRT77698.pdf (discussing the 
exclusion of investment income on life insurance and annuity contracts); Jonathan 
Barry Forman, Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions and Annuities, 18(1) 
CHAP. L. REV. 221, 231–233 (2014). But see Michael A. Schuyler, Tax Treatment 
of Inside Buildup In Life Insurance Products, INST. FOR RES. ON THE ECON. OF 
TAX’N (1994), http://iret.org/pub/FI-09.PDF (arguing against taxing inside buildup). 
453 See generally HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE 
DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert M. 
Haig, The Concept of Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921); see generally COMPREHENSIVE 
INCOME TAXATION (Joseph A. Pechman, ed., 1977); WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: 
INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?: A REPORT OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE FUND 
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH AND THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Joseph A. 
Pechman, ed., 1980); Henry Aaron, What is a Comprehensive Tax Base Anyway?, 
22 NAT’L TAX J. 543 (1969); BRADFORD & THE U.S. TREASURY, supra note 452. 
454 A similar deferral of tax occurs on investments in whole-life insurance 
policies. A whole-life insurance policy provides life insurance coverage throughout 
the insured’s whole life, as opposed to term-life insurance which provides coverage 
for a specified period. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 452, at 126. 
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the Joint Committee on Taxation, including the investment income from 
annuities (and life insurance) in taxable income would have raised $24 
billion in Fiscal Year 2015 and $210 billion over ten years.455 
Perhaps a better approach would be to continue the current exclusion 
for the inside buildup in annuities, but only for lifetime annuities. This 
approach—which was suggested by the President’s 2005 Advisory Panel on 
Federal Tax Reform—would continue to encourage annuities that provide 
lifetime income but discourage the use of annuities and variable annuities 
merely for tax avoidance.456 
The federal government might also consider other ways the tax 
system could be used to encourage investors and plan participants to select 
lifetime annuities and deferred income annuities. As explained in Part 
II.D.2.c above, current law allows a life annuitant to recover a portion of 
each annuity payment tax-free but only until she recovers her investment in 
the contract—typically, as she reaches her life expectancy; thereafter, each 
annuity payment received is fully taxable. The current rule provides some 
balance, as it typically allows annuitants who die before they recover their 
annuity investment to deduct the unrecovered portion in the year they die. 
Still, if the federal government wants to encourage individuals to buy 
lifetime annuities and deferred income annuities, it could consider allowing 
individuals to keep excluding a portion of each annuity payment from 
income even if they live beyond their life expectancy. After all, it certainly 
seems odd that taxes increase on those who “live too long.”457 Alternatively, 
or, perhaps, in addition to extending the exclusion ratio for more years, the 
federal government might also allow individuals to deduct any unrecovered 
annuity investments even if they die before the annuity starting date. After 
all, it seems strange that only those individuals who live past the annuity 
starting date are allowed to deduct their unrecovered annuity investments; 
and that rule almost certainly discourages the purchase of deferred income 
annuities.458 All in all, the benefits from changing these tax rules to better 
encourage the purchase of lifetime annuities and deferred income annuities 
                                                                                                                 
455 CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 452, at 126. See also Table 2, supra 
(showing the Office of Management and Budget’s slightly different tax expenditure 
estimates: $23 billion in Fiscal Year 2017 and $371 billion over ten years). 
456 The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and 
Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System, 123 (Nov. 2005), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Fix-Tax-
System-2005.pdf. 
457 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
458 See supra notes 172–176 and accompanying text. 
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would probably outweigh the revenue losses that would result from those 
changes.  
The federal government might even provide additional tax benefits 
for individuals who receive income from lifetime annuities and lifetime 
pensions, for example, by completely exempting lifetime income payments 
from income taxation or favoring them with a reduced tax rate.459 In that 
regard, investments always involve choices, and tax rates can influence those 
choices. Under current law, annuity (and pension) income is subject to 
ordinary income tax rates of up to 39.6 percent, but capital gains and 
dividends are typically taxed at just 0, 15, or 20 percent.460 Those preferential 
tax rates for capital gains and dividends can be very attractive, even to 
investors who would prefer the lifetime income that comes from investing in 
annuities (or pensions).461 Accordingly, as long as there are preferential tax 
rates for capital gains and dividends, it might make sense to extend those 
preferential tax rates to the income that comes from lifetime annuities and 
lifetime pensions. Policymakers could, of course, target the benefit towards 
less affluent retirees by limiting the preferential rates to, say, no more than 
$30,000 a year of annuity or pension income per retiree. 
 
C. THE GOVERNMENT COULD MANDATE OR ENCOURAGE 
ANNUITIZATION 
 
Since 2010, the IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor have made a 
concerted effort to promote lifetime income options for retirement plans.462 
For example, in 2012, the Treasury and the IRS released a package of 
proposed regulations and rulings intended to make it easier for pension plans 
to offer partial annuities, longevity annuities, and other lifetime income 
                                                                                                                 
459 See, e.g., Retirement Security Needs Lifetime Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 2748, 
111th Cong. (2009) (a bill introduced by former Representative Earl Pomeroy [D-
N.D.] to encourage guaranteed lifetime income payments by excluding from income 
a portion of such payments); Çebi, supra note 338, at 7; AM. ACAD.  OF ACTUARIES, 
supra note 448, at 8. 
460 See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
461 See, e.g., William J. Bernstein, A Limited Case for Variable Annuities, 
EFFICIENT FRONTIER, http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/701/annuity.htm (last 
visited July 27, 2016) (giving some numerical examples that show how investments 
in variable annuities compare with free-standing stock market investments over 
time). 
462 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SECURITY ADMIN., Lifetime 
Income Options for Participants and Beneficiaries in Retirement Plans (2010), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-1210-AB33.html. 
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choices;463 and in 2014, the IRS promulgated final regulations that ease the 
minimum distribution requirements to allow plan participants to spend up to 
$125,000 on qualified longevity annuity contracts (QLACs).464 This subpart 
discusses a variety of other ways that the government could promote 
annuitization. In that regard, however, policymakers need to bear in mind 
that some policies to mandate or encourage annuitization might have 
undesirable distributional consequences.465  
 
1. The Government Could Mandate Annuitization  
 
One approach would be for the government to mandate that retirees 
use at least a portion of their retirement savings to purchase annuities or 
similar lifetime income guarantees.466 Under this approach, participants in 
tax-favored plans and IRA holders could be required to annuitize at least a 
portion of their tax-favored retirement savings—unless they could show that 
they have adequate lifetime income streams from other sources. 
 
2. The Government Could Require that Pension Plans 
Offer Annuities as an Investment and/or Distribution 
Option 
 
Alternatively, the government might only want to encourage 
annuitization. For example, the government could require plan sponsors to 
include annuities or other lifetime income mechanisms in their investment 
options and/or in their distribution options.467 The government might also 
                                                                                                                 
463 See, e.g., id.; EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, 
SUPPORTING RET. FOR AM. FAMILIES (2012), http://benefitslink.com/articles/ 
CEA_report_2_2_2012.pdf. 
464 See supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text. 
465 See supra Part IV.D. See also Webb, The United States Longevity Insurance 
Market, in SECURING LIFELONG RETIREMENT INCOME: GLOBAL ANNUITY MARKETS 
AND POLICY, supra note 142, at 75–76 (noting that mandating annuitization could 
adversely affect a meaningful number of households). 
466 See, e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 117, at 191–200; Jeffrey R. Brown, 
Automatic Lifetime Income as a Path to Retirement Income Security (unpublished 
manuscript prepared for the American Council of Life Insurers, Aug. 7 2009), 
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/tax-
policy/files/2009/Brown_Automatic%20Lifetime%20Income_With%20Cover.pdf, 
Perun, supra note 327. 
467 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 38–39; 
Jeffrey R. Brown, Understanding the Role of Annuities in Retirement Planning, in 
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encourage pension plans to offer beneficiaries more flexibility, for example, 
by offering partial annuitization options and not just all-or-nothing 
annuitization choices.468 The government might even require plans to default 
participants into annuities or trial annuities, unless participants affirmatively 
elect otherwise.469 
                                                                                                                 
OVERCOMING THE SAVINGS SLUMP 178, 199–200 (Annamaria Lusardi, ed., 2008); 
Kathryn J. Kennedy, How Can Lifetime Income Be Made a Desirable Retirement 
Plan Distribution Option?, 2013 N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 1-
1; AM. ACAD.  OF ACTUARIES, Risky Business: Living Longer Without Income for 
Life: Legislative and Regulatory Issues, supra note 448. at 7; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-433, DOL COULD TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE 
RETIREMENT INCOME OPTIONS FOR PLAN PARTICIPANTS (2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/678924.pdf. 
468 See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 383, at 17 (finding that “most consumers 
prefer partial annuitization of their retirement nest egg over either 0% or 100% 
annuitization”); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,  Modifications to Minimum Present 
Value Requirements for Partial Annuity Distribution Options Under Defined Benefit 
Pension Plans 81 Fed. Reg. 62,359 (Sept. 9, 2016) (recently issued regulations that 
make it easier for defined benefit plans to offer both a partial lump sum and a partial 
annuity).  
469 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 51, at 39–40; 
MACKENZIE, supra note 117, at 200–203; J. Mark Iwry & John A. Turner, Automatic 
Annuitization: New Behavioral Strategies for Expanding Lifetime Income, 
BROOKINGS (Retirement Security Project Paper No. 2009-2, 2009), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/07_annuitization_ 
iwry.pdf (discussing various default strategies); William G. Gale, J. Mark Iwry, 
David C. John & Lina Walker, Increasing Annuitization in 401(k) Plans with 
Automatic Trial Income, BROOKINGS (Retirement Security Project, Paper No. 2008-
2, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_annuities_ 
gale.pdf (recommending defaulting retirees into receiving at least 24 consecutive 
monthly payments from an annuity or similar lifetime income product); Çebi, supra 
note 338, at 7; John J. Kalamarides & Srinivas D. Reddy, The Ease of Automation 
and Guaranteed Lifetime Income,  PRUDENTIAL FIN., INC. 7 (June 2016), 
http://research.prudential.com/documents/rp/RSWP021-Ease-of-Automation.pdf 
(“A majority of plan participants who understand guaranteed lifetime income 
solutions say being defaulted into them leads to better-than-average retirement 
outcomes.”); David Blanchett, Default Participants in Defined Contribution Plans 
into Annuities: Are the Potential Benefits Worth the Costs?, 4(1) J. OF RET. 54 
(2016). Australia is also looking at having its superannuation funds default plan 
participants into a “comprehensive income product for retirement” (CIPR) option. 
See, e.g., Australian Government, The Treasury, Financial System Inquiry Final 
Report 91, 117 (Nov. 2014), http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/12/FSI_Final_ 
Report_Consolidated20141210.pdf. 
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3. The Government Could Sell or Guarantee Annuities 
 
The federal government could even get into the market of selling 
annuities.470 As already mentioned, the Social Security system implicitly 
allows workers to buy actuarially fair lifetime annuities merely by delaying 
retirement beyond age 62,471 but the government might also let individuals 
and couples buy a limited amount of explicit inflation-adjusted lifetime 
annuities—perhaps enough to keep them out of poverty throughout their 
retirement years.472 Alternatively, the federal government could guarantee 
annuities sold by private companies. 
 
4. The Government Could Make It Easier for Plan 
Sponsors to Offer Annuities and Deferred Income 
Annuities 
 
As Parts III.B.2 and III.C.2 above explained, plan sponsors that offer 
annuities have fiduciary responsibilities with respect to the selection and 
monitoring of annuity providers. Plan sponsors can avoid those fiduciary 
duties if they instead only make lump sum distributions and leave it to the 
terminating employees to buy their own annuities directly (in after-tax 
dollars) or, alternatively, indirectly through a rollover IRA (using pre-tax 
dollars).473 The U.S. Department of Labor has a long way to go in 
overcoming plan sponsor concerns about offering in-plan annuities without 
fear of breaching their fiduciary duties.474 In general, it would be good to 
reduce these regulatory barriers.  
                                                                                                                 
470 See, e.g., Forman supra note 161 at 414–417 and sources cited therein; ELLIS 
ET AL. supra note 199, at 119. 
471 See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
472 In 2016, the poverty level for a single individual was $11,880, and the 
poverty level for a married couple was $16,020. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. 
SERVS, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, POVERTY 
GUIDELINES (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines. 
473 See, e.g., supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
474 See, e.g., Utkus, supra note 262 (“Concerns about barriers to in-plan 
annuities have led the Department of Labor to clarify its rules for in-plan annuity 
selection. So far, the rule clarification hasn’t changed employer sentiment.”); 
McGee, supra note 60, at 13; Brown, supra note 403; AM. ACAD.  OF ACTUARIES, 
supra note 448, at 5–6; VOYA, Legislative Update (June 2015), 
https://investments.voya.com/idc/groups/public/documents/retirement/132351.pdf; 
Steve Vernon, Foundations in Research for Regulatory Guidelines on the Design & 
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In particular, it might make sense to let plan sponsors rely on 
insurance regulators and industry standards to oversee and monitor annuity 
providers. That is the way it works in many other countries,475 and it could 
probably work in the United States, as well. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (or 
alternatively, the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Federal Insurance Office) 
could post a list of approved annuities and annuity providers that plan 
sponsors could use.476 Alternatively, the U.S. Department of Labor could at 
least host a website that would serve as a clearing house of information about 
annuity providers and annuity products.477 
Also, better guidance on the process of selecting qualifying 
longevity annuity contracts (QLACs) and other deferred income annuities 
would increase their utilization.478 For that matter, it could make sense for 
the government to “jump-start” the market for deferred income annuities by 
offering them in the federal government’s Thrift Savings defined 
contribution plan.479 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
Operation of Retirement Income Solutions in DC Plans, STANFORD CTR. ON 
LONGEVITY (Sept. 2014), http://longevity3.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/09/Foundations-for-Regulatory-Guidelines-2014-Final-.pdf. 
475 See supra notes 380-381 and accompanying text; Robert J. Toth, Jr. & Evan 
Giller, Regulatory Recommendations for the Department of Labor to Facilitate 
Lifetime Income, 3(4) J. OF RET. 28, 29–31 (2016), http://www.iijournals.com/ 
doi/pdfplus/10.3905/jor.2016.3.4.028. 
476 Insurers interested in having their annuity products on the “qualified” list 
could be required to formally apply for listing and meet certain solvency and 
consumer-protection standards. See also Abraham & Harris, supra note 153, at 22 
(suggesting that the government find a way to “certify financial products—including 
longevity annuities—that meet established standards for reliability, cost, and 
quality”). 
477 Toth & Giller, supra note 475, at 29–31. 
478 Ed McCarthy, Are Retirement Plan Sponsors Too Afraid of Longevity 
Annuities?, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Feb. 10, 2016) http://wealthmanagement. 
com/retirement-planning/are-retirement-plan-sponsors-too-afraid-longevity-
annuities. 
479 Abraham & Harris, supra note 153, at 22. 
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5. The Government Could Promote Education about 
Lifetime Income Options 
 
The government could promote lifetime income options both 
through its own educational efforts and also by making it easier for plan 
sponsors to provide financial education and retirement planning advice. 
 
a. Government Efforts 
 
At the very least, the government could promote better financial 
education about annuities and other lifetime income options.480 In that 
regard, one way to encourage retirees to choose annuities and other forms of 
lifetime income is to promote financial education that frames the retirement 
decision in terms of lifetime consumption rather than in investment-oriented 
language that simply encourages individuals to accumulate large lump 
sums.481 
Information about replacement rates would help workers better 
understand how to convert their account balances into lifetime income 
streams.482 The U.S. Government Accountability Office recommends that 
the U.S. Department of Labor retirement planning tools should build in more 
flexibility so that users can better understand how account balances translate 
into replacement rates that meet their personal needs.483 The U.S. 
Department of Labor already hosts a Lifetime Income Calculator that can be 
used to estimate monthly pension benefits for a typical retiree.484 For 
                                                                                                                 
480 Çebi, supra note 338, at 7. 
481 Robert Gazzale, Sandy Mackenzie & Lina Walker, Do Default and Longevity 
Annuities Improve Annuity Take-Up Rates? Results from an Experiment, AARP 
PUB. POL’Y INST. (Research Report No. 2012-11, Oct. 2012), https://www.tiaa-
crefinstitute.org/public/pdf/institute/events/pdfs/Do%20Default%20Longevity%20
Annuities%20Improve%20TakeUp%20Rates.pdf; Beshears et al., supra note 383, 
at 12–13, 13–14; Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan & 
Marian V. Wrobel, Why Don’t People Insure Late-Life Consumption? A Framing 
Explanation of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle, 98(2) AM. ECON. REV. 304 (2008); 
Brown, supra note 403. 
482 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-242, RETIREMENT 
SECURITY: BETTER INFORMATION ON INCOME REPLACEMENT RATES NEEDED TO 
HELP WORKERS PLAN FOR RETIREMENT, supra note 382. 
483 Id. at 38. 
484 Lifetime Income Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/lifetimeincomecalculator.html (last visited 
July 22, 2016): The calculator uses the safe harbor assumptions described in the 
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example, for a 65-year-old participant retiring on July 22, 2016 with a current 
account balance of $100,000, the calculator projects that she can expect to 
receive $486 a month for the rest of her life ($5832 per year = 12 × $486 per 
month).485 According to the Advanced Annuity Calculator at 
Immediateannuities.com, a 65-year-old man buying a $100,000 lifetime 
annuity on July 22, 2016 would receive $531 per month for the rest of his 
life ($6372 per year = 12 × $531 per month), while a 65-year-old woman 
would receive $498 per month for the rest of her life ($5976 per year = 12 × 
$498 per month).486 
                                                                                                                 
ANPRM [Advance notice of proposed rulemaking] for estimating future 
contributions, investment earnings, and inflation: 
 Contributions continue to Retirement Age at the Current Annual 
Contribution amount increased by 3 percent per year. 
 Investment returns are 7 percent per year (nominal). 
 An inflation rate of 3 percent per year is used for discounting the 
projected account balance to today’s dollars. 
In converting the account balances into lifetime income streams, the calculator 
uses the safe harbor annuity conversion assumptions described in the ANPRM: 
 A rate of interest equal to the 10-year constant maturity Treasury 
securities rate for the first business day of the last month of the 
period to which the statement relates (equal to 1.63% as of 
December 3, 2012 for statement periods ending December 31, 
2012). 
 The applicable mortality table under section 417(e)(3)(B) of the 
Internal Revenue Code in effect on the first day of the last month of 
the period to which the statement relates. This is a unisex table (i.e., 
the annuity values are the same for males and females). 
 No insurance company load for expenses, profit, reserves, etc. 
485 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN, supra note 484, click on 
“Go to the Calculator”; enter Retirement Age: 65; Current Account Balance: 
$100,000; Current Annual Contribution: $0; Years to Retirement: 0; Statement Date: 
enter today’s date; and click on “Calculate,” and get Lifetime Income/Month for 
Participant With No Survivor Benefit: $486). The results also show the $439 per 
month that the participant (and spouse) would receive under a joint and survivor 
annuity (and the $220 [50 percent] that would be paid to the surviving spouse), 
assuming that the participant and the spouse are the same age. Id 
486 Advanced Annuity Calculator, IMMEDIATEANNUITIES https://www. 
immediateannuities.com/annuity-calculators/ (last visited July 22, 2016) (Male: 
enter My Age Today: 65; My Gender: Male; State of Residence: DC; Income Start 
Date: Immediately; $ Investment: $100,000; click on “Calculate,” and get Estimated 
Monthly Income: $582; Female: enter My Age Today: 65; My Gender: Female; 
State of Residence: DC; Income Start Date: Immediately; $ Investment: $100,000; 
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In addition to the Lifetime Income Calculator, the U.S. Department 
of Labor could provide (or endorse) more extensive calculators that could be 
used by participants to evaluate the choice between lifetime pension benefits 
and lump sum distributions. Both present-value-of-an-annuity and principal-
sum-to-annuity calculators could be hosted. Ideally, these calculators would 
allow participants to use a variety of assumptions about life expectancy and 
rates of return, rather than just the fixed assumptions in the current Lifetime 
Income Calculator.487  
The U.S. Department of Labor could also design (or endorse) an 
individualized Life Expectancy Calculator to help participants get a better 
idea how long they and their spouses can expect to live. To calculate life 
expectancy, these individualized calculators typically ask about an 
individual’s age, education, work, smoking habits, exercise regime, and 
family health.488 At the very least, the U.S. Department of Labor could link 
to the very simple life expectancy calculator that the Social Security 
Administration hosts on its website.489 The U.S. Department of Labor could 
also prominently display or link to individual and joint life expectancy 
tables.490 In addition to providing life expectancy tables for the average 
                                                                                                                 
click on “Calculate,” and get Estimated Monthly Income: $531). The Advanced 
Annuity Calculator can also be used to find payments for couples. For example, 
when a 65-year-old male is coupled with a 65-year-old female, the results show that 
the 65-year-old couple would get a joint life annuity providing Estimated Monthly 
Income of $444 per month ($5328 per year = 12 × $444 per month). See also Should 
I Buy an Income Annuity?, CANNEX.COM, http://www.cannex.com/ 
public/antcvp01.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2017); What is My Return with an Income 
Annuity? (IRR), CANNEX.COM, https://www.cannex.com/usa/english/tool_ 
irr_public.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2017). 
487See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN supra note 484. 
488 See, e.g., Dean P. Foster, Choong Tze Chua & Lyle H. Ungar, How Long 
Will you Live?, WHARTON.UPENN.EDU, http://gosset.wharton.upenn.edu/~foster/ 
mortality/ (last visited July 22, 2016) (click on “Our longer version of the life 
calculator”). 
489 Retirement & Survivors Benefits: Life Expectancy Calculator, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/planners/benefitcalculators.html (last visited July 22, 
2016). 
490 See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN, supra note 132; Elizabeth Arias, United States 
Life Tables, 2011, 64(11) NAT’L VITAL STATS. REP. 1, 9 tbl.1 (2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_11.pdf; CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL, Life Tables, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/life_tables.htm (last 
updated Dec. 8, 2015); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., General Rule for Pensions and 
Annuities 26 tbl.V (Ordinary Life Annuities, One Life), 27–42 tbl.VI (Ordinary Joint 
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population, it could make sense to provide life tables for individuals who are 
healthier than the average population.491 
 
b. Plan Sponsors 
 
Plan sponsors are not required to provide retirement planning advice, 
and concerns about fiduciary liability often keep them from doing so.492 Even 
when employers provide financial education and retirement planning advice, 
they may not spend much effort explaining annuities and other lifetime 
income options.493 The costs of providing such retirement planning advice 
may also be a problem, particularly for smaller employees. Somehow, the 
government could make it easier for plan sponsors to provide such financial 
education and retirement planning advice. In that regard, the U.S. 
Department of Labor is already considering changes that would require that 
the periodic benefit statements provided to defined contribution plan 
participants about their account balances also show how those account 
balances would be expressed as estimated streams of payments.494 
 
                                                                                                                 
Life and Last Survivor Annuities, Two Lives) (Publication No. 939, 2013), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p939.pdf; Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 tbls.V & VI 
491 See supra note 176. 
492 See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 2; see also 
Transamerica Center for Retirement Studies, The Current State of Retirement: A 
Compendium of Findings About American Retirees 48 (Apr. 2016), 
https://www.transamericacenter.org/docs/default-source/retirees-
survey/tcrs2016_sr_retiree_compendium.pdf (survey showing that more than 60 
percent of most recent employers did little or nothing to help pre-retirees transition 
into retirement). 
493 For example, a recent survey of 406 large employers found that just 26.8% 
of those who offered financial/retirement education said they discussed annuities 
with their employees and plan participants. INT’L FOUND. OF EMP. BENEFIT PLANS, 
Financial Education for Today’s Workforce: 2016 Survey Results 20 ex.17 (2016), 
https://www.ifebp.org/pdf/financial-education-2016-survey-results.pdf. 
494 U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., Fact Sheet: Lifetime 
Income Illustration (May 7, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsanprm.pdf; 
Pension Benefits Statements, 78 Fed. Reg. 26,727 (May 8, 2013) (to be codified at 
29 C.F.R. pt. 2520), http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/PdfDisplay.aspx?Doc 
Id=26998 (Advance notice of proposed rulemaking issued under ERISA § 105, 29 
U.S.C. § 1025 (2006)). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 374, 
at 21–23. 
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D. IMPROVE ANNUITY REGULATION AND MARKETS 
 
1. Strengthen the Regulation of Annuities 
 
As already explained in Part III.A above, annuities are generally 
regulated under state insurance laws, and all states have state-based guaranty 
funds that provide at least $100,000 of protection for each annuitant in case 
the insurance company that sold the policy becomes insolvent. 
Unfortunately, the current state-by-state insurance regulatory system is 
antiquated, costly, and inefficient.495 One way to cut down on regulatory 
costs might be to allow insurance companies to avoid costly state-by-state 
regulation by instead electing an optional federal charter.496 Another 
approach would be to make the state-based guaranty funds that backstop 
annuities stronger. A more uniform standard, or even a federal guaranty fund, 
would be preferable to the current system.497 All in all, these kinds of 
improvements in annuity markets would make annuities more attractive to 
plan sponsors and to individual purchasers.498 
 
2. Allow Annuity Providers to Advertise Their State 
Guarantees 
 
A related problem with retail annuities in the United States is that 
state laws generally prevent insurance companies from mentioning their 
state-based guarantees in their sales material.499 That, too, could be changed. 
The no-advertising rule seems to be designed to limit the moral hazard 
among insurance companies that might occur if insurance companies took 
greater investment risks because they could rely on the state-based insurance 
guarantees.500 While we should be concerned about the solvency of insurance 
companies, allowing insurance companies to advertise their state-based 
                                                                                                                 
495 See, e.g., Pamela Perun, Putting Annuities Back into Savings Plans, in EMP. 
PENSIONS: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND POSSIBILITIES 143, 157 (Teresa Ghilarducci & 
Christian E. Weller, eds., 2007), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/ 
content/images/PerunPuttingAnnuities%20BackintoSavingsPlans.pdf. 
496 Id. at 156–159 (citing numerous insurance industry association proposals). 
497 Id. at 157–159. 
498 Id. at 158 and sources cited in 158 n15. 
499AM. ACAD.  OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 5; Abraham & Harris, supra 
note 153, at 20 (also noting that Alabama and Michigan are two states that do not 
have a no-advertising rule). 
500 AM. ACAD.  OF ACTUARIES, supra note 448, at 5. 
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guarantees would increase consumer confidence in annuities and so 
encourage more individuals to buy them.501 Moreover, competitive pricing 
of annuities would also improve, as consumers would feel less need to pay 
higher premiums to buy annuities from insurance companies with higher 
financial rankings.502 In short, purchasers would get better prices for their 
annuities. In that regard, while the Annuity Shopper reports that the average 
monthly benefit for a $100,000 immediate fixed annuity for a 65-year-old 
man in December 1, 2015 for a 65-year-old man was $545 per month ($6540 
per year),503 policy quotes from the individual companies cited there ranged 
from $528 per month to $560 per month.504 Simple single-life annuities such 
as the one for a 65-year-old male are probably the most competitive annuity 
product offered by insurance companies, but there is even more price 
variation on some of the more complicated annuity products reported on in 
a typical issue of the Annuity Shopper, and, no doubt, we would see even 
more price variation if we also reviewed the annuity prices charged by those 
insurance companies that are not included in the Annuity Shopper surveys. 
As all similar annuities come with the same state-based guarantee, we should 
be concerned anytime a purchaser has to pay much more than it would cost 
to cover the cost of an actuarial fair annuity plus a small premium to cover 
an insurance company’s risks and profits. 
 
3. Broaden the Range of Permissible Lifetime Income 
Products 
 
In addition to promoting annuities, it could make sense to broaden 
the range of permissible lifetime income products. One approach is to 
develop more products that pool risk among participants, as opposed to 
products that necessitate high premiums to compensate insurance companies 
for their guarantees and profits. In that regard, for example, TIAA’s College 
Retirement Equities Fund (CREF) has been offering low-cost variable 
annuities that pool risk among participants for years.505 Participants choose 
                                                                                                                 
501 See, e.g., Beshears et al., supra note 383, at 14. 
502 See, e.g., MOSHE MILEVSKY, LIFE ANNUITIES: AN OPTIMAL PRODUCT FOR 
RETIREMENT INCOME 27–30 (The Research Foundation of CFA Institute, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2571379 (discussing the relationship between annuity 
pricing and insurance company credit rating). 
503 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
504 Id. 
505 Poterba & Warshawsky, supra note 350, at 191–198 (discussing the history 
and development of individual annuities offered by TIAA); Forman & Sabin, supra 
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from various funds to invest in; and later on, they choose from among a 
variety of distribution options, including one-life and two-life annuities.506 
When a retiree selects a lifetime annuity, the annuity payments depend on 
both the investment experience of the chosen accounts and the mortality 
experience of the other participants, but the way these annuities are designed, 
the mortality risk falls on the annuitants and is not guaranteed by TIAA.507 
There are many other ideas for lifetime income products that could 
share longevity risk among participants.508 For example, so-called “defined-
                                                                                                                 
note 126, at 798; Roman L. Weil & Lawrence Fisher, TIAA/CREF: Who Gets What? 
An Analysis of Wealth Transfers in a Variable Annuity, 47(1) J. OF BUS. 67 (1974), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2352084.pdf. See, e.g., TIAA GLOBAL ASSET 
MANAGEMENT, supra note 354. 
506 Forman & Sabin, supra note 126, at 798 
507 Id. 
508 See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Actuarial Fairness and Solidarity in Pooled 
Annuity Funds, 45(1) ASTIN BULL. 49 (2015); Catherine Donnelly, Montserrat 
Guillén & Jens Perch Nielsen, Bringing cost transparency to the life annuity market, 
56(1) INS.: MATHEMATICS AND ECON. 14 (May 2014); Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. 
Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla & Vasily Kartashov, Lifecycle Portfolio Choice with 
Stochastic and Systematic Longevity Risk, and Variable Investment-Linked Deferred 
Annuities, 80(3) J. OF RISK AND INS. 649 (2013), http://online library.wiley.com/ 
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ambition plans”—like those in operation in the Netherlands—offer a way to 
share risk among plan participants.509 Also, elsewhere, the author has 
suggested we could pool risk among participants with so-called “tontine 
annuities”510 and “tontine pensions.”511 So-called “variable annuity pension 
plans” are another product that could help promote retirement income 
security.512 Another idea would be to modify ERISA to permit employers to 
offer longevity plans—supplemental defined benefit plans where 
participation begins at age 45 or later and benefits commence at age 75 or 
later.513  
 
E. OTHER IDEAS 
 
At some point the government also needs to solve the underfunding 
problems of both Social Security and the PBGC.514 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Pensions, annuities, and similar lifetime income products provide 
the best way to protect against longevity risk. Over the years, the 
responsibility for creating such secure retirement income streams has shifted 
from employers to individuals. This Article showed how changes in the U.S. 
laws and regulations governing pensions and annuities could help promote 
secure, lifetime income policies. More specifically, this Article showed how 
the laws governing annuities could be changed to make voluntary 
annuitization more attractive and how the laws regulating pensions could be 
changed to incentivize pension plan sponsors to offer more annuity options 
and to encourage employees to elect those options. 
  
